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This thesis examines trade and technology transfer between the Soviet Union and
Japan, The paper discusses the subject from the perspective of both Japan and the
USSR and considers the impact of the United States' and other nations' influence on
their bilateral relationship. The thesis delineates the affect of political, militar>', and
socio-psychological factors on the economic foundation of the issue. The USSR and
Japan are strongly complementary in purely economic terms, but trade is particularly
hindered by political and strategic considerations. Both nations claim rightful
own^rsh-p of the "Northern Territories"--a small group of islands between Japan's
Hokkaido and the USSR's Kurile Islands. Japan's government will not promote trade
until the islands are returned; the USSR will not give up the islands, which are a part
of its strategic nuclear bastion plan. Nonetheless, Japan's private business sector will
push for as much trade as possible with the USSR, separating economics from politics.
The USSR will promote trade with Japan whenever it can achieve a significant
advantage toward modernization and revitalization of the Soviet economy.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY
The Soviet Union has shown evidence of a major economic revitalization
initiative since Mikhail Gorbachev became General Secretary of the Politburo in 1985.
Although the need for action was undoubtedly evident and under discussion prior to
his accession to the post, the Western democratic world has identified the ensuing
reforms with Gorbachev.
Western analysts, in the past, have gloated and taken great satisfaction ui the
stagnating condition of the Soviet centrally-planned economy. The current wave of
reforms have shaken up both the domestic status quo of the USSR and smug analysts
around the globe. No earth-shaking advances have yet been noted in the Soviet
economy, but the Kremlin's emphasis on root problems rather than symptoms suggests
that the USSR may actually cure its economic illness. Demonstrated Soviet economic
success, instead of mere talk, would have tremendous impact on the attractiveness of
Soviet socialism worldwide.
Of all the world's developed nations, Japan has demonstrated the most consistent
record of economic success recently. Japan has amazed the world by its creativity, its
ability to promote productivity, its efficiency, and by the quality of its products.
Japanese researchers and developers have put Japan in the forefront of biotechnology,
electronics, automation, and artificial intelligence. If the USSR were able to enlist the
assistance of Japan in modernizing its facilities and developing the conditions for
increased productivity, the world could witness a phenomenal leap in the status of the
USSR's economy.
The implications for the United States are fairly obvious. The United States is
beginning to reorganize its economic mentality as well, to recover from a complacency-
driven decline in its own competitiveness. U.S. global defense expenditures, already
very high, could require exponential expansion if the Soviet Union successfully
acquired and integrated Japanese products and know-how...and applied them to its
military.
What are the chances that Japan will readily share its expertise with the USSR?
The basic supposition of this paper is that Japan will become increasingly involved in
trade \\^ith the USSR, marketing its products, production techniques, and managerial
methods.
Japanese-Soviet trade will necessarily be limited by the security Issues of
opposing blocs-socialism and capitalism. This paper will examine the positive and
negative affects of political, military, and psycho-social influences on the potential for
increased bilateral economic ties. Seemingly complementary economic factors
sometimes become inconsequential when considered in light of these related aspects.
As the United States is the ultimate guarantor of Japan's security, American
relations with Japan have direct implications for the issue. Examination of the
economic, political, and security issues involving the United States' affect on Soviet-
Japanese relations will provide a more distinct global focus on the question.
Each chapter \^ill examine the inter-relationship of the Soviet-Japanese bilateral
issues and international inputs to the situation. Historical indicators will be examined
in the context of their significance to current developments.
I use scientific knowledge as much as possible in exploring the parameters of
Soviet-Japanese trade. Inevitably, in questions involving political science, one is
required to make assumptions and judgements based on trends. This examination of
the subject will use scientific process to establish rational assumptions where facts are
unavailable or inappropriate.
When available, empirical evidence such as official statistics and documents are
discussed, rather than analyses or compilations by other writers. Although I attempt
to maintain a non-normative approach to the subject, expression of my own
evaluations are clearly evident in the paper. Again, the normative nature of political
issues requires an individual to make assumptions and to draw conclusions.
Because of the individualistic character of assumptions, the study's evidence may
provide another researcher with a different conclusion. The "weight" of importance
given to various aspects of the question determines the researcher's final judgement.
Although the evidence of specific portions of the study may be transmissible, the
overall complexity of the cumulative parts suggests that a different ultimate conclusion
is possible.
However, having stated the above caveat, I believe that my conclusion is correct.
The supporting evidence is clear. Empirical generalizations will be used to tie the
various aspects of the study together. Case studies are used to demonstrate how the
chapter topics interact in "snapshot" situations.
The combination of scientific evidence and logical assumptions explains the
reasons for historical events. This method of examination allows reasonable
delineation of trends. Recognition of trends makes prediction possible.
In this study of Japanese-Soviet relations, the weight of the various aspects
differs for each nation in recognizing its internal balance for improved trade potential.
Considering the volatile possibilities of the current Soviet economic reforms, many of
the Soviet assumptions could change, literally overnight. The secretive nature of the
Politburo, and rumors of dissatisfaction with the new Soviet direction, could culminate
in a Khrushchev-type ouster of Gorbachev. A change in the power composition of the
Politburo could radically alter on-going plans and projects.
In that sense, this study is truly provisional. Otherwise, disclosure of new details
should not significantly alter the fundamental proposition and conclusion of this
research.
B. OVERVIEW
The USSR and Japan appear to be almost perfectly suited for trade. The USSR
has lots of raw materials and natural resources which Japan needs. Japan is a world
leader in high-technology applications, in industrial modernization, and in iimovative
and efficient managerial techniques-all of which the USSR's economy needs. They are
also neighbors geographically. But, there are several factors which prohibit free
exchange between these two potentially complementary nations.
• Economics. The USSR has a shortage of convertible hard-currency with which
to buy Western goods. Consequently, the USSR likes "barter" arrangements,
whereas Japan prefers cash. The USSR usually demands subsidized credit for
trade, while Japan uses its Export-Import Bank to maintain control of its
private businessmen. The Soviet Union's centrally-planned economy has a
strong foundation in governmental control, which inhibits the diffusion of new
ideas and modem equipment throughout the system. The current Soviet
economic "reforms" are new, and consequently unstable-heavy investment in
the Soviet economy is risky at present.
• Technology Transfer. Japan is a member of the Coordinating Committee for
Export Controls (CoCom). This Western group attempts to control Soviet
access to militarily significant technologies and equipment by determining a list
of items which are restricted from export to the West's adversary-the Soviet
Union. The USSR attempts to acquire its perceived requirements, regardless of
the CoCom restrictions.
• Politics. Japan limits its imports of Soviet resources and raw materials because
of the political implications of economic vulnerability to an adversary. The
USSR and Japan have never concluded a peace treaty following WW II. Japan
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refuses to consider a peace treaty until the USSR returns a group of islands
northwest of Hokkaido which Japan considers to be rightfully its territory.,
(The disputed islands are referred to as the Northern Territories. See Fiaure-.
1.1)
• Militan.'. The USSR considers the "Northern Territories" as its territory-. The
islands play an important role in the Soviets' Far East military strategy. The
Soviet Union continually denounces Japan's domestic "remilitarization" and its
"subjection" to the United States. Japan's security against potential Soviet
aggression is guaranteed by its close cooperation within the United States'
global militar\- strategy.
• Socio-Psychological. Russian historical culture is not conducive to promotion
of trade with actors outside its sphere of influence. Japan's past experience has
shown the USSR to be stubborn and unpredictable. Diversity of the Japanese
and Russian cultures implies that significant modification is necessary to apply
culturally-based, successful Japanese managerial techniques to the workers of
the USSR. Soviets, from workers through ehtes, are resistant to change.
Mutual confidence is necessary for a successful partnership. Japan cannot be
confident that the USSR will continue its present course of detente. Soviet ideology
still envisions the "ultimate victory of sociaUsm". The CPSU's (Communist Party of
the Soviet Union) policy is oriented toward that goal. Clausewitz's statement that "war
is a continuation of politics", and Lenin's addition, "by violent means", provides the
foundation for the Soviet drive toward the victory of one or the other of the opposing
socio-political systems. In 1979, Marshal Ogarkov reiterated that military strategy is
subordinate to politics.^
The Soviets perceive the "war" as ongoing, even when active military action is
not apparent. The war against Capitalism includes the economic and political arenas.
The CPSU is using its political peace initiatives to diminish the mihtary buildup of
democratic Western nations. Its success in politics allows the USSR to concentrate on
the repair of its economy. Relaxed military and political pressure will enable the USSR
to afford and have access to the equipment desired for modernization.
In the case to be examined-the USSR and Japan-dominance in the relationship
shifts from one nation to the other in accordance with the perceived world political
situation. The USSR is a mihtary superpower; Japan is an economic giant. Since the
Soviet Union has undertaken a peace offensive, Japan has gained relatively greater
perceived power in the relationship. However, whenever the USSR reverts to its
capabihties as a mihtary superpower, Japan is left to rely primarily on the support of
^Harriet Fast Scott and Wilham F. Scott, The Armed Forces of the USSR, 3d ed.
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1984) pp. 87-88.
Figure 1.1 USSR-Japan Map.
the militar>' power of the United States. Therefore, Japan's maintenance of Western
alliances and friendships is crucial to its long-term prospects as a democratic society.
The question of trade and technolog\' transfer revolves around a number of
related considerations. Broadly speaking, the USSR would benefit by access to high-
quality goods and equipment as well as high-technology manufacturing know-how
from Japan. The Soviets claim that they are actually self-sufficient but will deal with
foreign capitalists for convenience sake. Japan is driven toward trade with the Soviet
Union for three basic reasons:
1. The Soviets have abundant natural resources, including energy sources, which
the Japanese need.
2. The USSR has a potentially large market for Japanese manufactured goods.
3. The Soviet Union could become politically and militarily troublesome if bilateral
Soviet-Japanese relations were poor.
These concerns \^-ill be examined in greater detail below. The discussion uill examine
economic, political, military, and socio-psychological aspects of the situation.
Definitions of key concepts are important for clarity of the following discussion.
"Trade" is normally understood as the sale or barter of goods or services between
nations. Defmitions pertinent to the high-technolog\' question are simple, but must be
clarified.' "Science" is the pursuit of knowledge. "Research" generally applies the
pursuit of knowledge to a specific area of interest. Once an idea has been defined in
research, the idea must be developed. "Technology" is the know-how required to
translate research knowledge into products. Generally, the transfer of a high-
technology product satisfies only a short-term need, whereas the transfer of the actual
technology enables the receiving nation to produce the high-technology products itself
^J. Fred Bucy, "Technology Transfer and East-West Trade: A Reappraisal,"
International Security, Winter 1980-81, pp. 134-135.
II. ECONOMICS
The trade and technology transfer question would be relatively simple if only
economics were involved. The USSR has abundant natural resources available in
relative proximity to Japan. Japan needs the resources. Japan is an acknowledged
giant in the fields of automation, electronics, and productivity. The Soviet economy
needs the stimulus which these Japanese strengths could provide. Simple supply-and-
demand considerations suggest strong trade and technology transfer possibilities
between the two actors.
A. LIMITING FACTORS OF JAPAN-USSR TRADE
1. Japanese Commercial Policy
As will be illustrated throughout this investigation, Japan's commercial policy
is an enigmatic concoction of emotional and rational inputs. Emotionally, the
Japanese tend to shy away from dealing with the Soviets. For the Japanese, historical
Russian imperialism has evolved into an unpredictable, fearsome, threatening Soviet
Union. Rationally, the USSR offers potentially abundant natural resources as well as
a vast export market. The USSR's marketing potential suggests a means for continued
Japanese export and economic growth, and implies reduced tensions through economic
detente.
2. Soviet Commercial Policy
The Soviet Union is displaying a new face to the world. General Secretary
Gorbachev has come into the world spotlight as the Soviet leader who can bring
security to the globe. Gorbachev's primary goal in all the excitement surrounding
openness (glasnost), restructuring (perestroika), and democratization is to make the
Soviet economy well.
Amidst extensive rhetoric and a few tangible domestic changes, Soviet
commercial policy toward foreign trade has changed relatively little. The Soviet
economic infrastructure and central-planning network need modernization, and
productivity needs stimulation. The Kremlin will balance its plan for economic revival
between attainable requirements from within its empire and low-risk opportunities with
the capitalist West.
B. ECONOMIC GROWTH STATUS
1. Japan
A combination of strengths and vulnerabiliLies makes Japan a neighbor on which the
USSR can capitalize, if appropriate diplomacy is utilized. It is the world's leader in
many areas of technological progress, specifically, in semiconductors (the key to
modem electronics and computers)-^ and robotics.'* According to the CMEA's
"Comprehensive Program of Scientific and Technological Progress Up to the Year
2000" (December 1985), these are the first two of the five pillars for the transformation
of the national economies of the socialist bloc.^
The world is enthralled with Japan's economic success. Japan has the free
world's second largest GNP and the world's highest average annual rate of growth in
real GNP.^ Although it is economically powerful, Japan must import most of the
minerals, metals, energy, and food which it consumes and utilizes.^ Its vulnerability is
sometimes overlooked due to the size of its trade surplus. However, a closer look at
Japan's condition since 1981 illustrates its dependence on foodstuffs, raw materials, and
fuels from outside sources (see Table 1).^
Japan's dependence on fuels has decreased considerably, but its reliance on food and
raw materials has increased. Recent statistics clarify the extent of Japan's reliance on
external sources of raw materials. In 1985, Japan imported over 95% of all the iron
ore, copper, nickel, bauxite, manganese, chromium, tin, and cobalt which it consumed.^
Imponing adequate provisions of foodstuffs appears to be another likely continuing
trend in Japan's vulnerability' to external pressures.
Further examination of the decreasing trend in "fuels" dependency reveals that
Japan is nonetheless highly dependent on energy imports as well (see Table 2)}^
^Christian Science Monitor, 2 February 1987, p. 13.
"^Col. Charles J. Garvey and Dr. James Richardson, "Robotics Finds Applications
in Ground Warfare," Military Electronics/ Countermeasures, March 1983, pp. 85-86.
^Takayama Satoshi, "The Soviet Union Smiles at Japan," Japan Quarterly, April-
June 1986, pp. 133-134; Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) {USSR, Daily
Report), 19 December 1985, pp. BB7-BB18.
^Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Handbook of Economic Statistics, 1986,
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986), pp. 2, 4.
"^Ibid., pp. 17, 130, 131.
^Ibid., p. 90.
^Ibid., p. 17.
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Total 63.2 362.1 300.9
Since 1970, Japan has shown a positive trend in energy production only in energy
sources of hydro/nuclear power.^^ In 1985, 86% of Japan's energy consumption was
from non-hydro/nuclear sources. Of that amount, 96.5% was imported.
The principles of trade dictate that Japan must provide payment for these vital
imports while offering incentives for the suppliers to continue providing these
necessities. Japan's future, therefore, rests on the desirability and affordability of its
export products to foreign markets. However, its reliance on trade with the socialist
bloc is tempered by the risks inherent in providing the Communists with the potential
for manipulation by economic leverage. Unfortunately for the USSR, Japan currently
Trade, and Consumption Patterns in the Pacific Basin," Economics and Pacific Security.
The 1986 Symposium, (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1987), p.
165.
^^CIA, Handbook of Economic Statistics, 1986, p. 132.
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does not need Soviet resources as badly as it did in the mid-1970's. The Japanese have
been careful to limit their dependence on Soviet inputs into their economy. ^^
Although from 1980-1985 Japan's exports to Communist countries grew from
S9.5 billion to SI 6.6 billion while its imports from Communist countries only grew from
S6.9 billion to S8.6 billion,^ ^ Japan's overall reliance on trade with the USSR remains
very low. In 1984 Japan imported only 1% of its total imports from the Soviet Union,
and exported only 1.5% of its total exports to the USSR.^'^ In 1985, the USSR's hard-
currency trade deficit with Japan grew to S1.63 billion from 51.49 billion in 1984.^^
Obviously, the potential for Japan to turn to the USSR for raw materials,
energy sources, and foodstuffs (in. exchange for goods, services, and technology) is very
real. It is also evident that although Japan has managed to fmd alternative sources, its
economic gro\^lh limitations, as a result of current disagreements with other Western
nations, could cause Japan to place greater confidence in the USSR. Should a scenario
develop whereby Japan would be forced to choose between slowed economic growth
and increased dependence/cooperation with the USSR, availability of Soviet resources
could provide the Russians with beneficial economic and political leverage. The desire
for continued high levels of economic growth may drive Japan toward greater
willingness to trade security risks for economic advantage.
2. USSR
The Soviet government economy is not well. Since 1966 the Five Year Plans
(FVT) have failed to meet their goals (see Table 3).^^
The leadership of the CPSU realizes that it must make some serious changes to make
the economy effective. In 1986 the Party established its "Long Term Plan to the Year
2000". In order to meet its goals, the USSR plans to increase its growth rate in the
1986-1990 (Twelfth) Five Year Plan to between 3.54 - 4.06% during this "period of
adjustment". ^^ In this timeframe, as part of the economic goal, the central planners
envision significant accomplishments:
^'^Peter Berton, "Soviet-Japanese Relations: Perceptions, Goals, Interactions,"
Asian Survey, December 1986, p. 1282.




^^Takayama Satoshi, "The Soviet Union Smiles at Japan," Japan Quarterly,
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• labor productivity should increase 2.3 to 2.5 times;
• consumption of materials per unit of production should be reduced by 4 to 5
percent;
• energy consumption per unit of production should be reduced by 7 to 9 percent.
After 1991, the projected growth rate will jump to 5.5% -as soon as the economic
changes of the 12th FYP have been solidified.
To achieve its ultimate economic goal of surpassing the West, the USSR must
first catch up to it. Attempts to untangle organizational bottle-necks, to modernize
equipment and managerial methods, and to improve the standard of living were
initiated as early as the late 1960's under Brezhnev. ^^ Although the desire for change
existed, the CPSU leadership was unwilling to risk the shake-ups required to energize
significant changes. The current reform movement is driven by the necessity to
stimulate economic growth.
Since the end of WWII, the Soviet leadership has traditionally emphasized
"extensive" development as its economic strategy (See Table 4).^^
From the table one can readily see that the growth rate of labor productivity has been
declining faster than the GNP's rate of decline for two decades. The slight
improvement in "Industrial Total Factor Productivity", from capital investments
^^Frederick C. Barghoorn and Thomas F. Remington, Politics in the USSR, 3d
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between 1960-75, reached the level of diminishing returns in 1970-75. Declining growth
rates followed, across the board, in the period 1975-80.
The leaders must diffuse any detected discontent to prevent strikes or
decreased producti\ity. The centralized plans are already stretched in the goals which
they expect to achieve. Decreased productivity would further disrupt the plaiming
cycle.
Measures must be instituted, then, to stimulate productivity. The centrally-
planned system of allocation is able to distribute available land and capital equipment
with relative ease. However, apportioning and energizing labor resources as desired,
and compensating for manpower shortages will require a new set of incentives-the old
ones have proven unsuccessful.^^ Requiring a longer work-week would be
counterproductive. The Soviet workers value their free time highly-greater production
would not be achieved by increasing the 41 -hour work-week.
The new "plan" being proposed aims to halt the deterioration of productivity,
and ultimately to see positive growth in this vital area. The plan revolves around four
basic principles:
1. to promote better work discipline;
2. to increase job satisfaction;
3. to reduce worker absence due to alcohol consumption;
4. to increase incentives to be productive.
"Ibid., pp. 405-419.
In the first nine months of 1986 factory productivity actually exceeded targets set by
the central planning process.-^ The 1986 increase in productivity is attributed to the
success of General Secretary Gorbachev's drive for efficiency.'^
The new leadership, under Secretary Gorbachev, is aware that one effective
incentive may be increased output in the consumer sector. The Soviet workers are
becoming increasingly aware of the disparity between their standard of living and the
standard of living in the capitalist countries. All the ideology in the world has to
ultimately face reality; the workers are ready to receive some of the long-promised
benefits of their efforts. Continued deprivation of the rewards of the system will, at a
minimum, continue the lack of motivation which contributes to low productivity.
From a demographic perspective, the labor force size in the USSR is not
keeping ^^cr with the demand for increased output.^^^ Even if intensive economic
measures are effective, the USSR will not be able to meet its optimistic goals without
reducing labor-intensity through modernization and technological change.
Consequently, one of the most reasonable solutions to rapid "catch-up" in the economy
is the conversion to decreased dependence on labor-intensive production.
Modernization toward capital-intensive production could have far-reaching
consequences. Not only could modem techniques, equipment, and technology increase
efficiency, they could possibly also increase the number of available production
facilities by allowing greater dispersion of labor. Development of remote areas could
then become more likely as a lower quota for workers (per facility) would exist.'^'* All
these grandiose projections depend on a rapid acceleration of Soviet progress in
scientific and technological methods (as iterated in the CMEA Plan to the Year 2000).
^^ Economist, 6 December 1986, p. 85.
^^Economist, 27 September 1986, p. 74.
^^Abram Bergson, "Can the Soviet Slowdown Be Reversed?" Challenge,
November-December 1981, pp. 35-37.
^'^Garvey and Richardson, "Robotics Finds Applications in Ground Warfare,"
Military Electronics! Countermeasures, March 1983, pp. 85-86; Abram Bergson, "Can
the Soviet Slowdown Be Reversed?" Challenge, November-December 1981, pp. 38-41.
The argument that labor-saving devices diminish a labor-intensive nation's comparative
advantage does not apply in the Soviet case. The Soviet Union is not a free-trade
system; its central planning decides where proportions of inputs will be distributed.
The dispersion of labor to a variety of non-labor-intensive projects can better utilize
the available labor force, if planning, labor incentives, and training are conducted in
accordance with capital-intensive goals.
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The West, and Japan in particular, are important to Soviet plans for
modernization because of the quality and efficiency of Western capital goods, as well.
Imported Japanese capital equipment is generally more efficient than Soviet domestic
capital due to Japan's superior technology and quality control.-^^
C. SOVIET REFORMS
The current reforms in Soviet economics began to appear shortly after Brezhnev's
death. Gorbachev's elevation to the post of CPSU General Secretary was consistent
with economic clues indicated during the brief leadership terms of Andropov and
Chemenko. The leadership had been advised that declining growth rates were due to
s>'stemic bottlenecks and low productivity of the work force. In 1983 Andropov,
believing what Soviet economists and managers told him, began a crackdown on
corruption among bureaucrats. He appealed to workers, advising them that their
productivity must increase so that benefits could increase.'^^
At Andropov's funeral, Chemenko stressed the importance of the CPSU's paying
attention to the thoughts of the masses.^^ Such statements could be construed as pure
rhetoric. In retrospect, however, they appear indicative of a new Party emphasis on
the standard of living of the masses. While capitalist "infection" was blamed for Soviet
youths' aspiration for material goods,^^ the accompanying "parasitical idleness of some
young people, (and) their unwillingness to work where they are needed"-^^ was a
catalyst for the 1984 education reform law.
The Soviet 1984 education reform aimed at solving the productivity problem by
restructuring the program of study to unify general education with occupational
education. An extra year of education was added for all youth. As well as increasing
the time specifically dedicated to labor education in school, expanded time is given to
on-the-job training and holiday work experience. -^^
'^^Mark M. Hopkins and Michael Kennedy, Comparisons and Implications of
Alternate Views of the Soviet Economy, Rand Report R-3075-NA (March 1984): pp.
18-21.
^^Barghoom and Remington, Politics in the USSR, p. 113.
2'^Ibid., p. 56.
^^Ibid., pp. 139-140.
^^Constantin Chemenko, Pravda, 15 June 1983, p. 2, as cited in Barghoom and
Remington, Politics in the USSR, p. 139.
^°Barghoorn and Remington, Politics in the USSR, pp. 139-140. Soviet children
now start school at six years old rather than seven.
From the Western perspective, Secretary Gorbachev has begun the risk-taking.
His policies of reform are true to the economic priorities inherent in Marxism.^^ One
can trace the objectives of liis reforms to the pre-eminent position of economics among
the factors which control history.
Economically, the USSR would benefit from modernizing trade with Japan. As
discussed earlier, quantitative growth has not been the answer to the USSR's problems.
Due to obviously declining economic growth rates since 1960 (See Table 4), the
Kremlin has realized that the centrally-planned system needs domestic reform and help
from external sources. Outside the socialist community, Western assistance is needed
for rapid modernization-the Japanese are the world's most effective modernizers.
Within the Politburo's realm of control, domestic reform^^^ is necessary for the
assimilation of Western assistance. Qualitative changes in inputs and the factors of
production (labor, capital, and land) are inescapable. Until "intensive" development is
accomplished, the USSR will continue to trail the West economically. Organizational
restructuring is also necessary to provide the networks for increased efficiency within
the centrally planned system.
Being mindful of the American public's ability to manipulate its leaders, the
Politburo has embarked on a political campaign of detente and peace initiatives. The
Politburo's spokesman is proposing peace initiatives which he knows are radical, but
which he also understands will arouse Western peaceful sentiment and put extreme
political pressure on Western leaders, and the American President, in particular, to
make concessions.^^ Reduction of the potential for conflict between the East and West
will serve the Kremlin's current priority of economic recuperation.^^ A lesser threat to
the USSR will enable the planners to redistribute more resources from the defense
^^"'Text' of (27th CPSU) Congress Resolution", FBIS {USSR, Daily Report), 6
iMarch 1986, p. 02.
^^Ibid., pp. 02-03.
^^During Gorbachev's 28 July 1986 "Vladivostok Speech" (Foreign Broadcast
Information Service (USSR), 29 July 1986, p. R17), he suggested that Hiroshima be
used as the meeting place for a Pacific collective security conference. He said that the
location would be appropriate for a peace conference since it was "the first victim of
the atomic evil". The Japanese promptly protested his linking of Japan with anti-U.S.
overtones, and emphasized that they had never discussed hosting such a conference in
Hiroshima.
^^Leonard Silk, "Responding to Gorbachev", New York Times, 13 May 1987, p.
30.
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sector to consumers and domestic investment. The General Secretary is
psychologically preparing the masses for greater access to Western information through
domestic "giasnost". Additionally, relaxation of cultural and personal freedom
controls, and projected economic and political reforms, are causing Americans to forget
fundamentals. From the Soviet perspective, we are part of "opposing systems"; the
inevitable result of the evolution of society will be the total victory of socialism over
capitalism,-^^ whether the confrontation is military, economic, or political.^^
While the pressure is turned away from the "new, friendly Soviets" and toward
extension of "good -^ill" by the West, the Soviets will gain some important ground
through foreign policy initiatives:
• Relaxed tension will allow the USSR to decrease its military emphasis. Factors
of production can then be diverted to the economy.
• Detente elTorts will further allow Soviet acquisition of previously unattainable
transfers of technology and equipment.
Eventually, the projected upswing hi economic stability and growth will allow the




Restructuring has begun within the structure of the Soviet economy. The
changes being initiated are expected to reduce bottlenecks in production and supply.
In the past, the "vertical" organization of the State Committees has caused significant
delay, inefficiency, and waste within the system (see Figure 2.1).
The slowness and poor communication within the system's bureaucracy has
encouraged hoarding of supplies and overemployment at the enterprise level (factories,
plants, works), and juggUng of data from the enterprise through state committee levels.
Waste has previously amounted to 20% of output at the junction of
ministries. Suppliers and producers have been separated by the system. Gorbachev's
proposed restructuring would aboUsh the multi-layered ministries and create state
committees which would locate inter-related enterprises "under one roof. Creation of
new "horizontal" ministries'^^ would heal many of the current system's afflictions. The
^
^William T. Lee and Richard F. Starr, Soviet Military Policy Since World War
II, with a Foreword by William R. Van Cleave (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press,
1986), p. 36.
^^"'Text' of Congress Resolution", FBIS {USSR, Daily Report), 6 March 1986, p.
07.
^^Lee and Starr, Soviet Military Policy Since World War II, pp. 177-181.















































Figure 2.1 Centralized Planning in the Soviet Economy.
new idea cannot be implemented overnight, but the alterations are already in
progress. ^^
An important new category has been introduced into the system — profit. In
selected enterprises, the new law of profitability has already been adopted. According
to the concept, whatever an enterprise earns belongs to the enterprise to distribute'*^
among three categories:
1. The State Bank receives revenues;
2. The enterprise invests in modernization of production and social development;
3. Workers receive bonuses for noteworthy achievement.'*^
Ultimately, unprofitable enterprises will be closed"*^ (!) under the new law.
Implications are significant in terms of the responsibilities of the socialist state for
ensured employment. Although only one enterprise has been closed so far (a
Leningrad construction company), the psychological impaa is enormous. This
Affairs), 18 February 1987, pp. S13, S14, S19, S25.
^^Ibid., pp. S1-S27.
"^^Ibid., p. S2.
"^Mbid., pp. S3, S17-S18. The law dictates that not less than 25-30% of the
profits be distributed to the workers as incentive pay (annual, quarterly, and monthly).
Distribution is decided by the enterprise director and is allotted in accordance with
individual rather than group merit.
^Ibid., pp. S26-S27.42ti
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"revolutionary" occurrence implies Gorbachev's willingness to employ startling
changes, where necessarv', to achieve the objective of economic revival (beyond mere
national survival).
Legislation has been enacted to promote greater incentives for private
enterprise (the "second economy"),'^'' to replace some "centralized interference" bureaus
with direct business links between firms,**^ and even to allow joint ventures with
capitalists into the USSR."^^ The government still officially controls supplies, so all
business activities ultimately depend on governmental control of resources. Although
group contracts include a citizen's govenmient employment, cooperatives and private
business are considered to be an individual's additional work. That is, all persons
involved in cooperative or private enterprise must also hold a full-time government job,
or be pensioners.
The new openness toward, and legislation of, entrepreneurial ventures has
several objectives:'*^
1. To help satisfy the demand for goods and services at the level of the masses
2. To circulate money piled up in personal savings accounts"^^
3. To gain profit for the government from the already existent "second economy";
4. To stimulate the state monopolies with competition."*^
a. Private Enterprise Law
The underground "second economy", while providing for the material
desires of the Soviet non-elites, has robbed the government of supplies and resources,
reduced incentives to force the official system to work efficiently, and eliminated
control of revenues on "second-economy" goods and services. The new private
^^New York Times, 20 November 1986, p. 5.
'*'*VIichael Kaser, "The Energy Crisis and Soviet Economic Prospects 1986-1990,"
World Today, June 1986, p. 92.
^^ Christian Science Monitor, 14 January 1987, p. 1; Economist, 20 December
1986, p. 91.
•*^BiU Keller, New York Times, 1 May 1987, pp. 1, 6.
'^^"Draft Law on State Enterprises", FBIS {USSR, National Affairs), 18 February
1987, pp. S1-S2.
"^^Hedrick Smith, The Russians, (New York: Ballantine Books, 1976), pp.
274-275. Sufficient and/or quality consumer goods are not available so workers have
stashed away great amounts of cash.
'*^"Draft Law on State Enterprises", FBIS (USSR, National Affairs), 18 February
1987, pp. S2, S13-S14, S-18, S-20.
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enterprise law seeks to direct revenues from individual enterprise into government
coffers.
The private enterprise legislation, which became law on 1 May 1987,
permits individual families to sell goods or services in their spare time.^^ These
businessmen set their own prices. The government gets a profit by requiring the
purchase of an annual permit (instead of taxes). Before the law, this activity existed
but the government had no control and received no direct benefit. The government is
encouraging private enterprise by making small bank loans available for rent, tools,
and raw materials.
Under the law citizens are permitted to manufacture items like clothing,
furniture, and sports equipment or provide services like car repair or apartment
painting. The law prohibits the manufacture of weapons, medicine, and copying
machines. ^^
b. Cooperatives
Cooperatives may be opened by a group of at least three people. They set
their own prices. The government profits by a 10% tax. The laws require that each
cooperative establish its own insurance and benefits fund for its members. The
cooperatives are usually affiliated with a state business, but buy necessary materials
directly from suppliers at retail prices. Examples of cooperatives have included cafes,
taxi services, and recycling centers.-^
c. Group Contracts
Group contracts are attempts to introduce greater incentives into
government business. By this method, a branch of a government factory or service is
established under contract to its parent enterprise. The state sets prices, and the
contractors pay a percentage of their income to the government. The branch's share is
then divided among the workers or invested in upgrading the business. The parent
company provides a business location, pensions, fringe benefits, and supplies at
wholesale prices. ^^
^°BiU Keller, New York Times, 1 May 1987, pp. 1, 6.
^^New York Times, 20 November 1986, p. 5.
^^KeUer, New York Times, 1 May 1987, pp. 1, 6.
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Why has the policy of "glasnost" been introduced into Soviet domestic
affairs? Pragmatically, the USSR's economy is in need of quick outside help:
• advanced technology to rapidly develop difficult projects to diminish the
"technology gap";
• basic industrial technology to reduce labor-intensity and develop robotics;
• electronic high-technology (e.g. computers and data processing) for more
efficient planning.
A key fear for the Soviet leadership is the potential for a loss of Party
control through a loss of information control.^"* Japan, a world leader in computers
and data processing equipment and technology, could provide the USSR with
assistance in all these areas. But what are the implications for the loss of control,
beyond economics, of the introduction of high-technology in computers and
information systems? General Secretary Gorbachev has already begun to prepare for
the eventuality of "adverse" information from the West by his policies of "Glasnost"
(openness) in the domestic Soviet press; by relaxing government information controls
domestically, he is psychologically paving the way for greater international information
input to the Soviet populace.
e. Joint Ventures Law
The Joint Ventures Law is an attempt to entice capitalist nations to
establish business in the USSR, simultaneously importing new and efficient
technologies. However, the secretiveness of the Soviet political culture and emphasis
on Soviet advantage detract from the attraction of the proposal to the West.
A brief outline of the framework of the proposed Soviet joint ventures law
illustrates the disincentives to capitalists.^^ First, the Soviet partner in any joint venture
must have a minimum of 51% of the capital (i.e. controlling interest). Consequently,
fmal decision-making power will go to the proven inefTicient, overcautious Soviet
partner. Second, the managing director must be Russian. How much voice will the
foreign company have in choosing the managing director, or in hiring and firing staff?
The question is unanswered.
Third, the Western partner is responsible for quality control. Will the
quality controller have any power?"his boss will be a Russian. The possibility is very
real that the Russian overall control will turn foreign investment into production of
^^New York Times, 26 January 1986, p. 22E.
^^Economist, 20 December 1986, p. 91.
Soviet-Style non-competitive junk. Fourth, joint ventures operate outside the state
plan. A reasonable fear for potential foreign investors is that Soviet-sourced suppUes
will not arrive on time to keep plants running efficiently, or will be preempted to
support the State FYP. This uncertainty spills over into the fifth plank of the
proposed joint venture framework—materials bought inside the USSR may be obtained
only through Soviet organizations licensed to conduct foreign trade.
Lastly, Soviet staff get Soviet pay. Although foreign nationals will be able
to receive foreign salaries, the expected discrepancies in pay between foreign and
domestic employees are likely to cause frictions and low Soviet morale. Furthermore,
the guidelines for repatriation of profits have not yet been clarified; judging from Soviet
motives for opening up to joint ventures and characteristic protective attitude, the
government is not likely to allow large percentages of the profits to leave the USSR.
Where technology transfer is concerned, high-efficiency, basic-technology
transfers could prove to be a real bonus to the Soviet partner. However, Japan will
not violate its support of CoCom restrictions or further strain its relationship with the
United States simply for risky joint ventures.
Japanese companies will view joint ventures as a way to produce goods for
the Soviet market, while the Soviets want to use them to expand exports. Soviet
preliminary talk about tax incentives and guarantees on repatriation of earnings may
not produce final proposals which appeal to the Japanese. Unless the Soviet reforms
introduce some form of international market economy, the existent state artificial
pricing system is unlikely to lure many serious investors to the USSR.
2. Efficiency
Under glasnost, a more open climate for cultural and political expression is
being tested to increase domestic morale and to convince foreigners of Soviet sincerity
in its peace initiatives. Ultimately, the objective is still economic revitalization.
Domestic glasnost leads to internal Soviet criticism.
Internal criticism reveals sources of discontent. Dissolution of discontent will
raise morale and motivate workers toward greater efficiency and productivity. A
similar thought process is very likely the evolution of the current Soviet "shake-up".
Corruption is being openly exposed, alcoholism and absenteeism are derided.
Gorbachev appears to the West as a leader dedicated to improving the life of the
masses and the stability of the world.
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While examples of corruption have been dealt with in the past, Gorbachev has
raised the stakes by exposing middle-level bureaucrats, and by pointing accusing fmgers
at departments which
ver>' generously suppon developing various kinds of production while being ver\'
mean in allocating funds for developing the social sphere. ..This is exactly that
sort of cunning that costs the state ver}- dear. That is the political assessment. ^^
Obviously. Secretan.' Gorbachev would like to win the hearts and minds of the masses
as well as presenting a more attractive, economically strong Soviet Socialism to the
world.
As a means of gaining public support (without endangering the position of the
high-level bureaucracy), Gorbachev's reforms have initiated "democratization" at the
trust and enterprise levels of the economy. The directors are elected by the workers.
The ?art\' makes its recommendation for these positions, but the workers choose.
Consequently, the Part^-'s control may be weakened by the possible introduction of
non-parr\' members into these economic positions. It is no surprise, then, that the
Party chooses candidates for positions above the trust level, and for the parallel Party
organizations at all levels.
Alcoholism and absenteeism have an obvious negative effect on efficiency. To
discourage excessive consumption of alcohol, the government has reduced available
quantities of vodka and raised its price. To discourage absenteeism, random
identification checks are being conducted of people standing in queues (i.e. shopping)
during working hours. Those who should be at work are reported to their superiors.
3. Resistance to Reforms
Such sweeping innovations to a s>-stem are bound to encounter inherent
resistance to change. Familiarity is ps\-chological security. Gorbachev's program is
encountering substantial resistance from various sectors of the USSR.^^
Soviet citizens in general recall the pattern of past attempts at reform.
Apprehension about the reforms, which so far consist largely of Party "resolutions"
rather than laws, exists because of historical reforms which eventually turned against
^^General Secretary- Gorbachev ("Vladivostok Speech"), FBIS {USSR), 29 July
1986, pp. R7-RS. "Departments" are the CPSU organizations which correlate to the
economic "ministries".
^'Hemy- Trewhitt with Maureen Santini and Jeff Trimble, U.S. Sews and World
Report, 9 February- 1987, pp. 36-37.
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their promoters. The Russian political culture is keen on survival. Rather than taking
a firm pro or con position, most citizens prefer to wait and observe.
Attempts to alter some entrenched traditions, however, are bound to cause
friction. Gorbachev has met resistance concerning his attack on alcoholism. Vodka is
an ingrained aspect of Soviet social functioning. Despite its statistically detrimental
affect on productivity and the divorce rate, alcohol consumption is considered a factor
of life. Citizens have met state-induced shortages by "home-brewing".
Much of the innovation in restructuring can be traced to the inefficiency
inherent in the "old" centrally-planned socialist economy. Incentives are needed to
boost workers' desire to excel. Thus, the honest appraisal by the CPSU leaders that
greater input is required for the Soviet consumer sector.
Prohibition of "queueing" during work hours attacks the methods of making
the shortage system work which have evolved. Social inter-relationships and inter-
dependencies are disrupted, dismantling some of the framework which has made the
system acceptable. If Gorbachev's objective is achieved, and better-quality/ higher-
quantity consumer goods are produced, this interdiction of the popular means of
coping will not be as important as it is today. At the moment, however, this logical
measure may produce more discontent than the trade-off it achieves in productivity.
As reflected in the "profitability" law, directors are required to return at least
25% of an enterprise's profits to individual workers. The threat of unemployment due
to unproductivity is also an incentive to do well. (In accordance with the socialist
contract, the workers from the closed construction company, mentioned earlier, have
been given new jobs.)^^
Perhaps the greatest impact on the psyche of the masses is generated by the
uncertainty associated with the "threat" of lost jobs. The Soviet Union's social
contract has been one of its most appealing and stabilizing domestic forces. A tacit
alliance has existed between the Party leadership, who want to maintain their control
of power and perquisites, and the workers, who have enjoyed the security of ensured
employment, basic social welfare benefits, and subsidized food, utilities, and housing.
Although Gorbachev's intent is to stimulate productivity by cutting away non-
contributing enterprises, the effect produced is doubt and insecurity among the masses.
^^"Draft Law on State Enterprises", FBIS (USSR), National Affairs, 18 February
1987, p. S27.
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The Soviet military arm is understandably negative about its reduced priority
in politics and over economic resources.^^ The Red Army leaders would rather
emphasize the threat from the West than give up their preeminence due to
economically-driven detente.
Gorbachev's program also threatens the Party apparatchiks-especially those
unproductive bureaucrats whose positions and perquisites are threatened by the
movement toward efficiency. Although Gorbachev has been realigning the political
power structure by fresh appointments, factions of the "old line" still exist in
opposition to his plans.
Whether Gorbachev will be able to survive the opposition to his reforms will
be determined by the demonstrated successes of the program. The proof will entail a
raised standard of living for the masses and demonstrated growth in the economy for
the apparatchiks. To be successful in rapid modernization, Gorbachev will need the
cooperation of the West.
D. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
1. USSR
Contrary to popular opinion, the Soviet Union is not slack in its emphasis on
R&D. On the contrary-, the Soviet Union and its CMEA^^ partners employ a greater
percentage of their work-force in R&D than the primary market economy nations.
(See Table 5).^^
The table shows that the CMEA countries generally allot a greater proportion
of their work force to R&D than the market economies. They also employ an overall
slightly greater number of scientists and engineers. They average 130% greater
investment of their GDP (Gross Domestic Product) in R&D than the market
economies. The United States shows very low figures in all three categories; the Soviet
^^Jeff Trimble with Robert Kaylor, "Plenty of Guns, No Politics for Gorbachev's
Generals", U.S. News and World Report, 11 iMay 1987, p. 32.
^'^Economist, 20 April 1985, p. "Survey" 3. The Council for Mutual Economic
Assistance is also known as Comecon. Active, full members include the USSR, the
German Democratic Republic (DDR), Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania,
and Bulgaria. A "special" relationship exists with Albania and Yugoslavia, in Eastern
Europe. Observer status has been granted to Afghanistan, Angola, China, Ethiopia,
Laos, Mozambique, North Korea, South Yemen, and Nicaragua. Cooperation
agreements have been signed with Finland, Iraq, and Mexico.
^^Jan Winiecki, "Soviet-Type Economies: Considerations for the Future," Soviet




as % of Scientists & ^Engineers as % of
R&D as total employment total emplovment% of GDP (excluding (excluding
CMEA in 1979 agriculture) agriculture)
Czecho-
slovakia 2.9( 978) .8 5.4
Bulgaria 1.7( 977). .5 8.2
4un2an^ 2.5( 978' .4 9.3
3DR 2.2 6.3
^oland 1.6(1 978) .4 6.9
Romania 0.7 ...
USSR 3.4(1977) 11.6
* Accurate fiaures on Soviet R&D personnel are not available as they are
often represented under other guises. The percentage expressed under




























Union invests 170% as much of its GDP in R&D as Japan and employs approximately
equal percentages of scientists and engineers. So why does the discrepancy in applied
technology exist?
The Soviet system is very slow at turning research into technology, and at
difTusion of technology throughout the centrally-planned economy.^^ The discoveries
which yield advanced technology require the translation of inventions into innovations
in production. Fear of the diffusion of advanced communications equipment (the
Party has feared loss of "control") throughout the nation has, in the past, been
counter-productive to investments in the qualitative expansion of its industrial base.
The recurrent themes of survival and risk avoidance has hampered Soviet efforts to
^^Thane Gustafson, Selling the Russians the Ropel Soviet Technology Policy and
U.S. Export Controls, Rand Report R-2649-ARPA (April 1981): pp. 39-41.
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stimulate grouih and has made implementation of proposed reforms very difficult.
Presently, the Soviet Union is facing several obstacles to the continuation of its
development plans.
First, the centrally-planned economy of the USSR is known for its inability to
produce functioning innovations.^^ Soviet researchers produce plenty of good ideas and
plans, but there is a breakdown between creation of a plan and its implementation.
Second, the system does not promote risk-taking. Soviet managers are unwilling to
voluntarily change a method which is currently meeting its quota, or to establish a
production line for an unsure project. Third, the system is not friendly to
entrepreneurs; there is much to lose and little to gain from risk-taking-the safe way to
ensure survival is to stick to the proven method.
For example, a disadvantage to attempts at improving consumer goods by
technological innovations has been the militar^-'s control over production assets. For
example, if a consumer innovation has a military application, a factory may be forced
to divert its production to the military usage and subsequently fall short of its quota
for consumer products. Therefore, the incentive for mangers is to stick to standard
products which have no appeal to the military and which do not threaten their jobs.^'*
Gorbachev's new priorities could ease this apprehension somewhat.
Even \\'ithout mihtary intervention, researchers have complained that scientists
did not whole-heartedly attempt to implement their ideas; scientists complained that
researchers did not understand the constraints of the system.^^ For example, they have
contended that researchers did not consider the consistent shortage of supplies, or the
pressure on enterprise managers to direct resources toward fulfillment of normal
quotas. Theoretically, innovation is possible; practically, the security of the "old way"
is still a hindrance to progress.
Due to the slowness of proposed changes to become reality, the easiest way
for the Soviet Union to catch up in its technological lag is initially to acquire advanced
technology from the West. Acquisition of the results of foreign research and
development would save the USSR a great deal of time, resources, and effort. The
three primarv' ways of acquiring advanced plans and equipment are to overtly
^^Ibid., pp. 16-17; Winiecki, "Soviet-Type Economies: Considerations for the
Future," Soviet Studies, October 1986, pp. 544-546.
^'^Brian Dailey, lecture at Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, 18
February- 1987.
^^Gustafson, Selling the Russians the Ropel p. 54.
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purchase, covertly buy, or steal them. The least expensive method, overall, is to
purchase by traditional means.^^ Usually, with equipment or technology purchases, the
Soviets receive training, maintenance, and spare parts benefits. Covertly buying and
stealing are seldom accompanied by the benefits mentioned and are costly in terms of
political repercussions (e.g. loss of world prestige and increased anti-Soviet sentiment);
furthennore, reverse engineering of products and diffusion of stolen technology may
initially be much more expensive than an outright overt purchase.
The Soviets are "forced" to resort to illegitimate acquisition because of
restrictions on availability of certain products. Therefore, a lessening of Western
distrust is beneficial to Soviet economic interests. A less aggressive posture may make
the West more inclined to help them grow, by relaxing restrictions on Soviet imports of
modem technology and equipment.
2. Japan
The United States' and Japan's governments spent roughly equivalent
percentages of their respective GNP's on Research and Development in 1986.^^ The
entrepreneurial attitude of independent Japanese businessmen, fueled by success, has
launched them to world leadership in several broad technological fields. Japan's
resource constraints have caused them to develop efficiency in use of materials, energy,
and operations.
In contrast to the USSR, Japan has been able to make practical application of
its research and development projects. Japan's capitalist system has rewarded
entrepreneurial efficiency, diversification, product improvements, and quality
workmanship.
Of particular interest to the Soviets are Japanese successes in techniques of
factory management, automation, and quality control. Although Japanese
accomplishments in efficient production have had unsettling repercussions to Japan's
own work force (i.e. lower labor-force requirements and consequent rising
unemployment), implementation of those successes in the USSR could help alleviate
the Soviet labor problem and produce world quality manufactures for export.
Japan's progress in electronics could enable the Soviet Union to establish
adequate communications (and improve data processing) for timely planning and
management of its economy. In fact, even basic computing and data processing
^^M orris Bronstein, Technology Transfer (Aim Arbor: University of Michigan
Press, 1986), pp. 15-17.
67 Wall Street Journal, 24 December 1986, p. 14.
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networks would be sufficient to more efficiently organize the Soviet system. More
effective control of resource distribution and management of inter-related producers
would allow more efficient central planning of materiel assets in the Soviet Union.
Japanese know-how for personnel management and training could greatly
facilitate the integration of advanced electronic equipment into the Soviet system. The
Soviet Union's drive for productivity would greatly benefit from the Japanese
perspective on quality control, efficiency, and incentives.
Japanese developments in bio-technology are to a great extent inspired by
Japan's dependence on foreign sources for its food. Its discoveries in the fields of
agriculture and genetic engineering have obvious application for the inefficient Soviet
agricultural system, as well as for Japan's own problem of inadequate land for the
Japanese population.
In addition to diversifying their businesses and increasing their imports, the
Japanese have undertaken genetic engineering projects toward the long-range
alleviation of its consumption requirements for fish.^^ The Japanese are experimenting
with chromosome manipulation and hormone treatments to create "superfish" which
could theoretically create giant salmon or tuna which return to their original fish
hatcheries to be harvested. Through biotechnology the Japanese hope to produce the
amount of seafood necessary- for survival, less dependent on outside sources. Recent
U.S. and USSR restrictions on Japanese fishing in their waters has reduced Japan's
distant-water catch from a peak of 3.7 million tons in 1974 to about 2 million tons in
1986. Japanese dependence on fish farms and its own waters may force it to become
the leader in fish productivity-another capability which the Soviet Union will want to
acquire.
Japan has been able to accomplish, by success in risk-taking with its limited
resources, what the resource-rich Soviet Union has failed to produce by its stifling
central planning. The USSR would now like to assimilate the results of Japan's efforts
by injecting modem equipment and techniques into its tightly controlled economic
framework. To find out whether the old wine skins will hold the new wine, the USSR
must first acquire the goods and services it perceives as necessary.
^Wall Street Journal, 11 February 1987, p.30.
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E. ECONOMIC COOPERATION
The USSR, under the Gorbachev regime, has been encouraging Japan to help in
its efTorts to revitalize the economy through joint projects. By ofTering cash, products
of the investment, and to some degree new markets, the USSR is enticing the
businesses of developed nations to build up the Soviet Union's economic base.
Through joint ventures the Soviets would be able to acquire turn-key projects,
including know-how and managerial skills, as well as high-tech equipment.
The USSR would Uke to capitalize on the demonstrated success of Japan as a
"guarantee" to industrial investments. If the Soviets would allow them free rein in joint
ventures, the Japanese would be less reluctant to risk their time and inputs in the
Soviet Union. But the bureaucratic slowness and insistence on control of the Soviet
system often make the relative risk of failure outweigh the potential benefits of profit.^^
Economic cooperation extends beyond the direct trade between the USSR and
Japan. The present alliances and "special relationships" revolving around the world's
two superpowers (the United States and the Soviet Union) extend the significance of
trade to issues of global interdependence. Within the existent bipolar system of inter-
relationships, trade cannot be conducted in a vacuum. Bilateral trade, whether intra-
or inter-alliance, affects the balance of global stability.
The USSR has continually stressed the inter-relationship between economic ties
and friendly political relations, whereas the Japanese have, in the past, sought to
separate the two factors. The Soviets have promoted trade with Japan by inviting
Japanese business groups to Moscow and whetting their capitalist appetites with
discussions of joint projects, by agreeing to set up a Japanese information office (as a
cultural center) outside the embassy premises, ^^ and by encouraging the development
of Japanese trade federations friendly to the USSR.^^
1. USSR-Japan
The Soviet Union has been planning the development of its Far East and
Eastern Sibeiian regions for at least two decades, and has done important preliminary
work by building the Baikal-Amur Mainline (BAM). Due to the BAM project alone,
^^Allen S. Whiting, Siberian Development and East Asia: Threat or Promisel
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1981), pp. 138-141.
'^^FBIS {USSR, Daily Report), 16 October 1986, p. C2; 29 May 1986, pp. CI, C2.
'^^FBIS (USSR, Daily Report), 29 May 1986, p. C2.
'^^FBIS (USSR, Daily Report), 13 March 1986, pp. C1-C2 (Trade Federation of
the Kansai region); FBIS (Asia), 8 November 1985, p. C5 (Kansai).
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the USSR has gained internationally valuable experience in controlling permafrost-
related construction problems and in identifying machinery and equipment problems
caused by the extremely cold environment.'^ Once the technical, technological, and
labor problems of extraction and transportation are overcome, the USSR could
presumably have irresistibly low-priced natural resources and energy available for sale
or barter.
a. History
In 1962 the fu-st significant steps were taken toward joint Japanese-Soviet
development of Siberian oil.'** The S350 million deal was ultimately rejected by Japan
on the pretext that the trade should be based solely on cash; the USSR wanted a
10-year deferred payment plan. The underlying cause of the deal's failure, however,
was U.S. pressure on Japan to refrain from dealing with the "Reds". This deal marked
the beginning of Japan's dilemma of balancing the need for economic trade benefits
against its political appeasement of its ally, the United States. When the U.S.-USSR
confrontation appeared to decrease following the Sino-Soviet split, Japanese
businessmen (largely from Keidanren and the Japan Chamber of Commerce and
Industry-) established the Japan-Soviet Joint Economic Cooperation Committee
(JSJECC) with the Soviet Chamber of Commerce, in September 1965.
For the next couple of years joint projects seemed not only possible but
likely. Proposals included joint construction of an oil pipeline between Tyumen and
Nakhodka, development of northern Sakhalin natural gas resources and Udokan
copper deposits, port construction in eastern Siberia, and forest exploitation.
Negotiations resulted in a successful agreement to jointly exploit forest
resources along the Amur River (in 1968) and an agreement (in 1970) on development
of a new port facility at Wrangel to handle the timber-related trade and coal shipments.
Conflicting national political priorities spilled over into economic affairs, limiting
success. The Soviet Union took a hard-line approach about its ability to develop
Siberia alone, if necessary. It projected unwillingness to "allow" Japanese participation
unless terms were clearly in the Soviets' favor. The USSR demanded that Japan
^^Whiting, Siberian Development and East Asia, 1981, pp. 30-31, 58-61, 101-104.
'HVythe E. Braden, "Anatomy of Failure: Japan-USSR Negotiations on Siberian
Oil Development," The Fletcher Forum, Winter 1981, p. 76. Facts for this "Historical
Perspective" subheading are taken from the Braden article and from Whiting's Siberian
Development and East Asia, especially in the chapter, "The Japan Connection", pp.
112-159.
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provide the greatest share of capital investments and offer long-term, low-interest loans
to the USSR from Japan's Export-Import Bank and major commercial banks.
The consequent need for Japanese government backing of loans led to
political frictions, causing the ultimate breakdown of the joint projects. The Northern
Territories issue assumed great symbolic meaning in Japanese politics despite efforts by
Prime Minister Tanaka (in 1973) to separate economic from political considerations.
The Japanese balked at Soviet efforts to link the joint economic ventures with the
"Asian Collective Security System""designed to contain China and, in this case, to
maneuver Japan away from cooperation with the PRC. The 1974 oil crisis alerted
Japanese politicians to the vulnerabilities inherent in dependence on any one politically
unreliable source of energy.
The Soviet political enigma and its unpredictability in economic deals made
Japan desirous of a stabilizing U.S. influence. In 1974 there appeared to be hope for
economic cooperation among the U.S., USSR, and Japan. Then, the Soviets cancelled
the T>Timen-Nakhodka oil pipeline idea and replaced it with a plan for transporting the
oil via a new railway, the Baikal-Amur Mainline (BAM). The railway's negative
military implications for Japanese security were too ominous, and the Japanese and
Americans withdrew from direct participation in BAM's construction.
Thereafter, political considerations caused U.S. participation to become
more important to Japan. The Japanese could not in good conscience chase after
economic benefits with the USSR while depending on the U.S.'s "nuclear umbrella" for
security. If Japan invested too heavily in joint projects on Soviet terms, Japanese
economic stakes in the Soviet Union could endanger its prioritization of security issues.
Sino-Japanese and Sino-American rapprochement then could possibly have been held
hostage if Japan had acquiesced to participate in the political-economic linkage of
Brezhnev's proposed Asian Collective Security System.
All these uncertainties combined to turn the Japanese away from the joint
ventures. Instead, Japan opted for straightforward commercial dealings in simple,
bilateral Soviet-Japanese trade. Siberian development slowed considerably as the
USSR continued the development alone.
Japan has based its policy for continued interest in Siberian development
on the simultaneous involvement of the United States. The reason that Japan desires
to share involvement with the United States in Soviet ventures is primarily that the
U.S. has the military, political, and economic power to effectively deal with the USSR.
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The disparin- in size, resources, and influence between Japan and the USSR is the
cause of much of the Japanese concern over its securir>\
The USSR, on the other hand, fears the creation or strengthening of an
encirclement of its territory', and especially of an anti-So^iet entente among Japan,
China, and the United States. General Secretary Gorbachev, seeking to maintain
influence among the potential entente members, has reinstituted ovenures for joint
development with Japan. Japanese involvement in Far East development would ser-^e
a dual role-political and economic. To rapidly energize the untapped potential of the
Far East region, the USSR has also attempted to provide incentives for Japanese
businessmen to suppon the plan. Future developments undoubtedly depend on the
revitaiizaticn of the USSR's domestic economy as well as its relationship with the
Japanese people.
b. Recent Developments
At a meeting of a Japanese private committee for business cooperation
with the Soviet Union in April 1986 - the USSR specifically proposed joint ventures
with Japan for processing food and wood in the Far East. The Soviets asked the
Japanese to provide techniques for increasing efficiency- of resources and energ\- and to
"extend technical cooperation' during the USSR's 12th F^T. Chemicals, automobiles,
machine tools, construction materials, home appliances, and medical care were noted
as areas where assistance was desired. Funhermore, an agreement was reached to
exchange logs and timber to Japan for "development equipment and materials".
In October 1986 the Japanese conducted an industrial fair in Moscow^
sponsored by the Japan-Soviet Business Cooperation Committee and the Japan
External Trade Organization. The fair, based on possible areas of Japanese-Soviet
technolog}^ transfer, included microprocessors, numerically controlled machine tools,
robots, new industrial materials, and biotechnolog\-. '^
The implications of these rwo events in 1986 are that the USSR and Japan
are interested in fmding a common ground for establishing a mutually beneficial trade
relationship. The Japanese are interested in broadening their market-base without
weakening their security-. The USSR's plan behind joint ventures is to help its
economy grow. Japanese businesses hold the potential of expertise in management and
^FBIS (USSR), 22 April 19S6, pp. CI. C2.
'^FBIS (Asia). 21 October 1986, p. C2.
"Takayama Satoshi, "The Soviet Union Smiles at Japan", Japan Quarterly,
April-June 1986. p. 134.
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quality control. Credit may be more readily available from other Western banks if the
Japanese are jointly involved in Soviet business ventures. Certainly, the Soviets expect
an inflow of technology inherent to the \entures as well.
2. CMEA-USSR
The "Comprehensive Program for Scientific and Technical Progress of the
CMEA Member Countries Through the Year 2000""^^ states the Soviet economic bloc's
vision for the next fifteen years. Section I describes "Objectives, Tasks, and Principles",
Section II delineates the "Front Lines of Scientific and Technical Progress", and
Section III projects "Ways of Implementation".
In Section I the framework is laid out in five priority avenues:
1. the use of electronics in the economy;
2. comprehensive automation;
3. nuclear power;
4. new materials and technologies for production and processing;
5. bioengineering.
These CMEA objectives are obviously congruent with the USSR's own economic
direction. Section I further explains that greater labor productivity and more efficient
use of energy and resources will enable the socialists to achieve their number one
priority--a higher standard of living.
In terms of technology transfer and modernizing trade, the Program explicitly
states that the CMEA countries
resolutely reject the policy of bans and discrimination in the sphere of machinery
and technology which is pursued by imperialist circles in the United States and
certain other capitalist countries. This policy is detrimental to international
economic relations in general and contrary to the nature of scientific and
technical progress, which has assumed a global scale.
The CMEA countries firmly advocate the normalization of international ties in
the sphere of the economy, science, and technology, the elimination of all
artificial obstacles and restrictions, confidence-building measures in international
economic relations, the elimination of all forms and varieties of economic
aggression, including those in the sphere of technology, the restructuring of the
entire system of international economic, scientific, and technical relations on a
just and democratic basis, and the establishment of a new international economic
order, and the elimination of underdevelopment as an acute global problem.^^
^FBIS (USSR), 19 December 1985, pp. BB7-BB18.
^Ibid., p. BB9.
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When the socialist brotherhood rhetoric is sifted out, the statement clearly indicates a
communist bloc desire to reap the benefits of Western advances in modernization,
unhindered by securirv'-minded restrictions.
Section II declares that (economic) "forces and resources" will be concentrated
toward accelerating development in the main sectors which determine intensive growth
of the entire economy--the five pillars of the Program. Within the discussion of each
of the five priority avenues the noted benefits continually return to raising the workers'
standard of living, labor-saving modernization, and increased productivity methods.
Supercomputers are identified for economic management and creation of data
bases. The promise is extended of introduction of personal computers into everyday
life. Robotics and fifth generation equipment are earmarked for reduction of labor-
intensity, ability to adapt to changing work conditions, increased productivity, and
consistent quality. New materials and technologies are promoted "to ensure the
competitiveness of CMEA countries' products on the world markets."^^ Naturally,
bioengineering is important in raising the standard of living, in particular in increased
food resources and in health care.
Section III of the Program describes how the CMEA countries intend to
implement their vision to the year 2000. First, all the CMEA nations will integrate the
fundamentals of the Program into their individual Five-Year Plans for 1986-1990.
Second, for the production benefits of economies of scale and in accordance with trade
theor\' of comparative advantage,
the CMEA countries will actively utilize the advantages of mutual cooperation
and socialist economic integration through the further development and
deepening of specialization and production sharing in the spheres of science,
technology, and production, the fuller and more efficient use of individual
countries' existing scientific and technical achievements, and the provision of the
requisite conditions for the broad development of direct ties between
organizations and enterprises on a contractual basis. ^^
Third, CMEA countries will set up joint scientific, technical, and production
associations, and other joint enterprises and technical collectives. Like the Soviet
domestic plan, the CMEA program is proposing that closer cooperation between





Measurement up to the "highest world standards" is continually stressed
throughout the Program text. This emphasis is consistent with the objective of
creating a socialism which is attractive, rather than repulsive. As further enticement to
the less enthusiastic CxMEA participants, the Program promises that
the CMEA countries not participating in the work envisaged by the program will
be entitled to obtain scientific and technical results on terms agreed with the
elaborating countries. ^^
Although trade with the West is not mentioned in Section III, the quote from
Section I clearly illustrates that the socialist bloc is ready to take whatever it can get to
minimize its own expenditures in modernization efforts. The democratic capitalist
West is debating over the profit versus security aspects of its response.
3. US-EEC-JA
The United States and Japan are highly interdependent. For the U.S., Japan
is a vital source of capital and its major ally in Asia; for Japan, the United States
provides miUtary security, its major market, and the focus of its foreign investment.
Economically, the United States is still the most prosperous industrial nation
in the world. That economic status has so far made Americans the leaders of the free
world. But the situation is changing. The U.S. government has been incapable of
instituting effective reforms to balance the budget and to revive American
competitiveness in local and world markets. Part of the problem lies in American
domestic complacency, and part in unequal international distribution of responsibihties
and benefits.
Americans of the "old stock" are reacting with fear to the recent Japanese
economic invasion of the United States. Japanese business has improved on America's
game. Despite its dependency on foreign natural resources, foodstuffs, and raw
materials, Japan has created an economic society based on quality and efficiency, and
driven by intelligent entrepreneurship.
The U.S. has gotten bogged down by resting on its laurels and by its current
status as a world superpower. American businesses have failed to invest in the future,
and have been swallowed up by the rapid progress of technological change. Unions
have attempted to compensate for inefficiency by bullying businesses into unsound
^Ibid., p. BB17.
contraas. The result of inflated wages is often loss of investment capital (for the
businesses) for staging competitive, increasing relative inefficiency productivity-, and
ultimately a defunct business and unemployment.
Beyond its domestic problems. America is now getting a taste of the colonial
paranoia which it has exported in the past. Japanese investors, lacking investment
opponunities in Japan, have begun to utilize the strong yen to "colonialize" the United
States. To avoid trade restrictions. Japanese bankers and businessmen are designing,
funding, building, and managing businesses and outlets in America. They are buying
up imponant real estate in key American industrial, fmancial, and political centers.
Historically-minded U.S. citizens, especially those alive during World War 11. are
nervous at the prospects of Japanese power gaining control in America.
Consequently, U.S. resentment is gro%ving toward Japan. Japan has also been
encountering increasing animosity firom its European capitalist "peers". Anicle 2 of the
NATO alliance treaty contains the pledge that the allies would "seek to eliminate
conflict in their international economic policies". ^-^ By logical extension to all the
"capitalist bloc" principle players, it is clear that resolution of conflicts among the
United States, Japan, and EEC members is vital to the economic, political, and militan.'
security of the West.
Since Japan's economic strength is currently creating a potential wedge within
the Western alliance, one would expect a non-emotional approach to compromise and
resolution of the problem. Instead, the British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, has
threatened to expel Japanese bankers from Great Britain. The attitude appears to be
indicative of a 'common front" against Japan by the other members of the Big Seven.^"^
The European Economic Community- (EEC) has warned Japan to open its markets to
more imports or to face export-limiting actions via the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT).^^
Both the United States and the European Economic Community' are disturbed
by Japan's failure to trade equitably with them. Japan has not allowed imports the
same freedom into its domestic markets that its exports have enjoyed into American
^^Staniey R. Sloan, SATO's Future: Toward a Xew Transatlaniic Bargain,
(Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1985), pp. 101-102.
^^I'.S. Xews and World Report, 20 .April 1987, p.55. The Big Seven consists of
the United States, Great Britain, Federal Republic of Germany, France. Canada, Italy,
and Japan.
^^Sew York Times, 14 April 1987, p. 37.
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and European markets. The EEC and U.S. are advocating the following changes in
Japanese economic policies:
• Restructuring of Japan's economy to make it more attractive to foreign and
domestic investment;
• Reciprocally liberalizing Japan's fmancial and capital markets to American and
European investors;
• Removing trade barriers to allow export-import flow based on comparative
advantage;
• Removing unfair trade practices (e.g. government subsidized "dumping");
• Cooperating to strengthen world trading and monetary systems.^^
The point is that Japan's allies think that Japan has grown up now and must adjust to
a less protectionist position. Japan's advantageous marketing posture can no longer be
supported by its competition.
There are indicators that Japan has taken the advice of its Allies to heart.
The Keidanren, Japan's most important business association, supports free trade as
being in Japan's ultimate interest. Furthermore, the Nakasone Government is
preparing a package for the Japanese Diet which proposes to speed up growth in the
domestic economy, to increase purchases from the United States, and to increase
Japanese aid to Third World countries. ^^ For example, the Japanese are considering a
S30 billion foreign aid package, not linked to Japanese exports, to Latin America.
However, the conflict between the Western capitalist powers could potentially
be exploited by the USSR. American and European haughty attitudes and
unwillingness to admit and correct their own economic shortcomings could drive Japan
toward a more independent global position. Although Japan is not likely to make an
abrupt political about-face, it is possible that its trade with a willing USSR could make
a marked increase. The new economic policies which its capitalist partners are
suggesting will increase its susceptibility to the prospect of new markets within the
Soviet bloc.
The EEC effectively accepts U.S. "protection" and promotes its own detente
with the USSR.^^ Japan could similarly fmd its own situation pliable enough to enter
into a Japanese version of a "separate peace", or at least greater political independence
from the United States.
^^Leonard Silk, New York Times, 11 April 1987, pp. 23, 27.
^^Leonard Silk, New York Times, 27 April 1987, p. 27.




Even without Soviet encouragement, the Japanese have shown that they are
not prohibited from dealing with Communist clients when the conditions are favorable
for profit. Japan has permitted its businessmen to develop relations with other
members of the Communist bloc as well as the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.
Vietnam and Japan have been developing economic ties. Japan is Vietnam's
second largest trading partner (after the USSR). Japan exports vehicles, ships and
telecommunications equipment to Vietnam, and imports a lot of shrimp. One Japanese
firm has started a shrimp-farming joint venture in Vietnam and has opened a liaison
office in Hanoi.^^
While the USSR is cutting back on its subsidies to Cuba (e.g. previous exports
of under-priced oil and imports of over-priced sugar) Japan had extended S500 million
in credit to Cuba by the end of 1984. In 1983 Japan's exports to Cuba (agricultural
chemicals, simple machinery, electric motors, small computers) came to S104.7 million;
by 1986 they had jumped to an armual rate of S420 million. In contrast, Japan's
imports from Cuba (sugar and shrimp) only rose from S78 miUion in 1984 to SI 20
million in 1986.^°
The implication is that, in the absence of other qualifiers (e.g. specific
political/military animosity), Japan is prepared to expand its export markets regardless
of ideological/political differences. If the USSR were to remove its specific barriers
with Japan (e.g. the Northern Territories issue or the visible military threat), Japanese
business drive could encourage bilateral trade opportunities.
F. SOVIET MONETARY RESOURCES
1 , Barter or Cash
In 1986, 38% of Soviet trade was with the non-Communist bloc.^^ This figure
does not include trade which is funneled from the West to the USSR through the
Communist bloc, especially through East Germany (DDR). Japan limited its share of
imports from the USSR to 1% in 1984, primarily due to poUtical instability of the
USSR-U.S. relationship. Japan, as the United States' most consistent supporter, is
^^ Economist, 6 September 1986, p. 66.
'^^Forbes, 3 November 1986, pp. 38-39.
^^CIA, Handbook of Economic Statistics, 1986, September 1986, p. 98. The
percentage includes trade with Newly Industrialized Countries as well as developed
countries.
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vulnerable to sanctions by either superpower. The USSR only imported 1.5% of
Japan's exports. Key reasons, pertinent to this discussion, are an aversion to building
a hard-currency budget deficit, and CoCom restrictions on some items desired for
import.^^
The specific implications for Japanese-Soviet trade become even more complex
when considering questions of payment; control of trade with the USSR is greatly
dependent on whether Japan accepts barter and buy-back, arrangements, for example,
or whether payment is in hard-currency. The Soviet economy does not create much
hard-currency and the Soviet government does not like to create a hard-currency debt.
Consequently, the Soviets favor barter related trade. But, the USSR generally needs
hard-currency and credits to trade with the West.
2. Western Credit
Related to the question of deciding what technologies should be exported to
the USSR, evaluating the Western position on helping the Soviets to afford the
purchases becomes important. A popular theory suggests that assisting Soviet
purchases of Western products benefits Western economies. Contrary to that theory, a
Rand Corporation study^^ concludes that the reduced welfare of domestic consumers
and taxpayers outweighs the benefit to producers.
Focusing specifically on the direct benefits for the USSR is more appropriate
from the standpoint of conflicting social systems. Western loan subsidies reduce the
pressure on the Soviet Union to comply with Western policies, and can be interpreted
as aiding the enemy, in a very understandable sense. A S3 billion subsidy in effect
saves the USSR the cost of an aircraft carrier^"^ or pays for the USSR's annual support
of Vietnam's Cambodian invasion^^ -the yearly amount of subsidy in 1986.
Furthermore, the subsidies allow the Soviet empire to continue its support of client
states.^^
^^Ibid., p. 97.
^^Daniel F. Kohler, Economic Cost and Benefits of Subsidizing Western Credits to
the East, Rand Report R-3129-USDP (July 1984): pp. 28-32.
^"^Ibid., p. 40.
^^Christian Science Monitor, 18 February 1986, p. 40.
^^Hopkins and Kennedy, Alternate Views of the Soviet Economy, iMarch 1984, pp.
12-20.
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Although the West should avoid forcing the Soviet Union into a corner,
effective use of credits wiihout subsidies makes better political sense than present
policies. Japanese and West European banks hold the bulk of Western commercial
bank exposure to the USSR.^"^ The key to controlling the credit flow to the USSR is
international cooperation; subsidies arise from competition to get the USSR's business.
The capitalist problem of multiple competitive sources for business acquisition seems
to preclude an end to this support of the enemy. The Japanese need new investment
opportunities now. Lacking Western consensus on non-subsidization of credits, they
can rationally be expected to compete for the loan accounts of the Soviet Union. The
USSR has historically been reliable in its debt repayments.^^
3. Exports = Hard-Currency
In order to buy whatever modernizing technologies and equipment become
available, the USSR needs to have hard-currency to facilitate its deals with the West
and Japan. Although barter and buy-back arrangements are sometimes feasible, they
are more time-consuming and less attractive to capitalist businessmen than cash deals.
The sale of exports provides the USSR with convertible currency for increased buying
power in the West.
The USSR's primar\' source of hard-currency is the sale of energy resources to
the West. 80*^o of the USSR's hard-currency earnings are dependent on energy
revenues.^^ When oil dropped below S15 per barrel, forecasters predicted hard-currency
earnings would drop by one-third. Its revenues from energy exports give the USSR
acceptable cash assets to spend on the Western equipment that it needs to compensate
for the inefficiency of unreformed Soviet industrial management.
The value of gold is staying low. Therefore, the USSR's other main source of
convertible currency, gold, for handling its trade deficit is temporarily, at least, of little
value for the purchase of imports from the West. The USSR, remember, does not like
to have a deficit.
^' Roger W. Robinson, Jr., "Soviet Cash and Western Banks," The National
Interest, Summer 1986, p. 38.
^^Gregory Grossman and Ronald L. Solberg, The Soviet Union's Hard-currency
Balance of Payments and Creditworthiness in 1985. Rand Report R-2956-USDP (April
1983): p. iii.
'^^Economist, 20 December 1986, p. 91. In recent years 80% of Soviet hard-
currency' earnings have derived from gas and oil sales alone.
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The effect of less hard-currency on the Soviet Union is that it has less money
to spend on imports of machinery for the modernization of factories'. Hard-currency is
also used to buy Western grain which it needs to offset the inefficiency of Soviet
agriculture.
Since hard-currency from energy exports is getting tougher to maintain at
sufficient levels, it is clear that the Soviets need Gorbachev's economic reforms to make
their agriculture and industry effective. In the long run, practical reforms are needed to
break the cycle of centrally-planned stagnation; short-term crisis management of
resources is no longer deemed acceptable by the CPSU leadership. The current Soviet
hard-currency sources reflect short-run attempts to fix the symptom rather than the
problem.
Recent pronouncements and reforms indicate that the Soviet bosses have
recognized the vulnerabilities inherent in limited sources of generating hard-currency.
The USSR needs to diversify from its dependence on energy resources as its primary
source of hard-currency. To decrease reliance on these current cash staples, the USSR
will have to make trade-expanding concessions toward the capitalist economic system.
A shift in exports from reliance on natural resources/raw materials toward competitive
{both in quality and price) machinery and manufactures would limit sensitivity to
external controls. Soviet dependence on energy sources for hard-currency makes its
economy extremely vulnerable to foreign controls on world pricing and demand for its
energy resources. Nikolai Ryzhkov, the Soviet Prime Minister, has called to Soviet
enterprises to "unite their interests with the demands of the foreign market". ^°° This
statement to the Comecon members, in a December 1985 meeting, indicates the
Soviets' new direction in terms of both improved technology and a shift in its types of
exports.
The first step in moving toward exportable, profitable manufactured goods
would likely be to produce cheap, basic-technology goods which still have high
demand.^^^ However, large-scale alternative world-quality exports are not yet a reality
for the USSR.
Michael Kaser, "The Energy Crisis and Soviet Economic Prospects
1986-1990," World Today, June 1986, p. 92.
Japan Economic Journal, 30 November 1985, p. 1:4; Foreign Broadcast
Information Service (FBIS) (USSR), 26 November 1985, p. C7.
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The Soviet Union invests one-third of its industrial inputs in energy projects.
Up until the Chernobyl disaster, the Soviet planners intended to double the country's
nuclear power capacity to 60,000 megawatts by 1990; coupled with higher coal and gas
production and more hydro-power stations, that energy' potential would free up about
40% of the 130 million tons of oil burned in Soviet power stations each year. But
post-Chernobyl events and the stagnation of oil production (as well as the high cost of




In the nine months from January to September 1986 the USSR increased
its volume of oil sales abroad by 13% and boosted sales of natural gas to record
levels.^^* But in terms of its cash How, the increased sales cannot compensate for fallen
oil prices. The Soviet Union has had to increase its borrowing and its gold sales to
keep the deficit at an acceptable level and to satisfy its hard-currency needs and debts.
The USSR plans for a massive investment {31% increase) to raise its oil
output to between 625-640 million tons by 1990. {Its 1981-1985 Five-Year Plan
minimum goal was 620 million tons, but actually fell from 616 million tons in 1983 to
595 million tons in 1986.)^^^ Although this investment is substantial, it is deemed
necessary for long-range economic revitalization. The current investment in oil equals
one-fifth of total Soviet industrial investment. The return is that two-thirds of its
revenues from the industrial West are generated from oil sales!
Since March 1983 oil exports have also declined as a result of increased
domestic needs. Oil was required to replace the loss of nuclear energy in the aftermath
of Chernobyl as well as to compensate for shortages of hydroelectric output caused by
the drought. The fallen price per barrel necessitates that the volume sold abroad must
increase; the Soviets must address the obvious problem created by the volume of
domestic consumption. To make matters worse, oil is sold on the basis of weak United
States dollars, whereas stronger Japanese yen or European currencies are needed to
purchase much of the available industrial equipment which it wants.
^'^^Economist, 6 December 1986, p. 85.
^^^Michael Kaser, "The Energy Crisis and Soviet Economic Prospects
1986-1990," World Today, June 1986, p.91.
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Unless there is a significant domestic redistribution of resources from either
industrial investment or the defense sector, funds for planned investments in consumer
goods will continue to be provided by currency from oil revenues. But a gap in
fulfillment of the domestic nuclear power plan has occurred which will have to be filled
by oil. Thus, the USSR will experience a decrease of exports as it utilizes oil assets to
meet its domestic needs. This decrease of its key export will necessarily decrease its
supply of hard-currency revenues by the loss of external sales, and further the case for
reducing the defense share of the planned budget.
b. Nuclear
The Chernobyl disaster of early 1986 has had a significant impact on the
USSR. Its immediate effects were loss of life, danger to health, and the loss of at least
one of the four Chernobyl reactors. The long-run effects will be the most telling.
Radiation has caused a reduction in the available arable land and dairy pasture in the
USSR's agricultural heartland. Not only have the other three reactors at Chernobyl
been shut down, temporarily, plans for two additional reactors there have been
suspended. The evacuation of the area also shut down other production in the affected
zone.
The immediate effect of the disaster on electrical power supplies was
minimal. Chernobyl only produced 0.3% (three-tenths of one percent) of the total
Soviet primary energy. However, the Five-Year Plan for 1986-1990 aims to produce
21% of its power from nuclear sources (the plan was pre-Chemobyl) and seems to be
endangered in that respect. Currently, nuclear power produces only 10% of Soviet
total electrical power, 4% short of the 1981-1985 Plan. Failure of the nuclear
production manufacturing plant at Atommash caused the nuclear engineering program
to slip. The Chernobyl accident, added to the fact that the last Five-year Plan missed
its goal, puts the pressure on the Soviets' future energy targets.
Consequently, Gorbachev has stressed that the USSR must become more
efficient in its use of energy. The current Five-Year Plan calls for reduction of energy
intensity (and implied reduction of energy dependence) by 7% to 9%.^'^'* That is, the
Plan demands that less energy be consumed per unit of output. If this feat can be
accomplished it will help to ease the burden of both the loss of planned nuclear power
and the demands on available energy for the domestic sector.




In April 1986 the USSR and Japan agreed merely to continue consultations
on the development of natural gas on the continental shelf off Sakhalin Island. The
project needs to be re-examined due to the sharp fall in crude oil prices worldwide. ^°^
The project could have been begun before the drop in prices occurred, but plans were
delayed by both a Soviet feasibility study and a slackening liquefied natural gas (LNG)
market.^^^ In 1978 the project appeared promising to Japan.^^^ However, after
experiencing the unpredictability and unreliability of the Soviet Union in the joint
Tviimen oil project^^^ and its political unpredictability (e.g. Afghanistan), Japan made
other arrangements for its LNG needs until the late 1990's. The stalled project would
have included 20-year imports by Japan of three million tons of LNG annually from
the USSR.
In August 1986 Japan announced that the USSR would pay cash for
200,000 tons of large diameter pipe, primarily for use in the Siberian natural gas
project. The order is for a total of 400,000 tons of pipe, but the Soviets will pay for
the first half of the order in yen (because of the yen's appreciation against the dollar).
The second half will be paid for in dollar-denominated payments. ^°^ The creation of
this deal is an indicator of the affect that fallen oil prices (based on dollars) have had
on Soviet hard-currency resources.^ ^°
^^^FBIS (USSR), 22 April 1986, p. C2.
^°^FBIS (USSR), 26 November 1985, p. C6.
^^'^Whiting, Siberian Development, 1984, pp. 146-151.
l°^Ibid., pp. 138-141.
^°V5/S (Asia), 13 August 1986, pp. C1-C2.




The building blocks of Secretary Gorbachev's plans to modernize the Soviet
economy require that proven inputs be utilized to make the new foundation stable and
durable. Some of the technology can be procured through socialist sources, but the
most advanced equipment, training programs, and managerial techniques have been
developed in the West (by Japan in particular). The fundamental aspects of critical
technology-related issues and their relevance to East-West trade restriction policies will
be examined in this chapter.
A. TRADE RESTRICTIONS
1. CoCom/National Restrictions.
The Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom) is an
informal, multilateral organization intended to halt the flow of Western militarily
significant technologies to the Communist bloc. CoCom relies on the continued willing
participation of members since it has no strict legal basis in treaty law. This
"gentleman's agreement" operates by prohibiting the export of goods which have been
unanimously accepted as part of the CoCom restriction list.^^^
Beyond the agreed CoCom list, each nation has its own restricted export list.
The United States, until recently, has maintained tight control over its own relevant
products and technologies. One of the most effective arguments for continuing severe
restrictions against Soviet acquisition of U.S. and Japanese high technology goods and
services has been the accusation of "supporting the enemy".
The most recent Report to the Congress by the Secretary of Defense stated
that the Soviets'
assimilation of Western technology has been so broad that the United States and
other Western nations have been, in eflTect, subsidizing the Soviet military
buildup.^ ^2
^^Mohn R. Mclntyre and Richard T. Cupitt, "Multilateral Strategic Trade
Controls Within the Western Alliance," Survey 25, Number 2, Spring 1980, pp. 81-108.
U.S. Secretary of Defense, Caspar W. Weinberger, Annual Report to the
Congress, Fiscal Year 1988, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1987), p. 300.
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The report declared that CoCom is the only organization through which all the NATO
nations (except Iceland) and Japan speak in agreement on the exportability of specified
goods and technology to the Warsaw Pact.
The effectiveness of (U.S) technology security program is inseparable from
multilateral efforts with the same objective. CoCom's efforts are being taken
with increased seriousness by all member countries. It has estabUshed a new
mechanism through which the organization can benefit from timely information
and analyses of technologies whose export may pose significant strategic risks for
the Western Alliance.^ ^^
Defense Secretary' Weinberger warned against supporting the enemy, and
reminded the Congress that the United States is the trend setter in CoCom--the U.S.
must remain firm in its control policies. Despite the efforts of the Department of
Defense, the Department of Commerce succeeded in easing restrictions on exports. ^^"^
A report by the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) appeared in January' 1987 which
articulated the United States' economic losses precipitated by "over-control" of
exports. ^^^ On 9 February 1987, the U.S. Secretary of Commerce aimounced plans for
streamlining the export control system.^ ^^ The immediate effects were exemption from
license requirements for enterprises controlled by allied governments (for the purchase
of U.S. strategic goods). The follow-on proposals included exemption of "reliable"
private companies from licensing requirements, and the elimination of export controls
on products which have readily available foreign equivalents.^ ^^
The United States has maintained its unilateral restrictions primarily to
prevent non-aligned and neutral nations (e.g. India, Brazil, Singapore, Sweden,
Switzerland, and Austria) from acting as middle-men in the transfer of U.S. technology
to the Communist bloc. Unilateral restrictions have given the United States economic
leverage to encourage the cooperation of non-CoCom countries with its policy of
restricting Communist access to American technological advantages.^ ^^ Generally, the
^^^Ibid., p. 303.
^^"^Eduardo Lachica, "U.S. to Relax License Rules on Exporting," JVall Street
Journal, 10 February 1987, p. 2.
^^^"Snips at the Tape", Economist, 17 January 1987, pp. 33-34.
^^^Ron Scherer, "Business Applauds Effort to Speed Up Export Licensing
Process," Christian Science Monitor, 11 February 1987, p. 6.
^^'"U.S. to Relax," Wall Street Journal, 10 February 1987, p. 2.
^^^Eduardo Lachica, "U.S. Plans to Urge Non-Aligned Nations to Keep
Advanced Gear from Soviet Bloc," and "Secrets Police: Neutral Nations Deny
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United States' intended effect has succeeded. The USSR regularly denounces the
capitalist technological selfishness as a hindrance to global forward progress.^ ^^ This
denunciation is an indicator that CoCom and U.S. restrictions have at least made
Soviet acquisition of high-technology goods a difficult task. Due to the diverse
perspectives of national interest among participating countries, CoCom has limited its
joint restriction list to technologies and equipment with military application. However,
as alluded to earlier, there is disagreement among the CoCom nations as to the
definition of critical technologies in terms of national and mutual securities. These
pluralistic countries must convince powerful business lobbies that they are jeapordizing
the security of the CoCom members. The United States, as a CoCom member, has
spearheaded the effort to severely restrict the transfer of technology to the USSR.
Japan generally has been more agreeable to U.S. restrictions than the NATO countries
which are involved in the Committee.
The U.S. relaxation of its unilateral export controls may have several pertinent
affects on Western technology transfer to the USSR:
1. The loosened U.S. restrictions increase the temptation for businessmen to sell
restricted goods to the USSR. Delegation of responsibility for upholding
agreements to individual nations and enterprises decreases the risk of detection
for potential violators.
2. Japan and the other CoCom nations are likely to relax their own unilateral
restrictions in accordance with the precedent set by the United States. The U.S.
decision implies a move toward an increasing prioritization of business relative
to security.
3. Inference that the U.S. is "downgrading" its export controls may act as a
catalyst to "downgrade" the CoCom list. Although the munitons and atomic
energy lists are not likely to be affected, the list of "dual-use"
industrial/commercial products is likely to be whittled down.
The informal nature of CoCom and the unanimity requirement of the CoCom list
makes the organization inherently unstable. However, the fact that it functions well
enough to frustrate the USSR is a tribute to its effectiveness, so far.
Technology to Russia," Wall Street Journal, 15 January 1987, pp. 1, 16.
^^^"CMEA Plan to the Year 2000" FBIS {USSR, Daily Report), 19 December
1985, p. BB9; and "Pravda Publishes Gorbachev Supreme Soviet Speech", FBIS
{USSR, National Affairs), 3 December 1985, pp. R13, R24.
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2. Arguments.
The arguments against the transfer of high-tech goods and technology to the
USSR are ver>' rational, but are also readily countered by those in the West who are
more concerned with profit than with national security. Ironically, the businessmen
who best epitomize the Soviet concept of insatiable capitalism are those most inclined
to enable the USSR to develop socialism as a viable system. That is, those most
ideologically despised by the Soviets are the USSR's greatest allies (in the market
economy countries), for helping to temporarily bypass the weaknesses of the centrally-
plaimed economy.
In that light, an important argument for fewer restrictions is based on the
global competition for sales of equipment and know-how; the U.S. and Japan do not
always have a strict monopoly on technologies. From the Japanese perspective, if
Japan supports severe U.S. restriction policies, the Soviets may acquire the goods from
some other source, and Japan will have only succeeded in losing business. The USSR
has demonstrated the abihty to covertly acquire many items and plans which officially
have limited access. Additionally, independent research and development efforts are
making simultaneous breakthroughs in similar areas of interest throughout the
world. ^^° Once an irmovation is in production, the product cycle is often so short that
if Japan refuses to sell an item, the USSR may be able to buy an equivalent item from
another country (e.g. France or West Germany) in a short time.
From the business perspective, the Japanese could certainly use the Soviet
markets for exports. The key question is whether the trade would appreciably diminish
the mutual and national security of Japan and the other CoCom members. Although
the fundamental disagreements, in the context of the CoCom mechanism, occur
concerning the transfer of "militarily significant" technologies, the issue is actually
political, not military. Defmition of what constitutes "militarily significant" is a
compromise (amongst CoCom members) based on divergent political perspectives of
national security, military application of technology, multiplicity of end-use, and
technology obsolescence. ^^^
^^^New York Times, 8 January 1987, p. 9; e.g. Breakthroughs in superconductors.
^^^Bucy, "Technology Transfer and East-West Trade," pp. 132-151. The
following arguments concerning the pros and cons of technology transfer to the USSR
are presented in greater depth in Bucy's article.
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The proponents of maximum trade mth the Soviet Union and its bloc argue
that only items which have specifically applied military significance should be
restricted, i.e. critical technologies which ensure Western strategic superiority via the
"technology gap". Maximum-trade advocates believe that technological progress is so
rapid now that even highly technical products and processes are practically obsolete
when they are fielded, i.e. the question of technology as end-products versus know-how.
According to this argument, the process design and manufacturing know-how are more
critical than the end-product and should be the object of control. This rationale
contends that product sales do little damage to national security while providing
increased business opportunities. A closely related point concerns active versus passive
transfer mechanisms. Active mechanisms of transfer (such as turnkey factories, joint
ventures, or contracts which include teaching efforts) are more beneficial to the
recipient than passive transfers (such as end-products or machinery) and tend to
rapidly close the technology gap. Again, proponents of increased trade argue that
simple product sales provide more economic gains than security losses.
A final general argument to diminish the criticality (and increase profits) of
sales to the USSR distinguishes between evolutionary versus revolutionary technologies.
This concept proposes that only products which embody state-of-the-art, revolutionary
advances have the potential to threaten the West's continued technological lead. The
contention is that transfer of evolutionary technologies provide ver>' little acceleration
of modernization because of the speed at which revolutionary discoveries are occurring.
Proponents of this view do not perceive that the transfer of even advance "old"
technologies will offer significant benefits to the USSR.
These arguments give little credit to Soviet capabilities for capitalizing on their
successes in acquiring modem equipment and processes. Pro-trade rationalizers ignore
or have forgotten Soviet advances and successes which surprised and puzzled the West
in the past:
• In 1953, the USSR set off its first hydrogen bomb. Fallout samples from the
explosion indicated progress ahead of the United States, in that the Soviet
bomb did not require refrigeration. The implication was that the USSR could
conceivably build an H-bomb-carrying Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM)
before the United States. ^^^
Fred Kaplan, Wizards of Armageddon, (New York: Simon & Schuster, Inc.,
1983), pp. 112-113.
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• In 1957 ihe USSR launched Sputnik, beating the U.S. in putting an object into
outer space. The implication was that the USSR could already have a
,
functional ICBM--years ahead of U.S. ICBM deployment. ^^^
'
•.
The U.S. was "forced" to begin a crash program to ensure that it kept pace with the
USSR in space and nuclear weapons programs.
• In the mid-1970's, the rapid growth of the Soviet chemical industry, made
possible by technology transfers from the West, caused a Western chemical
trade deficit with the East-which resulted in Western factory closings and
unemployment.^^"*
• In 1984 the USSR was exporting computer chips, 64K dynamic RAMs, to the
United States and had j^roduced a 256K dynamic RAM prototype "to match
anything in the West".^^^
The point is that the West cannot afford to underestimate Soviet capabilities to rapidly
advance in areas where the USSR concentrates its efforts. Playing "catch-up", as in the
space-race in the late 50's, is psychologically disadvantageous to the West.
Furthermore, reactive policies tend to be less efficient and less productive than
planned, proactive designs.
At the other end of the spectrum from those who support maximum business,
those for maximum restriction of trade argue that anything useful which we sell to the
USSR-any idea, technology, product or service which saves them research, time, or
money-is detrimental to the national interest. This argument has had its most
controversial impact on the restrictions of commercial and "dual-use" technologies.
"Dual-use" technologies/products normally include those which may be readily applied
to military' uses as well as to their designated commercial purpose.
"Dual-usage" has become an issue because commercial developments have
surpassed militarv* advances in many fields of investigation, especially in the U.S. and
Japan. The protectionist's contention is that regardless of the commercial use intended
by private enterprises (e.g. electronics and aero-space technologies), many of these
advancements have military appUcations which could reduce the West's technological
superiority over the USSR. Without this technological edge, the West's purported
advantage over the USSR's quantitative military superiority would be lost, endangering
the West's mutual security against Soviet expansionism.
123j'
^^'^Bucy, "Technology Transfer and East-West Trade," p. 142.




July 1984, p. 61
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Mention of a well-known example of the enormous affect that "harmless"
technology transfer can produce will illustrate the point. The sale of precision-grinding
machine tools from a Vermont firm to the USSR in the early 1970's would not appear
threatening to national security. -^-^ However, the tools enabled the Soviets to increase
the accuracy of their nuclear missile force by precision-grinding of ball-bearings used in
the control systems. The implications are fairly obvious. In terms of the numbers of
missiles required for the Soviet Union to achieve an acceptable probability of kill
against U.S. (or NATO and Japanese) targets, the inventory size was significantly
reduced.^^"^ A requirement for fewer missiles means that the USSR does not need to
spend as much on maintenance or production to sustain its desired level of potential.
A smaller inventory requirement also gives the USSR the ability to "safely"
negotiate to a smaller number of weapons. The Kremlin's April 1987 arms reduction
proposals^^^ suggest that this reduced quantitative need for maintaining a Soviet
advantage in "correlation of forces" has created greater Soviet flexibility toward the
nuclear balance issue. This negotiating capability is important to the current peace
offensive of the Gorbachev regime. Perhaps most importantly, in the context of the
Soviet economy, fewer rubles are required for maintenance of the USSR's nuclear
posture, making possible greater investment in either the conventional military or
consumer sectors. All these developments may have been possible, at least in part, by
the transfer of grinding machines. The trade restrictionist's viewpoint is well supported
by the enormity of the consequences of this one "dual-use" technology transfer.
B. ILLEGAL TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
All these aspects of the technology transfer question cause political tensions,
nvahry, and maneuvering between East and West, and among Western nations as well.
Illegal transfers of technology through third nations or front organizations further
complicate efforts to halt Soviet acquisition of specific technologies by trade
restrictions. ^^^
^^^Gustafson, "Selling the Russians the Rope?" pp. 10-14.
^^^Lee and Starr, Soviet Military Policy Since World War II, p. 161.
^^^Paul Lewis, "Some NATO Allies Cool to Removing Short-Range Arms," New
York Times, 17 April 1987, pp. 1, 4. xVIichael R. Gordon, "Head of U.S. Arms Control
Agency Criticizes Soviet Proposal," New York Times, 23 April 1987, p. 4.
^^^ Business Week, 29 July 1985, pp. 46-48; Wall Street Journal, 15 January 1987,
p. 1; Linda iMelvern et al., Techno-Bandits: How the Soviets are Stealing America's
High-Tech Future, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1984), passim.
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The Japanese are aware of the Soviet Union's aims m technology acquisition.
They are cognizant that "the priinar\^ aim of Soviet intelligence activities in Japan now
centers on obtaining high technologies developed by private Japanese corporations". ^^°
For example, in November 1985, a Tokyo trading company and two of its employees
were charged with violation of a CoCom ban of computers to the Soviet Union.
Allegedly, the employees of Kokusai Boeki Kaisha took six computers to the USSR as
handbaggage on five occasions between March and July 1985. The company did not
obtain a license from the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) to
expon the computers, worth about 35 million yen.^^^
The fact that underhanded acquisition of new technology and equipment is an
active Soviet government project^ ^" indicates the importance of modernization to the
Soviet leadership. The Soviets have generated a "shopping list" of desired technologies,
from which its agents focus their acquisition efforts worldwide. As former U.S.
Secretary of Defense Harold Brown suggested in 1982, since leakage of military
applications "is inevitable, the goal should be to keep the Soviets four or five years
behind in key technologies". ^^^ The "Year of the Spy, 1985, served as a somber
reminder that individual human appetites will provide the avenue for the USSR to
acquire technologies which it desires.
C. MILITARY
Within the military realm, the Soviet Union could utilize labor-saving high
technology and equipment to diminish the threat to continued Russian control caused
by its diminishing Slavic majority. ^^'* CoCom restrictions and Western policies which
inhibit the transfer of military-relevant technologies make the high-tech solution to the
military's demographic problem a burdensome proposition. The prospect of Soviet
bloc internal production of desired technologies, unavailable from foreign sources,
would require large investments of limited resources into building or upgrading
^^^FBIS (Asia), 21 October 1985, p. CI.
^^^FBIS (Asia), 22 November 1985, p. CI.
^^^Melvem, Techno-Bandits, pp. 17-20: the "shopping list"; pp. 68-70: the
KGB's "Directorate T".
^^^Harold Brown, "Economic Policy and National Security", Orbis, Summer
1982, p. 388. (pp. 381-390).
^^"^S. Enders Wimbush, "Nationalities in the Soviet Armed Forces," Soviet
Nationalities in Strategic Perspective, ed. S. Enders Wimbush, (New York: St. Martin's
Press, 1985), pp. 240-241.
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industries. Even "successful" acquisition of end-products and machinery are
problematic if they do not include technological know-how. Reverse engineering of
products, and trial-and-error organization of production lines are both time-consuming
and expensive. Existent export controls are designed to prevent easy duplication of
Western militarily- significant processes by restricting their accessibility to the USSR.
One of the most serious breaches of export controls, highlighting the national
security implications inherent in technology transfer to the Soviet Union, came to light
in early 1987.^^^ The Toshiba Machinery Company, of Japan, sold the Soviets four
milling machines that make reduced-noise submarine propeller blades. A state-owTied
Norwegian company, Kongsberg Vapenfabrik, sold the USSR the numerical control
systems for the machines.
Soviet technicians tested the room-sized machine at the Toshiba plant in Japan.
Later, the equipment was installed at a Soviet shipyard by employees of both Toshiba
and Kongsberg. To enable fmalization of the S17 million sale, Toshiba made changes
in the machine to circumvent CoCom export controls.
The military impact is that Soviet submarines are now more readily able to avoid
detection-a national security development which cannot easily be given a price tag.
The deliberate circumvention of CoCom controls is a more condemnable offense in
light of the relatively small monetary gain of the sale. Toshiba's American subsidiary,
Toshiba America Incorporated, alone sells about SI billion per year. Kongsberg is
currently contracting for adaptation of the Penguin anti-ship missile to the United
Stares Navy's Seahawk helicopter.
Both Japan and Norway have taken internal actions against the companies,^ -^^
but the damage is already done. The reduced-noise propellers have already been
installed on some Soviet submarines, and the United States will now be required to
address a new, multi-billion dollar antisubmarine warfare effort.
It would be ludicrous to expect that the Japanese government could prevent
further transgressions of this type. Japanese businessmen are aggressive. Despite the
continued potential for private citizens to circumvent the law, Japan has demonstrated
its intent to uphold its agreements with the West. The director and a deputy director
^^^Clyde H. Famsworth, New York Times, 1 May 1987, p. 26.
^^^Michael R. Gordon, New York Times, 14 May 1987, pp. 27, 31.
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of Toshiba were arrested in Tokyo on 27 May 1987 on charges of "illegally exporting
high-technology equipment to the Soviet Union", ^^^ in violation of Japan's
commitment to CoCcm.
The Western trend toward decreased restrictions on the transfer of non-military
technologies^-^ enables the USSR to introduce labor-saving systems into its other
domestic sectors. Easing of the demand for labor in those sectors will allow the
Russians to bolster the military's allowance of the proportionally declining Russian
population. If the economy is revived, investment resources will become sufficiently
available to pump into projects for decreasing the labor-intensity of the Soviet military,
as well.
D. NON-MILITARY
Ironically, on the page of the New York Times following the first report of the
propeller-milling sale, an article appeared concerning the Soviet "concession" to buy
subsidized American wheat. ^^^ The U.S. had been highly perturbed when the USSR
had failed, in 1986, to fulfill the purchases of wheat to which it was committed under a
five-year agreement signed in 1983.
There is no direct military application of this sale, but, obviously, subsidizing
Soviet food supplies benefits the USSR in important ways:
• Greater supplies of foodstuffs implies a higher standard of living and better
health for both civilian and militarv- populations;
• A higher standard of living increases Soviet domestic satisfaction with the
socialist s\-stem and makes it more attractive to other nations;
• Alleviating Soviet agricultural pressures releases resources to applications in the
military, industrial, or consumer sectors.
Regarding the announced Soviet purchase of four million metric tons of
American wheat (the largest sale ever of subsidized American wheat to a single
country), Daniel Amstutz, the Under Secretar\' of Agriculture, stated.
In a sense the agreement is a breakthrough in this long trade relationship
ber.veen the Soviet Union and the United States. It gives evidence that the
relationship is a better one that will lead to more business.
^'^^
^^^"Japan Holds Executives Over Exports to Soviet," New York Times, 28 .May
1987, p. 42.
^^^"Snips at the Tape," Economist, 17 January 1987, pp. 33-34.
^^^Gar>' Klott, New York Times, 1 May 1987, p. 27.
^"^Daniel Amstutz as cited in Gary Klott, New York Times, 1 May 1987, p. 27.
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Evidently, the political assessment is that the benefits of subsidizing grain sales for U.S.
farmers outweigh the risks of aiding the USSR's economic recovery.
Citing these points is not intended to declare that the agricultural subsidization
policy is incorrect for the United States. However, parallel arguments by U.S. Allies,
from their perspective, are equally as significant. The national and regional interests of
Western Europe were served by the Siberian Pipeline deal of the early [QSO's.^"^^ From
the same perspective, the United States would not have been equitable in condemning
Japanese participation in construction of the Baikal-Amur Mainline (BAM). At that
time, Japan's own sense of fairness and security imposed well-considered self-
constraint, despite the potential economic benefits.
E. IMPACT ON USSR
In light of the stagnating condition of the Soviet economy, the proposition that
"anything which helps the USSR in any area aids their military power" deserves
consideration. The Soviet economy, as stated earlier, has consistently failed to meet its
PiTP goals. ^"^^ To fix the economy, the Party leadership plans to apply more of the
factors of production to non-military enterprises, ^"^-^ consequently diverting resources
away from the miUtary buildup. Defense spending has accounted for approximately
14% of the Soviet GNP (conservative estimates) since 1967.^'^'*
The Soviet economy will not collapse. The central planners will allocate
resources wherever necessary to ensure that the country continues to exist. The reform
plan is to realize the "benefits of socialism" at the workers' level. Unless the civilian
economy is upgraded, through modernization of industry as well as by increased
efficiency of present production inputs, the socialist proletariat will merely continue to
suffer for the motherland while the defense industry is kept healthy to protect them
from the capitalists. The concept of survival is basic to the Soviet social and political
cultures.
John Van Oudenaren, The Urengoi Pipeline: Prospects for Soviet Leverage,"
Rand Report R-3207-RC (December 1984): pp. 32-52; Thane Gustafson, Soviet
Negotiating Strategy: The East- West Gas Pipeline Deal, 1980-1984, Rand Report
R-3220-FF (February 1985): pp. 1-9.
^"^^It is important, however, to stress that the Soviet economy is not likely to
collapse. The question remains how well it can be fixed, and what sacrifices will be
required in its fixing.
^^^New York Times, 15 May 1987, p. 29.
U.S Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World MiUtary Expenditures and
Arms Transfers, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985), Table I.
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However, the trend in tlie USSR is to increase the benefits of socialism to the
masseS"to move beyond mere survival. Success in this effort is expected to bolster
morale, improving the economy by productivity and making Soviet socialism more
appealing. To promote these results, the means for modernization must be available.
This necessity can be most rapidly fulfilled via advanced technology transfer with the
West. Since the USSR will attempt to meet its perceived requirements legally or
illegally (and always aggressively), Japan is in a position to benefit from high-tech trade
with the Soviet Union. The businessman's desire for expanded trade can be expected
to be satisfied whenever the security risks are sufficiently limited and when the trade is
not specifically prohibited by governmental regulations or agreements.
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IV. POLITICAL
Economic relations between nations do not exist in a vacuum. As the world
"shrinks" through improved communications, transportation, and expanded commerce,
international interdependence generally expands. The key variables restricting the
unhampered growth of globalism are politically based.
Each sovereign nation is primarily concerned with its own national interest
(including standard of living and security). To avoid having the will of a superpower
inflicted on them, nations generally either declare neutraUty or join an alliance. Within
either framework, a nation attempts to maintain its individuality while capitahzing as
much as possible on the benefits of the position it has chosen.
The complexities of global co-habitation foster conflict between nations and
alliances. Through international interaction, compromises or unilateral decisions
determine the nature of national coexistence. Unilateral decisions are normally reached
by victory in war or the threat of war. Peaceful coexistence is maintained through
politically-driven concessions or compromise.
The USSR, although it is a mihtary superpower, must weigh the economic,
ideological, and political risks of imposing its will on less powerful nations by force.
Acceptance by the West as a feared but respected superpower is important to the
Kremlin's image. The expected, unacceptable consequences of pre-meditated bullying
are a part of the deterrent which contains the USSR's ambitions for Soviet-socialist
expansion. The potential affects of economic and social linkage to aggressive
political/military actions at least keep the Soviet Union mindful that its international
relations are not unchecked by the West.
Like the USSR, Japan is very concerned with the way it is perceived by others.
Presentation of a strong and respectable unage is very important. International
embarrassment or humiliation is deeply felt and can cause emotional rather than
rational responses to stimuli. Japan's character is more restrained and patient than the
USSR's, but is no less intense.
The USSR is ruled by a political elite within one party-the CPSU. The executive
organs are the CPSU's Politburo and Secretariat. Although the details of the decision-
making process of the PoHtburo are not known, the process culminates in consensus.
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Although internal power struggles are on-going, Soviet political culture demands that
the leadership present a united front to outsiders. ^"^^ The Soviet people, in general, feel
comfonable when led and protected by an undivided, centralized leadership. A stable
government supports traditional habits of risk-avoidance, and fosters continued
cultural emphasis on group survival rather than individual interest. The centralized
Soviet state is, therefore, responsible for control of contacts with foreigners, as well.
Consequently, business transactions with Japan will be subject to governmental
approval, and will be affected by fundamental precepts of risk-avoidance and distrust
of outsiders.
The Japanese government, although pluralistic in a Western democratic format,
is also consensus-oriented. However, to a great degree it functions by compromise
among its parties. By perpetuation of this system, all factions gain input to decisions
and consequently receive a stake in political solutions. Private businesses are
encouraged to economically diversify and grow, while the government maintains
stabilit}^ and national security. The Japanese government controls its private
businesses' cooperation with the USSR by three basic mechanisms: ^"^^
1. Japan refuses to make inter-governmental agreements with the USSR, but has
no basic objection to expansion of economic ties between Japanese businessmen
and the Soviet Union.
2. To ensure Japan's security' and national interests, the government exercises
leverage via export controls on strategically significant products and technology,
and by control of loans, credits, and approval of the Export-Import Bank of
Japan-indispensable for implementing projects.
3. Japan insists that any large projects involving the development of strategic
resources (e.g. oil and natural gas) be conducted jointly with businesses from
other Western nations, preferably the United States. This policy offers more
leverage against potential Soviet failure to repay loans or debts than Japan
could wield if onlv its own businesses were involved.
^^^Edward L. Keenan, "Muscovite Political Folkways," The Russian Review 45,
1986, p.l71.
^^^Naotake Nobuhara and Nobutoshi Akao, "The Politics of Siberian
Development," Japan's Economic Security, ed. Nobutoshi Akao (New York: St.
Martin's Press, 1983), pp. 208-9.
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A. USSR
The USSR's political system may be considered authoritarian.^'*^ Its identifying
characteristics, both structural and functional, determine the likelihood of a Soviet
decision to increase trade with Japan and suggest procedures which can reasonably be
expected in the implementation of the government's ambitions. Structural
considerations^"*^ (such as political culture, the legal system, the media, and internal
opposition forces) and functional notions^ "^^ (including political socialization, political
recruitment, and political communication) have direct impact on trade with Japan due
to the control of the government over all foreign trade.^^°
Structural patterns of institutional behavior are primarily influenced by the
political culture of the Soviet Union. Crucial to this component of the Soviet national
w^U 's the current thrust toward increasing the benefits of the system to the masses.
Success in this area will increase the peoples' stake in the system as well as being
critical to the economic recovery.
The legal s^'stem is manipulated to demonstrate governmental support for new
ideas. The current state of flux of economic legislation has caused many Soviets to be
hesitant about risking personal attachment to the new proposals. Historical precedents
of failed reform policies under Khrushchev inhibit rapid public acceptance of new
concepts. Although the Private Enterprise law was effective on 1 May 1987, the Law
on State Enterprise, fundamental to the proposed reforms, is still in the draft stage.
Until testing and debate are completed, modernization will be hampered by distrust at
the popular level. The end of economic debate and concensus on the fmal version of
this basic law will be a signal for relatively safe acceptance of its principles.
Secretary Gorbachev's domestic "glasnost" is a pragmatic policy designed to
prepare the way for greater access to international information throughout the USSR.
Gorbachev is facing the need to introduce mass-communication systems (for computer
and data-processing modernization) head-on. Despite the use of "glasnost" by his
opponents to attempt the undermining of his reforms, Gorbachev has not yet
succumbed to the temptation to silence them by restoring tough, pro-regime editorial
censorship. In fact, beyond withstanding the pressures of domestic glasnost. Secretary
Gorbachev appears to have begun the process toward global glasnost by halting the




^^^FBIS, (USSR, National Affairs), 18 February 1987, pp. S23-S24.
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jamming of Voice of America broadcasts directed at the USSR.^^^ Gennady
Gerasimov. a spokesman for the Soviet Foreign Ministry,^^^ and Gene Pell, president
of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty,^ ^^ both alluded to the concept that "forbidden
fruit is the sweetest". By relaxing information control, Secretary Gorbachev is
providing a vehicle for the inroads of mass-communication and technological
modernization, "legitimizing" the government as the proponent rather than the repressor
of information flow.
Similarly, through relaxation of restrictions on emigration^ ^'^ and the freeing of
political prisoners, Gorbachev has inspired hope that an enlightened, humanitarian
government is emerging. ^^^ The entrenched ethnic Russian dominance of the system
suggests that domestic nationalistic controversy will continue, and with it the historical
Nippophobic and pro-Slavic racist attitudes of the ruling elite-a hindrance to any
improvements between the USSR and Japan, including trade.
Among the functional political processes affecting Soviet-Japanese trade
relations, the most important is certainly the USSR's efforts toward direct political
socialization within its own system. In the West, political socialization may be an
indirect process. The system evolves in accordance with enlightenment or shifting
focus of public opinion. In the USSR, continuation of the existing political system has
traditionally been ensured by manipulating public beliefs, attitudes, and values.
Control of the political socialization process has been possible by indoctrination within
the education system, within youth and social groups, and through the media.
One of the bases of opposition to Gorbachev's "glasnost" and "perestroika"
campaigns is the fear of governmental bureaucrats, secure in the nomenklatura, that the
preservation of their privileged existence is threatened. The CPSU has ensured its
dominance over the system via highly selective political recruitment practices. The
procedures also function to maintain the loyalty of the political elite by making their
stake in the benefits dependent on support of the system.
^^^ David Binder, "Soviet 'Voice' Jammers Shift to 'Liberty'," New York Times, 2
June 1987, p. 6.
^^^U.S. News & World Report, 8 June 1987, p. 9.
^^^Binder, New York Times, 2 June 1987, p. 6.
^^**"Jews Are Said to Leave Soviet at a Higher Rate", New York Times, 2 June
1987, p. 3.
^^^Bill Keller, "Some Soviet Dissidents Complain Sakharov Is Softer on Civil
Rights," New York Times, 3 April 1987, pp. 1, 6.
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Secretary Gorbachev's overtures toward "democratization" have threatened the
security of Party members at the middle levels by upsetting established procedures for
appointment to official positions. Bureaucrats have reacted by disrupting
implementation of "democratic procedures" in the nominations and elections of
government and Party officials. ^^^
The USSR is undergoing a shock effect in reaction to glasnost. Secretary
Gorbachev has demonstrated determination to prepare the way for expansion in
communications capabilities. Rather than easing the nation into information access,
he has chosen to bombard the people with new facts and ideas. Many Soviets already
wish to return to the former situation whereby they trusted in the government to take
care of them--reform efforts have promoted a sense of insecurity among much of the
population. ^^^ Glasnost has stirred up uncertainty.
Gorbachev knows that after the turmoil, the dust will settle. He aims to see the
Party in a stronger position-as soon as the novelty of information overload has waned
and the resistance to change has subsided. The vision he sees is a Soviet Union with
the CPSU still in firm political control, militarily strong, economically modernized and
energized, and more attractive to its population and to the world.
The drive for new openness suggests Soviet willingness to be more reasonable in
its terms with foreign businesses. The threat which Gorbachev faces is comprised of
impatience, perceived insecurity, and a lack of vision within the Party bureaucracy.
Within this politically unstable framework, reasonable steps toward increased trade
may be interpreted by Party apparatchiks as a demonstration of governmental
weakness and as a long-range threat to their special position in the society. The longer
Gorbachev survives politically, the greater the chance that the system will conform to
his vision and that the USSR will offer greater incentives to trade with Japan.
B. JAPAN
The political system is a reflection of the fundamental political culture of the
nation as well. Probably the most significant difference between the USSR and Japan
in the political realm is that Japan is a pluralistic, Western democratic society. As
such, Japan's government normally considers the needs of all the people and factions in
reaching a consensus on specific issues. The Japanese political culture does not allow
156
May 1987, p. 3.
Philip Taubman, "An Election in Moscow Sputters Out," New York Times, 29
157Flora Lewis, "Soviet Hopes and Fears," New York Times, 8 June 1987, p. 23.
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minority groups to be ignored or elite groups to receive special ofTicially-promoted
advantages. Compromise is a traditional tool for offering all factions a stake in final
decisions.
The recent disagreement over imposition of a sales tax serves as an example of
the possible repercussions of efforts to circumvent this tradition. Prime Minister
Nakasone's Liberal Democratic Party forced the proposed Japanese budget bill
through a parliamentary committee"tr\'ing to speed up work on economic measures
requested by the United States. ^^^ Opposition parties reacted angrily and vowed to
mount a fiUbuster. True to their word, a coalition of the opposition parties blocked
passage of the budget by conducting three days of speeches and no-confidence votes in
the House. After Xakasone gave in to the pressure and agreed to drop the proposed
sales tax, the S3 80 billion budget passed in the House of Representatives within
minutes. ^^^ Anger at the attempted violation of the tradition of consensus
overshadowed Nakasone's "good intentions" of working quickly to appease Japan's
impatient American friends.
As in other highly literate countries, Japan's media holds great control over the
political atmosphere of the people. However, true to its pluralistic. Western
democratic foundations, the Japanese press is free to express its prejudices (including
nationalistic emotions) as its editors see fit. Even under "glasnost", the Soviet press is
still ultimately controlled by the government, whether formally or informally.
A representative portrayal of Japan's press was conveyed in an article in the Ne^v
York Times in May, 1987.^^° The Japanese media was characterized as reliable, but
tending toward the sensational. In Japan, as in the United States, "spice" sells
newspapers. An example (within the article) demonstrated the media's exploitation of
emotions which could lead to popular support of Japanese trade expansion with the
USSR.
Nuances of translations were used to arouse anti-American sentiments. In
discussing the U.S. Senate Finance Committee's version of the United States' trade bill,
the concept of "adversarial trade" stirred up substantial controversy. The phrase
^^^Susan Chira, "Nakasone Party Forces Budget Bill Through Panel," New York
Times, 16 April 1987, p. 4.
^^^Clyde Haberman, "Nakasone Suffers a Severe Setback as Japan's Leader,"
New York Times, 24 April 1987, pp. 1, 4.
^^^Clyde H. Farnsworth, "How the Japanese Gain Perspective on Covering
America," iV^w York Times, 27 May 1987, p. 10.
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defines "conditions in which one country uses trade barriers combined with policies
favoring certain industries to obtain advantages over a trading partner". ^^^ Most
Japanese newspapers translated the phrase "adversarial trade" as "teki-taitekei boeki"—
i.e. trade in the face of an enemy. Such a strong public response was felt in Japan that
the Japanese Foreign Ministry advised Japanese newspapers to change the translation
to "sogai boeki"--i.e. obstructionist trade-the Ministry's own translation of the phrase.
The newspapers responded in democratic fashion to the government's advice.
Mainichi Shimbun, a large Japanese newspaper, accepted the less sensational
translation; Yomiuri Shimbun, Japan's biggest-selling newspaper, retained the alarmist
translation; and Asahi Shimbun, the second-largest Japanese newspaper, continued to
use the original translation with the less-sensational one in parentheses.
The public clamor over this issue illustrates the power that the media ^^-ields in
the Japanese consensus-oriented political arena. The point that Japan's two largest
newspapers opted for continued usage of the "negative" translation is noteworthy.
Popular friction is growing among Japanese toward Americans. ^^^ The USSR would
benefit from deteriorating Japanese-American friendship by inhibition of progress on
joint U.S.-Japan projects. However, close political ties between Japan and the USSR
are prohibited by their failure to conclude a peace treaty following WW II. Japan




Japan's participation in the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) has become a
serious political issue in the USSR's perceptions and rhetoric toward the relationship
between the two countries. In 1985, when the Soviets saw Japan's cooperation with
the United States on SDI becoming a likelihood, they launched a threat and
propaganda campaign. The Soviet press noted the imminent transfer of Japanese
optical communications, electronics, and missile homing technology to the U.S., and
added,
i^^Ibid.
^^^Clyde Haberman, "U.S. and Japan: Fraying Ties," New York Times, 5 June
1987, pp. 27, 31.
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Facts indicate that acting on Washington's prompting, the Japanese ruling circles
ore pushing their country' to the dangerous road of joint American-Japanese
nuclear preparations.'^^
In fact, under Japanese law. militarily applicable technologies can be exported only to
the United States/^"*
Japanese SDI-related frictions have not been limited to the Soviet Union, but
have also extended to its Western allies. The Japanese, although they are very
interested in the project, are wary of the potential for CoCom restrictions on the fruits
of their SDI research. Japanese firms involved in the research would like to be able to
apply developments to civilian products as well as to the SDI project. The Japanese
Federation of Economic Organizations (Keidanren) has asked the Japanese government
to work out the details of the Japanese participation in the SDI program. ^^^ The
Keidanren further requested that the government exempt techniques which have
already been developed; they feel that restrictions on the grounds of militar>' secrecy
should not apply to research previously accomplished. The Japanese business
community wants the freedom to apply developments to commercial ventures as much
as possible.
Actually, the Soviet Union is not likely to attack Japan because of the SDI
issue due to the high risk of almost certain U.S. intervention. But the Japanese will use
economic appeasement of the So\'iets as a means of maintaining as low a tension level
as possible between the two nations.
2. Northern Territories
Within Japan's pluralistic society, there is general agreement that Japan
should not give up on the Northern Territories issue. However, there are significant
differences among parties and interest groups regarding the specifics of the bottom line
for settlement; views range from the return of only the Habomais and Shikotan, to the
Japanese Communist Party's contention that the Japanese should settle for no less
than the Northern Territories plus the entire Kurile Chain! ^^^
The Soviet Union would like to settle its differences \v\\h Japan. Resolution
of their mutual contentions would make economic cooperation simpler and would offer
the Soviet Union another tool for separating Japan from its present allies. A
''^'FBIS {USSR. Daily Report), 8 November 1985, pp. C1-C2.
^^FBIS {Asia), 21 October 1985, p. CI.
^^^FBIS {Asia), 21 October 1986, p. C3.
^^^Berton, Asian Survey, December 1986. p. 1262.
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U.S.-Japan nft would increase the USSR's opportunities for extending political
influence within the Japanese government and culture. The promotion of detente by
settling the Northern Territories issue could be an indisputable propaganda boost for
Japanese perceptions of the Soviets. However, Soviet control of the Sea of Okhotsk as
part of its "bastion concept" makes such a possibility unlikely at best. In contrast to
the rationality of pursuing rapprochement, the USSR continually reduces its political
standing among the Japanese by continued military buildup and refusal to admit that a
Northern Territories question even exists. ^^"^ The Soviet Union's official position is that
the question is already settled.
The CPSU's belief is that there will be an ultimate victory of socialism.
Unless there were some other great gain ("two steps forward") to be made by making
this territorial concession ("one step backward"), the USSR would be unlikely to give
up the ground it has gained. By waiting, the Soviets believe that events will
scientifically evolve to give them the advantage... scientific socialism is not in a hurry.
Whether the forward-moving economic prospects of increased friendship with Japan
will seem great enough to take a step backward, territorially and strategically, will be
decided in the Politburo.
3. Political Indicators
In January 1986, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze visited Japan.
His was the first visit by a Soviet Foreign Minister to Japan in ten years.^^^ During his
visit a new Japanese-Soviet trade and payments agreement was signed which officially
established the trend toward mutual trade and economic cooperation. ^^^ The Soviets
are attempting to correct the recent downward trend of Soviet-Japanese trade; after
peaking at S5.5 billion in 1982, USSR-Japan trade was down to S4.2 billion in 1985.^'^°
As a "gesture of good will", the Soviet Union agreed to allow Japanese citizens
to visit ancestral graves on the Northern Territories without submitting to Soviet
political manipulation. The Soviets began requiring a visa to visit the islands in 1976.
Japanese compliance with their demand would have implied agreement with Soviet
^^^Hiroshi Kimura, "The Soviet Military Buildup: Its Impact on Japan and Its
Aims," Soviet Far East Military Buildup: Nuclear Dilemmas and National Security,
Richard H. Solomon and Masataka Kosaka, eds., (Dover, Massachusetts: Auburn
House Publishing Company, 1986), pp. 114-118.
^^^Berton, Asian Survey, December 1986, p. 1273.
^^^FBIS {USSR, Daily Report), 13 March 1986, p. CI.
^"^^Berton, Asian Survey, December 1986, p. 1273.
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ownership of the Northern Territories. In 1986, the procedure was simplified when the
USSR dropped the visa requirement for Japanese visits to the Northern Territories.
Although the Northern Territories deadlock was not resolved, this relaxed visitation
policy could eventually decrease some of the domestic pressure for the return of the
Territories to Japan.^'^ On the other hand, the "generosity" of the USSR only served
as a reminder of Soviet heavy-handedness and had the short-term effect of irritating
many Japanese. Nonetheless, the agreement for reciprocal visits by Japanese and
Soviet citizens to ancestral gravesites was announced on 1 July 1986, and the first visit
by Japanese nationals began on 21 August 1986 with a group of forty- six persons to
Shikotan and the Habomai Islands. ^^^
The USSR is experiencing political problems in Japan even with its
Communist "comrades" there. The Japanese Communist Party (JCP) is willing to
support the CPSU's rhetoric for world peace and nuclear disarmament, and to
eliminate the Japan-United States military alliance. Furthermore, the JCP vigorously
protested the Japanese government's refusal to allow a delegation from the
Kampuchean Peoples' Revolutionary Party (KPRP) to come to the JCP 17th Party
Congress in Japan.^'^ But the CPSU was not pleased with the JCP's stand on the
Territorial issue- the JCP believes that the entire Kuriles should be returned to Japan.
The JCP was accused of being "in league with those who are pushing the country down
the dangerous road of reassessing the outcome of World War 11".^^"^ As a result, when
the JCP Chairman, Tetsuzo Fuwa, later visited Moscow in August 1986, his scheduled
meeting with Secretary Gorbachev was delayed for a week because Gorbachev was
"suffering from a cold". At their eventual meeting, the two simply agreed to strengthen
the relations between their Parties. ^^^
Although the Japanese government would not allow the KPRP delegation to
enter Japan, Vietnamese State Minister Vo Dong Giang visited Tokyo in October 1986.
Japan, along v^ith China and the ASEAN nations, has condemned the Vietnamese
invasion of Kampuchea. Soviet relations with all those nations have been hampered
by its enabling support of the Vietnamese action. Nonetheless, Japan did allow the
Vietnamese Minister to visit, indicating that Japan is not closed to dialogue with the
^^Mbid., p. 1277.
^"^^FBIS {Asia), 13 August 1986, p. CI.
^''^FBIS {USSR, Daily Report), 26 November 1985, pp. C1-C6.
1
'^Ibid., p. C5.
^''^FBIS {Asia), 13 August 1986, p. CI.
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Soviet client. Vo Dong Giang declared during the visit that there is a 99.99% certainty
that the Vietnamese pullout from Kampuchea will be completed by 1990J^^
Small incidents tend to keep the nations politically on edge, despite efforts to
relieve tensions. On 14 February 1986 a seaman from a Soviet trawler jumped off his
boat in the Tsugaru Strait and was picked up by Japanese fishermen. When he arrived
in Tokyo he requested asylum in the United States.^^^ Defections are politically
embarrassing.
Three months earlier, in November 1985, a Soviet minesweeper in the
Tsushima Strait fired three warning shots when a small Japanese fishing boat
attempted to untie a rope which had coiled around the anchor of the minesweeper.
The minesweeper left the area when two Japanese patrol boats arrived, but the
Japanese government protested the incident ''complete with the minesweeper's hull
number and name).
In some cases, political incidents become directly enmeshed with economic
implications. In 1985, before disruption of the fishing accord talks, the Soviet fisheries
minister had indicated during a visit to Tokyo that the USSR would not object to
Japanese salmon fishing in the Northwest Pacific for at least two years, and implied
that Japanese fishing would not affect the salmon stocks there for at least that long.
However, when the negotiations began for the accords, the Soviet hard-line came into
effect. The fisheries minister informed the Japanese that the USSR was waiting for a
proposal from Japan for a joint plant to produce fish paste in Sakhalin^ "^ before
finalizing the accords. Thus, the latest salmon accords do not enhance a belief that the
USSR will be a reliable business partner. Rather, they expect the Soviets to be highly
manipulative in linking politics to economics.
The Japanese perceive the Soviets' political oscillations to be as unpredictable
as the Kremlin's perception of the Americans'. Brezhnev stated in 1978 that the
as the Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea, and Soviet support of Vietnam, is a focal
point of contention among the USSR, China, and ASEAN. Japanese bilateral
relations with Vietnam consequently interest Japan's neighbors.
FBIS (Asia), 22 November 1985, p. CI.178
^'^'^FBIS {Asia), 19 November 1985, p. C2.
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world is getting an even clearer picture of the United States as an absolutely
unreliable partner in interstate ties, as a state whose leadership, prompted by
some whim, caprice, or emotional outburst or by considerations of narrowly
understood immediate advantage, is capable at any moment of violating its
international commitments and nullifying treaties and agreements it has
.ion ' = =
signed/I 180
Although the United States' unpredictability is generally ascribed to the American
emotional character, Soviet unreliability due to party control and inflexibility of the
centrally-planned system yields the same ultimate result. The Kremlin is either
unwilling or unable to reconcile this common restrictor to effective commerce. Due to
occurrences like the fisheries accords cited above, Japan suspects the same unreliability
in bilateral dealings with the Soviet Union that Brezhnev expressed toward the United
States.
But these doubts did not entirely cripple Soviet-Japanese negotiations. A
Soviet-Japanese fishery accord, completed in April 1986, indicated that the
governments are in fact able to reach compromises and will continue to conduct
bilateral trade. However, the Japanese people are not entirely complacent about
governmental political maneuverings. As part of the accord, each nation must provide
one port for food supplies and rest of fishermen operating near each other's territorial
waters. When two Soviet trawlers entered Hitachi Port, 1500 policemen were called
out to ensure control of about 330 anti-communist protestors against the port-call. ^^^
D. AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS
Ultimately, Japan depends on the United States for its security. But the Japanese
Defense Forces are growing stronger and Japan is accepting greater responsibility for
its share in the Western military power buildup-as a hedge against potential Soviet
hegemonic maneuverings. Although some of the nations of the Far Eastern and
Pacific regions are not entirely enthusiastic about growing Japanese military power
(due to memories of World War II), the United States government is generally
supportive of increased Japanese military participation for its own defense.
^^^Leonid Brezhnev, Pravda, 17 June 1978, as quoted in Vernon V. Aspaturian's
"Soviet Global Power and the Correlation of Forces," Problems of Communism, May-
June 1980, p. 14.
^^^FBIS (Asia), 13 November 1986, pp. C5-C6.
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The Iraqi attack on the U.S. Navy guided missile frigate, the Siark, focused
attention on the danger and expense of U.S. protection of its allies' interests in the
Persian Gulf.^^^ Japan receives 56% of its oil from the Gulf region, ^^^ but has no
military presence in the area. Consequently, most of its petroleum imports (and its
industry, by extension) are assured by the United States.
Since Japan's constitution prohibits power projection beyond its immediate
environs, ^^"^ Prime Minister Nakasone has offered to relieve some of the U.S.'s
superpower financial burden by contributing in other ways. Japan has pledged to
contribute aid to third world countries (with no "strings" attached) in Latin America
(S30 billion), Africa, and Asia.^^^ Moreover, Japan has offered to give the United
States money to help cover the protection costs of its Gulf oil imports. Japan is, after
all, the world's second-largest free market economy. ^^^
However, the United States' friend Japan has seemingly learned its economic
lessons too well. Significant tensions and ill feelings have been generated as the U.S.
and Japan have tried to constrain the Japanese economic surge from doing too much
damage to the declining American status as the preeminent world economic power.
While the U.S. has enjoyed the side effect of reducing its budget deficit by the
devaluation of the dollar, the Japanese have been experiencing the obvious affects of
the rapidly appreciated yen^^'^ -growing unemployment (2.9%),^^^ decreased demand
for its exports (down 4.6% in 1986 due to relatively higher international prices), and
total economic growth slowed (to 2.3% in 1986). The yen has appreciated 70%
against the dollar (from 260 to 153 per dollar) in two years. The U.S. has agreed to try
to stop the continued devaluation of the dollar, while Japan promises to stimulate its
domestic economy (to reduce exports and increase American imports to Japan).
^'^^John H. Cushman, "Iraqi Missiles Hit U.S. Navy Frigate in Persian Gulf,"
New York Times, 18 May 1987, pp. 1, 8.
^^^Lee A. Daniels, "Oil from Persian Gulf: Little Threat Seen Now," New York
Times 28 May 1987, p. 9.
^^"^"Japan Weighs a Contribution," New York Times, 5 June 1987, p. 7.
^^^Leonard Silk, "Painful Japan-U.S. Shift in Economic Relations," New York
Times, 27 April 1987, pp. 23, 27.
^^^"Japan Weighs a Contribution," New York Times, 5 June 1987, p. 7.
^^^ Business Week, "The Rampaging Yen is Leaving a Trail of Misery," 16
February 1987, pp. 46-47.
^^^U.S. News and World Report, 9 March 1987, pp. 42-43. Data found in the
rest of the paragraph is taken from the same report.
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Unfortunately, both governments criticize each other, saying that agreements are not
being kept and both are developing an attitude of wariness toward the other's motives.
As Japanese businessmen seek to continue their expansion and profits, they have
sought investments in foreign countries where their returns can be assessed in terms of
relatively less valued currencies, culminating in greater competitiveness in world
markets. As regards the topic of this paper, this is a positive prospect for Japanese
investments in the USSR. But in terms of relations with the United States, a
noticeable "American nationalism" is reacting against the surge of Japanese
investments in the United States. ^^^ Japanese businesses are establishing factories and
buying important real estate across the United States.^^° Americans are reacting with
paranoia to their first serious taste of what American businessmen have been spreading
to the world for decades. Many Americans fear that Japan is economically colonizing
the United States.
The biggest issues between the United States and Japan have been the charges,
against Japan, of microchip dumping, and of failure to adhere to a bilateral agreement
whereby Japan would import more American semiconductors.^^^ The protectionist
reaction by the United States resulted in the "incentive" levying of 100% tariffs on S300
million worth of selected Japanese electronic products. Although Japan has denied the
dumping charges, it has nonetheless taken measures to appease the United States'
perception of the issue. ^^^
Allen Wallis, United States Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs,
attributed a great deal of the economic ill feelings between Japan and the United States
to "unsupported and inflated rhetoric". He maintained that "much of what is said is
wrong and mischievous, serving selfish special interests at the expense of our national
interest". ^^^ He stated that the real causes of the trade problem are in macroeconomics.
Mr. Wallis delineated the six main elements of the American position on Japanese
trade:
^^"^Asian Wall Street Journal, 20 January 1987, p. 10.
^^^Business Week, 17 November 1986, pp. 80-81, and 27 October 1986, p. 55.
^^^ Clyde Haberman, "Nakasone Urges U.S. to Withdraw Its Tariff Plan," New
York Times, 7 April 1987, p. 36.
^^^Leonard Silk, "On Mutual Deterrence," New York Times, 22 April 1987, p. 30.
^^^Silk, "Painful Shift," New York Times, 27 April 1987, p. 27.
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1. Japan should restructure its economy to attract more foreign and domestic
investment; tlie United States is seeking a gradual reduction of capital inflow
into the United States.
2. Japan should liberalize its financial and capital markets by making them as
accessible to American investors as the U.S. capital market is to theirs.
3. Japan should remove its trade barriers to allow export-import flow based on
comparative advantage.
4. Entire industrial sectors should be opened through the MOSS (market-oriented,
sector selective) talks.
5. Action will be taken under international law (or unilaterally if necessary) to
remove unfair trade practices (e.g. U.S. unilateral punitive tariffs due to alleged
Japanese microchip dumping).
6. The United States and Japan must cooperate to strengthen the world trading
and monetary systems. ^^''^
Japan has, in fact, initiated measures to respond along the proposed lines.
• Domestically, Japan is attempting to stimulate economic growth to encourage
the purchase of imports and narrow its trade surplus. The government, on 29
May 1987, a|3proved a package for public works spending and tax cuts totalling
S42 bniion.^^^
• Three British investment banks are expected to gain membership on the Tokyo
Stock Exchange,^ ^^ and four major American commercial banks will be
permitted to establish securities underwriting and trading operations in
Tokyo.^^^
Japan has plans to increase purchases of U.S. supercomputers, and to purchase fighter
aircraft from the United States rather than to build their own. About SI billion is
expected to be spent on imports, mostly from the U.S., to help reduce the American
trade deficit with Japan. ^^^
In a speech at Stanford University in May 1987, the U.S. Secretary of State,
George Schultz, warned that the United States can no longer be counted on to provide
the impetus for world economic growth. He urged other nations to change their
policies of depending on the United States.
l^'^Ibid.
^^^"Japan Moves to Hasten Public Works Spending," Wall Street Journal, 3 June
1987, p. 26.
l^^Ibid.
^^^Eric N. Berg, "Japan Lets 4 U.S. Banks Underwrite Securities," New York
Times, 4 June 1987, p. 25.
^"Japan's Plan for Economy," New York Times, 29 May 1987, p. 41.198-
In years past, a vigorous and open American economy served as the major
engine of global grovnh. But in a world economy with increasingly diverse
centers of productive capacity, the United States cannot continue to perform this
function alone. ^^^
Commenting on the need for Japan to reduce its trade surplus, he stated that such
steps by Japan would benefit the Japanese people and the global economy as a whole.
Although coordinated policies are needed to stabilize the world economy,
political leaders generally continue to prioritize national economic and political
interests ahead of global considerations. This fact is not surprising. Politicians in the
West tend to put popular appeasement and re-election ahead of realistic, long-range
objectives. Furthermore, inter-governmental agreements increasingly seem to create a
gap between words and actions.
Most international attempts at stabilizing the free-market economies consist of
governmental plans rather than accomplishments. The U.S. continues to pressure its
Allies to help reduce the American budget deficit rather than to take decisive but
tmpopular unilateral steps (e.g. domestic tax increases). The Allies resist U.S.
pressures, feeling that their own national growth should not be hampered by America's
relatively declining economic power. Japan has "planned" a number of appeasing
measures, has actually made a few significant concessions, but will understandably
continue to balk at being blamed for the United States' overextended economic
condition.
E. ASIAN-PACIFIC INTERNATIONAL
Soviet and Japanese interests in the Asian-Pacific region are of political and
strategic significance even by geographic considerations alone. Moreover, the Soviet
Union fears anything foreign. In particular, as regards Japan, the USSR fears
development of an anti-Soviet political entente which might threaten its borders.
Unlike its situation in Europe, the Soviet Union has not been able, in Asia, to develop
a complete security system with established buffers between its own territory and its
opponents.
I. China
Geographically, the most immediate political and military threat to the Soviet
Union comes from China. Although China is largely still very backward and has only
^^^"Schultz Urges Asian Action," New York Times, 15 May 1987, p. 28.
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a limited nuclear capability (see Table 6),^
TABLE 6
FAR EAST NUCLEAR FORCES, 1985
CHINA USSR U.S.
ICBM 2 na na
MR/IRBM Launchers 110 135-171
MR Bombers 120 250 14




SSBN's 1 31 5
the existence of a 4575-mile common border causes the Sinophobic Soviets
considerable unease.^^^ The USSR's Chinese unease was not alleviated any when
Japan and China signed a peace treaty in 1978. The Soviet Union particularly
protested the "anti-hegemony" clause of the treaty which the USSR viewed as a direct
threat to itself. Although the treaty stated that the clause was not directed at anyone
in particular, the Soviets were unconvinced. Then, China began to show rapid
economic progress-in great part due to its rapprochement and new trading
opportunities with Japan and the United States.^^^ Deng Xiaoping projects that via the
"socialist market economy" China will become a major power by 2050, or even sooner.
Although China has suffered political growing pains along with its economic growth,
the USSR is not comfortable watching this great power grow on its border.'^^^
and Kosaka, eds., 1986, pp. 272-274.
^°^ Robert A. Scalapino, "Asia in a Global Context: Strategic Issues for the
Soviet Union," The Soviet Far East Military Buildup, Solomon and Kosaka, eds., 1986,
pp. 26-30. A concise presentation of the major issues and options for Sino-Soviet
military considerations.
^^^Business Week, 27 October 1986, p. 63; Christian Science Monitor, 6
November 1986, p. 2. e.g. On 30 October 1986, U.S. Secretary of Defense Caspar
Weinberger made a S550 million deal with the PRC for aircraft radar and electronic
equipment. From 5-11 November 1986, U.S. Navy ships visited Qingdao, home of
China's "north sea" fleet.
^°^Henry S. Rowen, "Distant Relations: Links Between Asian and European
Security," Soviet Far East Military Buildup, Solomon and Kosaka, eds., 1986, p. 226.
The Chinese are trying to reduce their conventional military defense manpower from 4
million to 3 million, and possess very limited nuclear assets. However, Deng Xiaoping
does not believe that a major war is a near-term likelihood. Once the PRC's economic
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Paranoia has been inspirational to the Soviets both in attempts to reach a
reconciliation with China and to borrow ideas from China's economic success.-^"*
In view of Soviet ovenures lo the Chinese in the past few years, relatively
little progress has actually been made in USSR-PRC interactions. Although relations
are well-advanced since the era of competing socialist camps, Soviet attempts to
entangle China in its political peace initiatives have been only politely considered.
In his July 1986 "Vladivostok. Speech" General Secretan.' Gorbachev indicated
that the USSR was ver\- desirous of further improving Sino-Soviet relations. -"^^ He
spoke of the common socialist bond, the common priority of socio-economic
development, the joint development and usage of the Amur River, a railway link
between Kazakhstan and the Xinjiang regions, and mutual exchanges in culture in
education. He said. "We hope that in the near future the frontier which divides us, I
would like to say which unites us, will become a zone of peace and friendship."
Starting in 1983, the Chinese had begun building Soviet bloc relations by visits
from CCP leader Hu and, or Foreign Minister Wu Xuequian to the DDR, Hungar}-,
Yugosla\-ia, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria.-^^ Following the Vladivostok
Speech, the USSR reciprocated by allo-wing General Wojciech Jaruzelski, head of the
Polish Communist Party, to pay a 3-day visit to China in September.'^^'' He met with
both Deng Xiaoping and the CCP chief Hu Yaobang. Next, Erich Honecker, the
leader of the DDR, visited China from 21-26 October 1986. East Germany, as the
most industrially advanced of the East European nations, can offer China some
technology and industrial equipment at a cost lower than Western nations.-^^ Visits by
Janos Kadar (Hungar>') and leaders from Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria are expected to
follow.
base is established, defense may move from its present position as the last priority of
the "Four Modernizations".
^^Chrisnan Science Monitor, 11 August 1986, pp. 1, 10; and Alan D. Romberg,
'New Stirrings in Asia." Foreign Affairs, Volume 64, Number 3, 1985, p. 526.
^^^'Gorbachev 28 July Speech in Vladivostok," FBIS (USSR, Saiional Affairs),
29 July 1986, pp. R13-R15.
'
^o^Ibid.
Chrisiian Science Monitor, Ibid.
'^^'^ Washington Post, 22 October 1986, p. A30. China made a deal with East
Germany for 300 railroad passenger coaches at a cost of over SI 00 million prior to
Honecker's trip to China.
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But China is skeptical about Soviet objectives and has made three difficult
political demands of the USSR. Until the USSR meets these demands, China will
refrain from serious considerations of a Sino-Soviet rapprochement:
1. The USSR must end support for Vietnam's intervention in Kampuchea.
2. Border issues include reduction of Soviet forces along the Chinese border to
pre-1965 levels and withdrawal of Soviet troops from Mongolia.
3. Soviet troops must be withdrawn from Afghanistan.
The USSR has made token, but encouraging, concessions on the second and third
points. China responded by resuming consular relations with the USSR's friend
Mongolia in August 1986.'^'^^ But the key to the USSR-PRC relationship lies in the
Kampuchean issue. The most serious obstacle to a serious Sino-Soviet rapprochement
is Deng's refusal to meet with Gorbachev until the USSR has withdrawn support from
the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea.^^° This seems the least likely issue to be
resolved. Vietnam, although it receives S3 million per day in general aid from the
USSR (plus more for its Kampuchean occupation), is independent-minded.^^^
Meanwhile, the USSR supports the Vietnamese to guarantee its usage of the military
facilities at Cam Rahn Bay^^^ and Da Nang, while the PRC supports the Khmer
Rouge and conflicts with the Vietnamese on its own China-Vietnam border. Since the
Soviets want to keep their bases in Vietnam, they have encouraged a Sino-Vietnamese
reconciliation-attacking the obstacle from an indirect angle. The Soviets have stated
that they cannot make decisions for third parties, i.e. Vietnam and Afghanistan,^^
^
officially removing themselves from China's displeasure in those two countries.
^^^"Russia's Pacific Century," Economist, 16 August 1986, p. 22.
^^^Christian Science Monitor, 10 September 1986, p. 16.
^^^ Economist, 24 May 1986, pp. 44-46. The Vietnamese state that they will be
out of Kampuchea by 1990. But mutual suspicions are growing between the guerillas
and Vietnamese; the guerillas perceive that the Vietnamese are trying to annex
Kampuchea, and the Vietnamese voice their prediction that the Khmer Rouge would
take over any settlement-decided government in Kampuchea as soon as the Vietnamese
had withdrawn.
^^^Christian Science Monitor, 10 September 1986, p. 6. Cam Rahn Bay is the
USSR's largest naval base outside the Warsaw Pact; it normally has 20 ships and six
attack/cruise missile submarines, and 24 long-range or strike aircraft.
'^^^ Christian Science Monitor, 9 September 1986, p.ll; FBIS {USSR, National
Affairs), 29 i\i\y 1986, p. R17.
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Japan's approach to China is less threatening than the USSR's. Japan has
taken advantage of Chinese economic pragmatism to establish a foothold in the
PRC.-^'* Smo-Japanese trade grew from S8.9 billion in 1983 to 519 billion in 1985.
Japanese companies in China have demonstrated the business strategy which
has made them successful worldwide. While other nations are hesitant about the
Chinese government's unpredictability and about near-term losses, Japanese businesses
are taking the risk of unhesitatingly investing in the potential of Chinese markets.
Despite Chinese historical animosity toward Japan (especially recalling Japanese
atrocities in China during their recent war form 1937-45), more than 300 Japanese
companies have established offices in Beijing alone. The Japanese expect that their
positive trading reputation (i.e. good service and low prices) will break down historical
distrust and anger, and that future trade will offset current losses suffered in becoming
established.
Since Hu Yaobang, a friend of Japan, was dismissed from his post as Chinese
Communist Party General Secretary (in January 1987), diplomatic relations between
the PRC and Japan have cooled. Japanese businessmen continue to work toward
establishing economic relationships which will pay off in long-term profits-despite
acknowledged short-term losses in current trade. Even now, Japan is responsible for
29% of China's imports, compared to 11% from the United States. Through economic
persistence, Japan is building important ties to China through attractive deals in both
goods and financing.
Overall, Japan appears to enjoy a substantial political advantage over the
USSR in ties v^ith China. The Soviet Union is a superpower, but its political and
military strength make it potentially more dangerous than valuable to China. Japan,
although not a socialist nation, offers economic resources which China can tap as it
needs, except in strategically restricted goods and services.
Even more discomforting to the Soviet Union have been the series of
developments which have strengthened Japanese and Chinese ties with the United
States. Although the United States does not own any territory in close proximity to
the contiguous Soviet-Japanese boundaries, its Pacific Fleet, ground forces in the
Republic of Korea (ROK), military facilities and access to ports in Japan, the
Philippines, Australia, and China, all highlight the continual presence of the U.S. threat
to the Soviet Union. Obviously, the U.S. threat in Asia is primarily nuclear, but the
^^"^Nicholas D. Kristof, "Japan Winning Race in China," New York Times, 29
April 1987, pp. 33, 41.
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concept of an American-Japanese-Chinese anti-Soviet entente will never be passively
accepted by the Soviets. In addition to the blatant military affect of U.S. forces in the
area, the U.S. strategic and theater forces there have developed political forces which
restrain the Soviet Union from pressuring Pacific nations into economic deals.-^^
2. ASEAN and the "All-Asia Security Conference''
The All-Asia Security Conference proposed by General Secretary Gorbachev
is a variant of the Asian Collective Security System proposed by Brezhnev in 1969.'^^^
Brezhnev's system was intended to develop Asia under the leadership of the Soviet
Union and to contain China's influence in the region.^^^ The result was that an
American-led rapprochement developed in Sino-Japanese and Sino-American relations
by the late 1970's.
The new variant, the proposed All-Asia Security Conference, seeks to achieve
basically the same goals as Brezhnev's plan through a peace offensive and attempts to
drive wedges among the regional nations and the United States.^^^ As part of its plan
to further its own standing in Asia, the USSR has attempted to increase its bilateral
and multi-lateral exchanges with the ASEAN nations.
The ASEAN and "Oceania" nations are suspicious of the USSR and are
simultaneously open to the overtures of the U.S., Japan, and China. The ASEAN
nations, in particular, protest the USSR's backing of continued Vietnamese occupation
of Kampuchea. The Chinese, particularly interested in preventing a united Indochina
under Vietnamese control, have led them in the protest against Vietnam's expansion
into Cambodia.
The Chinese ties with ASEAN, in opposition to Vietnam and its Soviet
benefactor, have given China an edge over the USSR in competition for ASEAN
friendship.'^^^ Japan has also expanded its influence in ASEAN via aid and trade.
^^^Chrisiian Science Monitor, 24 October 1986, p. 11; 29 January 1987, p. 9;
Asian Wall Street Journal, 16 January 1987, p. 3.
^^^Solomon and Kosaka, "Nuclear Dilemmas and Asian Security: Problems of
Coalition Defense in the Nuclear Era," Soviet Far East Military Buildup, Solomon and
Kosaka, eds., 1986, p. 6.
^^^Young-Sun Ha, "Soviet iMilitary Buildup m the Far East: Implications for the
Security of South Korea," Soviet Far East Military Buildup, Solomon and Kosaka, eds.,
1986, p. 146.
^^^Yao Wenbin, "Soviet iMilitary Deployments in the Asia-Pacific Region:
Implications for China's Security," Soviet Far East Military Buildup, Solomon and
Kosaka, eds., 1986, p. 99.
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helping to dispel recent memories of Japanese military expansionism during WWII and
subsequent fears of a resurgence of that militarism. Chinese and Japanese influence
together has hindered Soviet efforts at gaining significant influence in the region.
F. WESTERN EUROPE
The major political impact of Western Europe on Soviet-Japanese relations is
embodied in two issues. The first concerns West European condemnation of Japan for
its trade surplus, and its failure to open its domestic markets to foreign investment and
imports. The particulars are basically the same as those discussed in the Japan-United
States section of this chapter and will not be elaborated further. The point of the
problem is that continued Japan-bashing by the West European nations demonstrates
a dangerous insensitivit}^ to Japanese accomplishments and contributions to the West
in general. If Japan becomes alienated from the Western camp, the potential for it to
turn to the USSR is greatly enhanced.
The second issue revolves around the arms reduction proposals for Europe. The
proposed "double-zero" option treats Japan as though it exists in a vacuum, rather
than as an important member of the Western AUiance. Although geographically
NATO is concerned with Europe, the scope of the Alliance's perspective on this issue
should extend to include all its friends.
Moscow's proposal is that both short-range (300-600 miles) and intermediate-
range (more than 600 miles) nuclear forces (INF) be eliminated from Europe.
However, the Soviet proposal would allow the USSR to maintain one hundred SS-20's
east of the Vrals, and one hundred U.S. missiles on U.S. territory, but not in Alaska.
The SS-20 issue will be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter. The political
implication of accepting this proposal is that the SS-20 threat to China and Japan is
acceptable. Psychologically, this "abandonment" of Japan to Soviet INFs is a serious
matter. Relieving NATO members of the INF threat separate from Japan creates
psychological disunity of purpose among Western nations.
Japan will have little actual input to resolution of this geographic issue. The
negotiations are bound to cause second thoughts among the Japanese about their
position and value within the Western camp.
In summation, Japan and the Soviet Union are, at present, pursuing mutual
economic interests as much as possible while political relations are simmering on a
back burner. The key political issue separating the two is the Northern Territories
219 Christian Science Monitor, 24 October 1986, p. 11.
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question. For Japan the issue is primarily emotional and cultural-nationalistically-
oriented. For the USSR the islands represent a strategic/military asset. Neither player
is likely to concede the game under the present circumstances.
Within their geographic environs, the Japanese and Soviets both evoke a
cautious attitude from their neighbors. Japan's martial history has not been forgotten.
Its economic prov^^ess produces a gnawing paranoia that Japan's
technological/industrial success could be transformed into a renewed expansionist
Japanese threat. Japanese nationalism, even if economically-oriented, causes a
fearsome doubt in the region. The Soviet Union's political overtures in the region have
met with little success. The secretive, conspiratorial nature of its centralized political
process offers little incentive or enticement to join its mysterious and unpredictable
camp. Through projection of military' power, the USSR intimidates regional nations
into limited cooperation for appeasement, and simultaneously ensures that the
threatening giant will make no real friends.
The United States, despite economic bickering with Japan, provides political
superpower friendship. The Western Alliance benefits greatly from Japan's example in
modernization and economic innovation, despite the disorienting impact on capitalists
who are slow to adapt to the demonstrated effectiveness of Japanese managerial
methods and modernized industrial techniques. The Soviet political peace offensive is
not fulfilling objectives of economic modernization transfers from the West. The
United States, primarily responsible for deterrence and military parity against the
USSR, has protected Allied technological advantage as much as possible. Soviet
efforts to stir up business lobbies have been managed successfully so far by the U.S.
and Japanese governments.
V. MILITARY
The national military status of both Japan and the Soviet Union plays an
important role in their potential for trade. Security is one of the fundamental national
interests of all nations. The USSR's security is provided by its own military. Japan
relies on the United States for its global security, although it maintains nominal Self-
Defense Forces (SDF). The unequal military strengths may affect Japanese-Soviet
trade in the following ways:
• Soviet intimidation efforts alienate Japan from interacting in the
political/economic arenas.
• Soviet detente efforts increase the potential for official rapprochement while
spreading uneasiness about their "real" intentions.
• Japan attempts to hold the USSR at bay by appeasement via relaxation of trade
restrictions, neatly employing separation of economics from politics.
• Japan denounces the Soviet military buildup and uses actual or threatened trade
sanctions as leverage toward security objectives.
The USSR attempts to weaken domestic Japanese domestic consensus on
security cooperation with the United States to lure Japan away from its Western
security orientation. The Kremlin uses whatever technique (intimidation or detente)
seems appropriate for the moment to promote an attractive image of itself or to
foment frictions between the United States and Japan.
Although some of these points appear contradictor}' when first examined, their
utilization as political tools is clarified within the context of specific examples. The
fluctuation of international relationships over time allows extreme variations of
political maneuvering-especially regarding the often unpredictable and inconsistent
Soviet and American policies.
A. USSR
From the Soviet perspective, its nuclear and conventional forces are maintained
at a high level in order to deter an invasion of the Soviet Union by enemies.
Individually, the USSR's opponents do not pose much of a threat in Asia. The United
States and China are its two most potent adversaries.
The USSR fears that an effort is unden^'ay, with collaboration between the U.S.
and the PRC, to establish a "second front" against it--a Northeast Asian equivalent to
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NATO."^ This new alliance supposedly would include Japan and South Korea, as
well, and be directed specifically against the Soviet Union.
The highest military and diplomatic priority in dealing with threats to Soviet
national security goes to strategic nuclear weapons. Only the United States can offer
an immediate strategic challenge to the USSR. The U.S. does not have the political
basis (domestic or international) nor a large enough conventional force to invade the
Soviet Union. A U.S. preemptive nuclear attack, without provocation is inconceivable
(although the Soviets are not necessarily convinced!). Nonetheless, the USSR is
inclined to believe that by militarily intimidating Japan it can lessen the U.S.' ability to
maintain a nuclear presence in the Pacific.
The USSR knows that China is not readily intimidated. The recent Soviet
attempts at rapprochement with China are largely motivated by the security
implications of the PRC's increased ties with Japan and the United States. The Sino-
Japanese (August 1978 Treaty of Peace and Friendship) and Sino-American (December
1978 finalized restoration of diplomatic relations) normalizations intensified the
USSR's already weighty Sinophobia. Soviet fears are logically built on the rapid
growth of China as an economically prospering nation, made possible by its pragmatic
(and fruitful) openness to Japan, the United States, and Western Europe.
Although China has made some beneficial deals with the West for military
equipment, its focus is not on military growth. China has decided to greatly emphasize
a healthy economy over military expenditures. In fact, the PRC is trying to reduce its
conventional military forces from 4 million to 3 million; it has only developed a large
enough nuclear capability to deter a Soviet attack, on its territory.-^^^
The USSR has drastically built up both its nuclear and conventional forces in the
Far East (discussed in more detail below). The outstanding issue, both from political
and security standpoints, involves the "Northern Territories" issue. To reiterate, Japan
claims that the islands of Shikotan, the Habomais, Kunashiri, and Etorofu (between
Hokkaido and the Kurile Islands) are historically its territory, and that the USSR must
return control of those islands to Japan. The Japanese will not conclude a peace treaty
with the Soviets until such action is accomplished. •^'^^
^^^Robert Scalapino, "The Political Influence of the USSR in Asia," Soviet Policy
in East Asia, ed. Donald S. Zagoria (New Haven & London: Yale University Press,
1982), p. 78.
^^^J.J. Martin, "Thinking About the Nuclear Balance in Asia," The Soviet Far
East Military Buildup, Solomon and Kosaka, eds., 1986, pp. 59-60, 66, 73, 83.
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For the Japanese, the issue is more political and historical than strategic, but for
the Soviet Union the Northern Territories have strategic significance. Control of the
disputed islands increases the Soviets' capabihties for controlling access to the Sea of
Okhotsk for its fleet, through the Soya Strait and along the island chain from Japan to
the Kamchatka Peninsula. Having its own troops stationed on the disputed islands
eliminates the possibility that Japan (or its allies) will station forces and equipment
there. Such forces could facilitate monitoring, impeding, or destroying Soviet naval
forces in the Sea of Okhotsk.
The movement of the Soviet Naval forces in the Sea of Okhotsk is, to a large
degree, controlled by the Soya (La Perouse) Strait, Hokkaido, and the islands of the
Northern Territories. Moreover, Japan controls the Straits of Tsushima and Tsugaru
from the Sea of Japan into the East China Sea and the Pacific Ocean, straits which are
critical to the Soviet Pacific Fleet's freedom to maneuver and to protect the Sea of
Okhotsk bastion.
Superficially, the Soviet bastion concept is simple. The USSR locates its primary
survivable strategic nuclear forces-balhstic missile submarines (SSBNs)-in a defensible
area. In time of war, the Soviet fleet establishes an echeloned defense to protect the
SSBNs from destruction by enemy air and sea anti-submarine warfare (ASW) assets.
The Sea of Okhotsk is believed to be one of the USSR's bastions. From the Sea of
Okhotsk, Soviet SS-N-18s can reach most of the continental United States.^^^
Maintenance of its strategic capability to attack the United States is critical to the
USSR's security consciousness. Therefore, the Soviet Union needs to retain control of
the approaches to the Sea of Okhotsk to enable the echeloned deployment of its
Navy's air, surface, and sub-surface assets in defense of the bastion.
In 1945 Stalin declared that the island chain was both a gateway to the Pacific
and a wall proteaing the Soviet Far East. The Soviet perception of the island chain as
a "screen of steel" and a "1,000-kilometer cossack sabre" has been bolstered by the
USSR's bastion stratesy.'^^*
^^^For a concise discussion of the history of the Northern Territories issue, see
Fuji Kamiya, "The Northern Territories: 130 Years of Japanese Talks with Czarist
Russia and the Soviet Union," Soviet Policy in East Asia, Donald S. Zagoria, ed., 1982,
pp. 121-152.
^^^John J. Stephan, "Asia in the Soviet Conception," Soviet Policy in East Asia,
ed. Zagoria, 1982, p. 40.
^^"^Whiting, Siberian Development and East Asia, pp. 125-26.
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The Northern Territories stretch across approximately one-quarter of the
distance from Hokkaido to the Kamchatka Peninsula. Soviet conventional troops have
been stationed on the Northern Territories and Kurile Islands to ensure Soviet control
of the surrounding waters. Western occupation of the islands would obviously increase
Soviet problems of controlling access to the Sea of Okhotsk. In the event that the
USSR relinquished/returned the islands to Japan, the Soviet Navy would have to
contend with a new threat on the southeastern edge of its bastion, as well as with the
three straits noted above.
If the USSR were to "trade the Northern Territories to Japan for technological
economic gains, its current national defense strategy would suffer a severe setback.
There is, however, one possible concession which would have limited impact on the
Soviet strategic concerns. The key islands in the Northern Territories (for continuity in
the "chain of steel") are Kunashiri and Etorofu.
Since Shikotan and the Habomai Islands are small and lay south of the two large
islands, their "loss" could be acceptable to the USSR if a substantial economic
objective was realized by the deal. However, exactly that deal was almost concluded in
1955, but fell through. When the Soviets responded favorably to a Japanese
memorandum offering a peace treaty in exchange for Shikotan and the Habomais, the
Japanese cabinet overruled a compromise settlement made by the Foreign iMinister
with iMoscow.^^^
Whether the reversal was due to Japanese internal politics or because of U.S.
pressure to divert a Soviet-Japanese rapprochement, the point is that a compromise
agreement was once almost reached. It is not inconceivable that the evolution of
political relations will once again provide an opportunity for a settlement-one which
would likely contain economic accessions for the USSR.
The USSR has considerably built up both its theater nuclear (see Table 7) and
conventional forces in the Far East during the past 10 years. The reasons for the
Soviet military buildup in the Far East and Pacific can be outlined as foDows:
• To provide security for the USSR by protecting the Far East from attack and
by guarding its strategic missile forces in the Sea of Okhotsk (and elsewhere in
the Pacific).
• To inhibit American, Japanese, or Chinese consideration of "rolling back" the
USSR in the region.
^Ibid.. pp. 126-27.
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• To project militan- power in opposition to the American Seventh Fleet and U.S.
bases in the Pacific.
• To emplace forces capable of protecting its own sea and air transport assets
while challenging the security of sea lanes of communication between the U.S.
and its allies in Asia.--^
Its military buildup can further be examined in the context of its foreign policy
objectives toward Japan:
• To prevent closer ties, or break down present ones, between Japan and the
United States.
• To drive wedges in Japan's anti-Soviet alliance relations.
• To reduce Sino-Japanese cooperation.
• To undermine Japanese "militarization".
• To promote increased economic ties between Japan and the USSR.
• To sidestep the Northern Territories issue, or advantageously eliminate the
problem.'^''
The Soviets perceive the Japanese as ultimately vulnerable to intimidation.
Because Japan maintains only a small military force of its own, and due to its
vulnerability to importation of food, natural resources, and raw materials, the USSR
persists in attempting to coerce Japan toward the Soviet camp by militar}'- visibility.
The USSR is successful in clearly demonstrating its power for aggression, but generally
unsuccessful in achieving the desired effect. The Kremlin's power projections have
largely driven the Japanese closer to their Western allies.
However, the new Soviet peace offensives have cast additional light on the
subject, illuminating different aspects of the relationship. The new face of the Soviet
leadership offers hope that a new mentality has emerged, as well. The change in world
opinion toward the Politburo helps to alter the frame of reference from which military
developments are viewed.
It is possible that the trend in Japan will mirror the trend in Europe-the USSR is
perceived as less threatening by virtue of the rhetoric of detente, arms control and
reduction, glasnost, and perestroika. Although virtually nothing has changed, the
^^^Richard H. Solomon, "Coalition Building or Condominium? The Soviet
Presence in Asia and American Policy Alternatives," Soviet Policy in East Asia, ed.
Zagoria, 1981, pp. 291-94.
^^^Hiroshi Kimura, "The Soviet Military Buildup: Its Impact on Japan and Its
Aims," The Soviet Far East Military Buildup, Solomon and Kosaka, eds., 1986, pp.
113-18.
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media bombardment with "happy taik" has suddenly made the USSR a friendly
adversary, decreasing the urgency for allied unity against the potential Soviet threat.'^^^
The Soviets have traditionally maintained that the necessity for a large military
force is a defensive consideration-an extension of their preoccupation with survival.
The Soviet military buildup in the Far Eastern TVD over the past twenty years has
gone beyond the requirements of defense. Military forces there include:
• 53 divisions of ground forces with approximately 32,000 armored vehicles
supported by 1700 tactical aircraft. Approximately one division is located on
the islands of the Northern Territories.
• One naval infantry division based in Vladivostok.
• Combined Naval Aviation and Air Force Backfire bombers total 80.
• The Soviet Pacific Fleet includes 83 principal surface combatants, 90 attack
submarines, and approximately 25 SSBNs.
• More than 170 SS-20 INFs are deployed at 15 or more bases in central and
eastern USSR.^^^
Of the ground divisions in the above count, approximately 15% are considered
Category 1 (75-100% of wartime manning strength). About 35% are Categor>' 2
(50-75%) and 50% are Category 3 (presently at cadre strength). These last two
categories would require a mobilization to bring them up to fighting strength. The
mobilization process in the Far East portends some potentially serious problems for
Soviet planners. The non-Slavic ethnic heritage of most Asian inhabitants raises
questions of political/military reliability and combat readiness of units filled by local
reservists.-^^^
^^^Flora Lewis, "European Happy Talk," New York Times, 27 April 1987, p. 21.
^^^U.S. Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power. 1986 (Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Government Prmting Office, 1986), pp. 8-9, 13; Young-Sun Ha, "The Soviet
Military Buildup in the Far East: Implications for the Security of South Korea," The
Soviet Far East Military Buildup, Solomon and Kosaka, eds., 1986, pp. 142-43.
^^^S. Enders Wimbush and Alex Alexiev, The Ethnic Factor in the Soviet Armed
Forces, Rand Report R-2787/1 (March 1982): pp. 49-50, passim. Non-Slavic
minorities seldom receive combat training in the military because of the potential for
turning that training against the Russian regime. Consequently, mobilize^ reservists in
predominantly "minority" regions are very likely to have had inadequate combat
training, even at the basic level. The reliability of those forces to support the Russian-
dominated regime is also questionable, as a consequence of second-class treatment in
everyday Soviet affairs and overt racism within the Soviet military.
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The Pacific Fleet has shown marked growth. It is now the largest of the four
Soviet fleets. The Soviet Pacific Fleet totals an impressive 1.5 millions tons (although
many of the craft included are vQry old and ver\- small), compared to the 650,000 tons
of the American Seventh Fleet. ---^ Especially notable are the addition of the Kiev-class
carrier Minsk to the Fleet in 1979 and a second Kiev-class carrier, the Novarossisk,
added in 1984. The presence of 15 Delta-class SSBXs, 8 Yankee-class SSBNs, and 90
attack submarines located in the Sea of Okhotsk and Sea of Japan is evidence of the
bastion concept being employed there. The Delta-class subs are equipped with either
the SS-N-8 missile (8,000 kilometer range) or SS-N-18 (7,500 kilometer range) and the
Yankee-class SSBNs with SS-N-16 missiles (1,600 kilometer range).-^*
The Soviet Union could actually afford to make political "concessions" to the
Japanese or Chinese in exchange for economic benefits by withdrawal of large numbers
of conventional forces. '-^^ The USSR would still maintain an ominous threat via its Far
East nuclear arsenal, perhaps a more effective deterrent than masses of troops.
One of the inherent advantages for a Soviet switch to greater reUance on nuclear
forces, rather than conventional, would be that nuclear weapons require lower manning
levels. In the U.S., nuclear forces have greater utility than conventional ones due to
political pressure (i.e. in peacetime the American public will not permit a lot of men at
arms, so nuclear weapons become the solution for deterrence).
The question of political reliabihty among ethnic minorities, coupled with the
relative demographic decline of draft-age ethnic Russians,'^-''* suggests that the USSR
-•^^ Donald S. Zagoria, "The Strategic Environment in Asia," Soviet Policy in East
Asia, ed. Zagoria, 1982, p. 18.
^^^Young-Sun Ha, "The Soviet Militar}' Buildup in the Far East: Implications
for the Security of South Korea," The Soviet Far East Military Buildup, Solomon and
Kosaka, eds., 1986, pp. 142-143. The relatively short-range SS-N-16s are a specific
threat to Japan. Sapporo, Japan, can be targeted from an>'where in the Sea of
Okhotsk except the extreme northeast comer, and Tokyo can be targeted from
approximately 50 degrees latitude southward-about one-third of the Sea's area.
'^^^The USSR is making overtures to the Chinese about reducing troop levels
along their common border, and has discussed pulling some of its conventional forces
out of Mongolia as a further "carrot" to the Chinese. The USSR is less likely to
withdraw its troops from the Northern Territories due to their geostrategic significance
in the Sea of Okhotsk bastion. The counter-argument is that the disputed islands can
not give Japan a significantly greater advantage than it already has in the location of
Hokkaido over the Soya Strait.
^^^Edmund Brunner, Jr., Soviet Demographic Trends and the Ethnic Composition
of Draft Age Males, I9S0-I995, Rand Report N- 1654 1 (February- 1981): pp. v-vi.
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will continue to build its strategic nuclear forces. The prudent solution to the Soviet
balance between conventional and nuclear forces would favor nuclear forces. A
credible conventional threat would simultaneously be maintained by reliance on the
deterrent potential of Category 2 and Category 3 divisions-more fearsome on paper
than in reality.
The most formidable nuclear weapon which has disturbed Japan and its Asian
neighbors is the SS-20.^^^ The USSR has deployed between 135-171 SS-20's in the Far
East and Central Asia (see Table 7). These long-range intermediate nuclear force
(INF) weapons are capable of striking targets anywhere in Asia from their bases in
Central Asia and the Far East. Whereas the Sea of Okhotsk bastion forces are
primarily a strategic asset for use against the United States, the land-based SS-20s
threaten Japan from almost anywhere east of the Urals.-^^^
B. JAPAN
Since Japan and China concluded their peace treaty in 1978, the USSR has
increasingly been recognized by the Japanese as the primary challenge to their security.
Despite Soviet peace initiatives, Japan is reminded of the Soviet Union's potential for
military coercion by events of this past decade:
• The USSR has developed and expanded its military forces on the disputed
Northern Territories.
• The USSR invaded Afghanistan and continues to wage war against the
populace there. The USSR is also supporting the Vietnamese invasion of
Kampuchea.
• The USSR has deployed large numbers of SS-20s in Asia and does not appear
likely to bargain those forces away.
^^^J.J. Martin, "Thinking About the Nuclear Balance in Asia," The Soviet Far
East Military Buildup, Solomon and Kosaka, eds., 1986, pp. 61-63. Each SS-20
launcher is assessed to have one refire/reload missile, and each missile has three
Multiple Independently-targetable Re-entry Vehicle (MIRV) warheads. The maximum
range is 5000 kilometers.
^Michael R. Gordon, "Soviet Proposal Would Disarm Bonn's Missiles," New
York Times, 28 April 1987, pp. 1,2. The arms reduction proposals by the USSR in
April 1987 that is keep only 100 SS-20s, all east of the Urals, does not seem very
encouraging to the Japanese. The separation of Europe from an overall Allied security
perspective gives the appearance of isolation of Japan from the global "Western"
partnership. However, the proposal does not actually remove the SS-20s from the
NATO picture, either. SS-20s sited near the Yenisey River in Central USSR could
target either Bonn or Tokyo.
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• The USSR has periodically threatened Japan because of its security ties to the
United States.
The Soviet Union has accused Japan of remilitarizing. The USSR complains that
Japan's remilitarization significantly decreases regional stability. These accusations are
directed more at preventing Japan from developing its potential, than at any truly
ominous current capabilities.
Japan has the eleventh largest militarv- force in Asia (counting the USSR)--it is
hardly a 'militarized nation" when compared to its industrial capability and its potential
for militarization. Japan's decision to spend above its previously self-imposed limit of
1% of GNP is not as serious an issue as the USSR would like to assert. If considered
in the same terms as European countries, Japan was already spending well over l°/'o of
its GNP on defense. '^^^ Although its GNP is so large that Japanese defense spending
almost equalled the European allies (see Table 8), the percentage of GNP spent on
defense is low, and was perceptibly miniscule in terms of doUars per person.
TABLE 8
DEFENSE SPENDING 1986
Outlavs % S per
(bn S) GNP person
Japan '22.0' .0 "^ 182
West Germany 445
France 2717 4:0 499
Great Britain 28.7 5.2 5 1
United States 292.6 6.7 12 4
Upon the decision to surpass the 1% mark, the Japanese government emphasized
that it still promoted the non-military perspective adhered to previously, but had
removed the arbitrary ceiling.^^^ Based on its national tendencies since WW II, Japan
is unlikely to radically increase its per capita spending on defense.
By its restrictive impon policies, Japan has demonstrated that it does not feel
compelled to apply the same rules to itself as to others. Whereas it severely restricts
imports, it expects other nations to be unrestrictive toward its exports. Similarly, its
national abhorrence of war (and nuclear warfare in particular) has generated a national
^^^' Economist, 17 Januar/ 1987, p. 40.
"^^^ Christian Science Monitor, 26 Januar>' 1987, p. 13.
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unwillingness toward increasing Japanese defense expenditures, while expecting the
United States to provide for defense of Japan's sovereignty and economic prowess.
Japan maintains conventional national Self-Defense Forces (SDF). The SDF is
limited to 180,000 soldiers, 60 anti-submarine warships, and 430 combat aircraft.^^^
These forces represent 86% of the manpower permitted, but the direction of
conventional force improvements leans more toward better training and improved
logistics than toward more equipment.
The defense review published by the Japanese government in August 1987
declared that Japan's SDF would be incapable of repulsing even a limited and small
scale invasion-giving a worst-case defeat time-frame as two days.^^° To encourage the
continued protection of the United States, Japan has agreed to an increased strategic
role in the region. That role is naval- oriented.
Japan's strategic location, as the eastern border of the Sea of Japan, gives it a
logical part in contaiimient of the Soviet Pacific Fleet. By merely controlling the
waters around its sovereign territory, Japan limits the usage of the Tsushima and Soya
Straits (at the southern and northern ends of the Sea of Japan) and the Tsugaru Strait
(between Honshu and Hokkaido). Simply mining these straits would create a severe
bottleneck for Soviet naval forces attempting to deploy from Vladivostok out of the
Sea of Japan.
Japan has promised to take on responsibility for keeping open sea lines of
communication (SLOC) up to 1,000 nautical miles away from Japan, extending its
military reach south of the Philippines.^"^^ The Japanese are both quantitatively and
qualitatively improving their naval forces toward this objective, but will not meet the
targets until the 1990's.
Japan's reaction to its loss in WW II is exemplified by its nuclear policy. A key
platform of Japan's defense policy is built on the "three non-nuclear principles":
1. Not to acquire nuclear weapons.
2. Not to produce nuclear weapons.
3. Not to introduce nuclear munitions into Japan.
^^^"The Cautious Sharpening of the Samurai's Sword," Economist, 16 August
1986, pp. 21-22.
240lbid.
^"^^ Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to the Congress, Fiscal Year 1988
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1987), p. 265.
The first two principles, non-possession and non-production of nuclear weapons,
are now actually part of international law via the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
The third principle—not to introduce nuclear weapons—has caused some controversy in
Japan. The problem will be addressed below in the "United States-Japan" section. The
principal point of the matter is that Japan does, and will probably continue to, depend
on American nuclear weapons as a deterrent against Soviet nuclear weapons and
conventional forces.
C. UNITED STATES-JAPAN
Despite Soviet protestations about Japan's increasing "militarization",^"^^ Japan
has contributed relatively little to its own defense, relying instead on the protection of
the United States. Japan has offered to provide funds toward sharing the "Western"
burden of building global interdependence. Its willingness to share the financial
burden, but not the "stigma" (in terms of the global peace movement) of a military
power, has sparked various reactions in the United States. The viewpoints range from
pragmatic gratitude over Japan's recognition of its "indebtedness" to the U.S., to smug
condemnation of Japan's unwillingness to become a significant military power.
Given the political culture of Japan and its recent historical experience in WW
II, Japan's readiness to assist the Western cause by financial outlays seems an
appropriate response to the current status of the AUiance. The United States is in deep
financial trouble, partly due to the fiscal requirements of maintaining its military role
as the Western superpower. Powerful historical and cultural forces are active both
Mvithin Japan and among its neighbors which inhibit the Japanese government from
expanding militarily. Rather than condemning the Japanese, Americans would be v^dse
to capitalize on the offers which are forthcoming from Japan-offers which are
consistent with its national will.
Many Americans react to Japanese "pacifism" emotionally, rather than in context
of divergent pasts. The American perspective, that Japan is not contributing fairly, is
understandable, but rather short-sighted. The U.S. does not want to be stereo-typed as
the military "bad guy". Japanese offers to extend economic aid to third world countries
would allow the U.S. to utilize some of its funds, previously ear-marked for aid, for its
defense budget. Such an arrangement would indeed relieve pressure on the United
States' budget, but self-conscious Americans might resent categorization by the world
^^^Mikhail Gorbachev, "Vladivostok Speech", FBIS {USSR, National Affairs), 29
July 1986, pp. R12, R13.
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as "aggressive capitalists" while Japan would enjoy laurels as a great contributor to
world peace and globalism.
The perspective that all Western nations should shoulder the military burden
equally has provoked some very insulting responses toward the Japanese. The
Japanese, in turn, are reacting to American and European economic, poHtical, and
military Japan-bashing by increasingly vocal anti-Americanism, alienation from the
West, and Japanese nationalism-provoked by Japan's democratic media.
Much of the military-oriented Japan-bashing focuses on its failure to equally
share the defense burden or to directly compensate the United States for the cost of
Pacific security. -^"^-^ The argument declares that Japan uses its former image as the
"yellow peril" to dodge military responsibility-and expenditures. A volatile implication
is that the Japanese imperialistic "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" policies of
the 1930s and 1940s, designed to harness East Asia for Japan's benefit, is being
continued (and even expanded world-wide)...now through economic rather than
military means.
Japan's concept of "comprehensive security" bases responsibility for contribution
to the Alliance's security on comparative advantage. Since it views its own advantage
as economic prowess, Japan wishes to contribute by aid to foreign countries of
strategic importance. Opponents contend that Japan should pay the United States for
its military protection. In that way, the U.S. can then pass the money on to needy
countries and get "credit" for its benevolence.
The major flaw of such an arrangement is that it makes Japan a client, not a
partner, of the United States. Scholars and governmental officials apply the same
rhetoric to the USSR and its "clients" disparagingly. If the U.S. and Japan really are
members of an alliance, each must be willing to make concessions to the life-style,
culture, and political process of the other.
The Japanese have agreed to funnel third world contributions through world
organizations. Even if the U.S. does not get the credit, critics should be pleased that
Japan will not either. The Japanese have also agreed, in response to U.S. pressures, to
assume greater responsibility for its own defense, by becoming responsible for two
1,000-mile sea lines of communication in the Pacific Ocean.-^'^'^ Although the actual
^'^^Krauss, "Japan: King of the Free Riders," How NATO Weakens the West,
1986, pp. 157-80. His chapter is representative of the arguments, antagonistic to
Japan, which insist that the Japanese must see the world through American eyes.
^'^^Economist, 16 August 1986, p. 22.
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capability will not be effective until the 1990s, Japan's agreement to extend its
responsibility is evidence of its commitment to the Alliance, and its \\'illingness to
compromise. The Japanese also allow the U.S. Na\y to use its ports in the face of
So\iet threats, providing the United States with imponant facilities for power
projection in the region.
The significance of unchecked American naval access to Japan is that nuclear-
armed warships could potentially violate the third non-nuclear principle of Japan's
domestic policy. In 1985 the problem received increased attention when New Zealand
refused the U.S. Naw access to its ports by either nuclear-armed or nuclear-powered
vessels. ^"^^ New Zealand's policy in effect required the United States to disclose which
of its ships were nuclear-armed. The U.S. policy- is non-disclosure, and since all its
ships are potentially nuclear-capable, New Zealand's polic\' effectively closed its ports
to the United States Navv-. The U.S. reaction to New Zealand's decision was to
suspend most of the operations of the Australia-New Zealand-United States (ANZUS)
treaty which applied to New Zealand.
This example has encouraged Japan to closely examine the consequences of
declared policy- on nuclear weapons. Japan's well-being is closely intertwined -v^ith the
United States in economic, political, and military realms. The potential effects of
intergoverrmiental linkage to the non-nuclear policy are serious for both nations.
In April 1987 members of the Japanese Communist Party, visiting the United
States, found documentary evidence of Japanese agreement to the "introduction" of
U.S. nuclear weapons into Japan.^**^ The JCP members, searching in the Library- of
Congress, found a telegram to the American Embassy in Japan, signed by Secretary- of
State Dean Rusk (1966), which indicated official Japanese acceptance of "ambiguity"
toward the question. By not asking whether U.S. ships are nuclear-armed, the
government tacitly allows them into its ports.
More explicitly, the telegram referred to a top-secret agreement which was
appended to the 1960 United States-Japan Mutual Security Treaty. The "transit
agreement", referenced in a national security study memorandum in 1969,
^*^Tom Millar, "ANZAC Perspectives on Soviet Power in the Pacific," Soviet Far
East Military Buildup, Solomon and Kosaka, eds., 1986, pp. 166-70.
^"^^Richard Halloran, "Tokyo Leftists Uncover Evidence of Secret US-Japan
Arms Pact," Xew York Times, 7 April 1987, pp. 1, 3.
101
provides that American warships and warplanes may carry nuclear arms into and
out of Japan but may not store them in Japan or launch them from there.^^^
The 1966 telegram from Secretary of State Rusk instructed that the
"Government of Japan should also be reminded that confidential 1960 agreement
affords the U.S. right to seek, consent to introduction of nuclear weapons into
Japan.248
Whether the referenced top-secret agreement in the Mutual Security Treaty
violates the popular Japanese non-nuclear sentiments is yet to be decided. The intent
of the policy is clearly that nuclear weapons will not be based, stored, or fired from
Japanese territory. Despite Soviet allegations to the contrary,^**^ there is no evidence
that the intent has been violated.
Japan appears to be willing to accept the USSR's threats as an acceptable
consequence of the security it receives from the United States. In a commendable
acceptance of compromise, Japan will increase its role in regional security and relieve
some of the U.S. burden of "Western" aid. Hopefully, American haughtiness will be
transformed into a pragmatic respect for Japan's aversion to militarism and its
willingness to share the "burden" via alternative means. At the same time, Americans
may confidently accept the U.S.' role as the power most capable of representing
Western military strength globally.
D. IMPACT ON TRADE/POLITICS
To some degree, the Japanese can be expected to continue dealing with the
USSR in economic terms despite political and military tensions. Good economic
relations may develop a new conditioned response, replacing the Soviet perception that
military strength is its most effective diplomatic tool. Currently, the USSR fears the
economic life-blood of Japan, and its potential for congealing an anti-Soviet alliance.
The USSR probably overrates Japan's potential to rapidly develop into a military
power itself, or to use its economic leverage to unify the region against the Soviet
Union. The other regional nations are also wary of a renewed Japanese imperialism.




^"^^"TASS Cites Pravda on F-16 Deployment in Japan," FBIS (USSR, Daily
Report), 15 April 1985, p. CI.
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The established pattern seems likely to continue. The USSR will bluster about
increasing threats to its security, it will threaten its neighbors, and they will be leery of
conducting increased trade with the apparently paranoid, unstable Soviet Union. The
U.S. security "guarantee" enables Japanese businessmen to take legal economic risks
without violating government security policy. Greater private Japanese trade, without
official vuhierability, is likely to aid the growth of friendly Soviet-Japanese relations.
But the Soviet fixation on security-consciousness keeps relations strained. As
noted earlier, the Soviet Union has expressed concern about the increasing militarism
of Japan. For strategic security, the USSR has located a tangible military threat on
the disputed islands.
As part of the Soviets' 1985 campaign to threaten Japan into a withdrawal of
support from the United States, the Soviet press built up the issue of the U.S. F-16's at
Misawa. The USSR accused Japan of supporting the U.S. in its buildup of offensive
capabilities there. Accusations included:
• Basing of "nuclear-capable" F-16's;
• Permitting existence of an "underground nuclear arsenal";
• Providing a command post for directing nuclear, chemical and bacteriological
warfare against the Northwest Pacific.
The implicit threat was clarified by citing that
it would be naive to believe that the states to which the systems threaten will not
take counter-measures to neutralize the new danger emanating from Japanese
territory.'?^°
In other words, if it continues to host U.S. forces, Japan faces Soviet nuclear strikes.
This threat was declared despite Soviet acknowledgement that the forces are managed
by Washington, not by Tokyo.
Soviet troops are stationed on Kunashiri. Only seventeen kilometers separate
Kunashiri from Hokkaido. Although this presence is superficially a deterrent, the
psychological effect has been to drive the Japanese closer to the United States and
further from a rapprochement with the USSR.
The Iraqi attack on the Stark in the Persian Gulf reminded Americans as well as
its allies of the importance of U.S. power projection. Although it was not a secret,
Japan's dependence on the Persian Gulf region for over 50% of its oil imports became




intolerance as Americans stormed over Japanese unwillingness to "play fairly". Neither
Japan nor the Federal Republic of Germany is constitutionally allowed to project
forces distant from its borders--e.g. to the Persian Gulf.
The point is well taken that the United States has assumed a critical role for
Japan's continued prosperity. Prime Minister Nakasone re-emphasized Japan's
willingness to provide alternative contributions. Members of the U.S. Congress took
the opportunity to remind Americans of Japan's restrictions to free trade. Nakasone
responded by outlining the incremental changes which Japan has undertaken in
compromise.
In summary, the trend in Soviet military projection is superficially paradoxical.
Political rhetoric emphasizes the Kremlin's desire for peace, arms control/reduction,
and peaceful coexistence. Reality indicates sustained emphasis on gaining advantage in
the correlation of forces with the West. In Soviet thinking, the use of misleading
rhetoric is not "lying", but part of the strategic deception ("maskirovka") plan.
The effect of the peace ofTensive on trade is to make economic cooperation seem
more likely. Under the circumstances, an increased economic relationship appears
promising for Japan from two viewpoints:
1. Business envisions profits and sustained growth.
2. Government aspires to create a bilateral atmosphere predominated by mutually
beneficial trade rather than mutually threatening military power.
In the end, Japanese trade could help the USSR to overcome its nationality problem in
the conventional forces. This assistance would be in the form of reduced reliance on
manpower through military applications of robotics, cybernetics and fifth generation
(artificial intelligence) developments, and improved C'' capabilities.
The Kremlin denounces Japan's growing militarism, not because of current
capabilities but to discourage it from developing its potential. Soviet threats also aim
to inhibit Japan from increasing its reliance on the United States.
Japan's national will supports the Kremlin's desire for minimal Japanese
militarism, but Moscow's threats tend to remind the Japanese of Tokyo's reliance on
Washington. During this period of American-Japanese trade frictions, Soviet threats
help to maintain the bond between the United States and Japan for the mutual security
which the relationship provides.
Cessation of threats against Japan would greatly enhance the USSR's aspirations
for trade, partly by reducing Japan's feeling of dependency on the United States. An
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OiTered concession on the Northern Territories (such as Shikotan and the Habomais for
a peace treaty) would increase Japanese trust in the USSR's motives without
significantly altering the USSR's strategic plans. Whether the Japanese government
accepted such an ofTer or not, the offer would probably have a greater positive impact




Socio-psychological aspects of Soviet-Japanese trade relations include ideological
and cultural perspectives. To accurately investigate relations between the two nations,
one must make assumptions about each nation's cultural perspective of life. This
assessment is necessary to properly evaluate national decision-making. Both the
Japanese and Soviet cultures can be considered to be "high context" in that their
societies are oriented toward a group consciousness, rather than toward a focus on the
individual.
However, Japan is primarily comprised of one culture, whereas the Soviet Union
is comprised of over one hundred nationalities of divergent cultures; the Soviet masses
are controlled by the Slavic Russian rulers. In this regard, it is important to
understand that the leaders of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU)-the
decision-makers-intend to maintain the dominance of ethnic Russians in the position
of power.-^^^ Consequently, the Russian culture predominates for the Soviet Union in
the context of bilateral national relations.
The Japanese would like to establish a harmonious world, regardless of cultural
and political differences. Although the Soviets would also like to achieve a stable
world, the Russians' siege mentality^^^ will be eradicated only after the "inevitable
victory of socialism".^^^ The affect of the Russian xenophobia (both culturally and
politically) was evident in the discussion of Soviet nationalities and the Far East
military buildup.
A. USSR
Ideologically, the Soviet Union ascribes to iMarxism-Leninism. iMarx's theory
focuses on economics as the instigator of historical change. Consequently, the USSR
is determined to create the economic conditions necessary for the success of socialism.
Contrary to the projections of iMarx's "dialectical materialism", the Soviet Union
currently is showing its greatest economic strength in natural resources (as evidenced
^^^ Smith, "Religion: Solzhenitsyn and the Russianness of Russia", The Russians,
1976, p. 573.
^^^Berton, "Soviet-Japanese Relations", p. 1263.
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by raw materials' preponderant share of exports).-^^'* Most of the USSR's quality
finished products must be imported from the West, and the West is not interested in
buying the USSR's fmished products.-^^ From an ideological standpoint, then, the
Soviet Union needs to "correct" its status within the world economic community.
Soviet cultural identity is being stressed because of demographic developments.
The Slavic nationalities, and especially the ruling Russians, have been experiencing a
decline in population growth while Central Asian minority nationalities have been
g^o^^'ing relatively rapidly. Attempts to "Russify" the minority nationalities throughout
the USSR have been unsuccessful. The significance of the problem for the ruling
Soviets in economic and political applications revolves around their desire for control.
As the ruling and majority ethnic group, the political culture of the Russians
largely determines the effect of socio-psychological considerations on the Soviet
economy. There are six basic mind-sets which largely determine the standard behavior
of Russians:
1. Consensus.^^^ All Russians support the "Party line". Rather than a Western
"democratic" concept whereby the majority rules and dissenters continue to
dissent, the norm in the USSR is to arrive at a consensus. Russians are more
willing to give up details of disagreement to arrive at a sense of unity. A
common goal is comforting in terms of mutual support. The oligarchic nature
of the Politburo is based on this principle of consensus. As an expression of
this consensus, the Politburo presents a "unanimous" front to the outside via a
charismatic representative--the CPSU General Secretary.
2. Secretiveness.^^ Russians exhibit a conspiratorial nature. Although they may
have disagreements internally, a common front is displayed to outsiders.
Foreigners are distrusted and feared as they threaten the accepted integrity and
continuity of the consensus-system. For this reason, Russians are wary of
allowing foreigners to observe activities within Russia, and tightly control the
movement and contacts of foreigners who are allowed in. Traditional Russians
do not "take their garbage out of the hut" for outsiders to see. Outsiders need
only to see a well-organized, tightly-knit facade.
^^"^Economist, 27 September 1986, p. 74; CIA, Handbook of Economic Statistics,
1986, p. 99.
^^^Marshall I. Goldman, "Opening the Soviet Hothouse: How Far Can
Gorbachev Go?" Technology Review, 18 January 1987, pp. 18, 77.
^^^Keenan, "Muscovite Political Folkways," pp. 128, 142-143, 156-158, 168-171.
25^Ibid., pp. 119-120, 158, 168.
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3. Deception.'-^^ To maintain the facade, intricate and highly-developed systems of
deception/camouflage ("maskirovka") are established. Elaborate deceptions are
designed to manipulate outsiders into furthering the Soviet Union's goals. This
deception is not considered "lying" as it promotes the higher good of the group.
A well-known manifestation of the deception principle is the "high-road/low-
road" Russian approach to international affairs. While the Soviet government
works through official "high-road" channels to achieve its purposes, the "low-
road" is functioning through subversive means (e.g. espionage and theft of
technology) to meet its objectives.
4. Control.'^^^ Centralized control ensures that detailed planning is properly
coordinated and executed. By not allowing departures from the norm, the
Russian conspiratorial nature is preserved and survival of the system is insured.
Conflicting political power bases are not allowed. Control is maintained by
elimination of anyone who attempts to build a rival camp against the existing
consensus. Thus, when a new leader is chosen in the Politburo, the West
observes a gradual change in high positions which it terms "building a power
base". In reality, this process is the realignment of consensus.
5. Survival.'^^^ Survival is fundamental to Russian thought. The other five mind-
sets mentioned here are predicated on this Russian absolute. The concept
evolved from the harsh geographic/climatic conditions in Russia-a person's first
task was to stay alive. Out of this necessity grew a tendency toward risk
avoidance-if a new/different concept arises, one is wiser to adhere to the
established mode than to risk destruction or a "step backward". Consequently,
there is a strong will to hang on to what one already has (as evidenced in
popular resistance to Gorbachev's reforms).
6. Man is evil.^^^ Russian xenophobia is well-developed. The fear of outsiders has
been established by repeated invasions of Russia. But even beyond the
understandable paranoia generated by history, Russians also perceive that all
men, including Russians, are inherently evil. Thus, control, consensus,
secretiveness, and survival combine to protect the group from the weakness of
individuals. In other words, don't trust anyone outside the village, and be wary
of those within!
Ideologically, man is perfectable. Otherwise, there is no hope of attaining the state of
communism where all men contribute unselfishly for the good of all. The "New Soviet
Man", as opposed to the real, existent man, must work to avoid alienation from the
perfect plan. A man realizes his "nature" in his work-his existence is in his production.
^Ibid., pp. 145-148.
^Ibid., pp. 130-132, 138, 157, 168.
°Ibid., pp. 125-126, 158, 168-169.
^Ibid., pp. 126-127, 162-163.
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While the number of ethnic Russians is decreasing, the requirements for filling
"vital" positions are increasing. To maintain Nomenklatura control, Slavs need to
retain leadership in military, government, industry, and agriculture positions.
With the need to expand the economy, the Soviet nationality dilemma has
arrived. Increasing emphasis is being put on development of Asia. Unless some
measures are taken to overcome the increasing requirements for non-Slavic labor, the
predominantly Slavic Party must face dilution of its power by the national minorities.
A pragmatic approach to the problem is to reduce the labor demand to meet the
available number of Russians. In the military this can be done, as previously
mentioned, by greater reliance on nuclear forces which are much less labor-intensive
than conventional forces. In industry, agriculture, and even in military conventional
forces, greater reliance on modem equipment to replace workers and soldiers would at
least partially decrease the control problems facing the diminishing ethnic Russian
population. Although the Russians are making advances in this area independently,
the transfer of robotics, cybernetics, and fifth-generation technology from Japan, the
world leader^^^ in automation, could significantly reduce the immediacy of the Soviet
nationality problem.
Secretary- Gorbachev has also shown intense interest in the Japanese ability to
motivate workers. He would like to infuse Japan's managerial techniques into Soviet
industry'. Successful implementation of Japanese techniques would undoubtedly
produce the increased effectiveness and productivity of workers-another partial
solution to the USSR's labor shortage.
B. JAPAiN
Cultural characteristics and attributes embodied in Japanese business sense are
sometimes misinterpreted as insidious and calculated schemes by Japanese businessmen
or government. In the United States, the misunderstanding leads to accusations of
Japanese unfairness in trade policy. In the Soviet Union, successful Japanese practices
create a sense of awe, strangely coupled with traditional Russian paranoia. But due to
the Japanese record of success, the USSR is very interested in adapting Japanese
managerial practices to its own economic system.
^^^StafT Report, "Pushing the State of the Art", Datamation, 1 October 1985, pp.
68-72.
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In relations with thie U.S., the Japanese have earned some of the charges of
unfairness by continuance of trade barriers which have outlived their initial purpose-
helping "infant industries" to become established. However, economic Japan-bashing is
too often a reaction against legitimate Japanese successes. Disgruntled businessmen
would do better to learn from the Japanese culture how to succeed than to scatter
blame for their own lagging competitiveness.
Some cultures are better suited to certain activities (e.g. research, development,
and production) than others. Japanese culture is suited to:
• Close coordination of available information.
• Coordinated planning and execution of multi-faceted production undertakings.
• Attention to detail.
• Ability to organize the distribution of collective gains as rewards and incentives
to individuals. ^^
The behavioral patterns which influence Japanese business and employees are a
reflection of six socio-psychological factors within Japanese society:
1. Japan is a vertical society where a person's relative ranking among his associates
is critical. Japanese are most psychologically comfortable when their position
in the vertical ranking is well-established.
2. A Japanese business interacts with its employees by the social characteristic
called paternalism or familyism. The employer often fosters employee dedication
by providing welfare programs, providing company housing, and holding pre-
work motivation sessions. In Japan, the lifetime employment system, still the
norm of the cultural contract, represents the ultimate form of paternalism.
3. The flrst two factors (seniority and membership in the company "house")
combine to create the third principle, men over organization. In the traditions of
Japan, employees matter above all else. Workers do their best because they
understand that they are not being exploited, but have a real share in the fruits
of their labor as members of the "house".
4. Decision-making, mentioned as applicable to bureaucracy in the "Political"
chapter, is based on consensus-building. Any change in routine, tactics, or
strategy of a business originates at the level which will be directly affected. A
proposed change must meet consensus at every echelon before it reaches the
executive level. This system controls the pressure on individual subordinates to
concede to poor ideas from powerful superiors out of fear of individual
repercussions. This method of decision-making is obviously very time-
consuming, and is being complemented by some time-critical Western concepts
for long-range plaiming.
^^^Yamamura Kozo, "Behind the 'Made in Japan' Label," Politics and Economics
! Contemporary Japan (Tokyo: Kodansha International Ltd., 1983), p. 131.
5. Japanese fascination with detail and subtle distinctions (as evidenced in its
traditional an) has made them ven' capable in developing nuances of
production, in determining and isolating faults, and in fme-tuning production
lines. This attention to detail has provided the foundation for the quality
control which has put Japanese products in high demand.
6. Japan is a homogeneous and cohesive society whose common basic values,
ethnic origin, and language enable ready understanding and facilitate
communicaiion among its members. ^^"^
As in all societies, Japan's historical culture is evolving, integrating more of the
features of the various cultures which it encounters globally. But these principle
features still make up the framework, of both Japanese society and business
associations.
C. JAPANESE GLOBAL, "CULTURAL" EXPANSION
Some Japanese have allowed a strong business sense to pragmatically circumvent
tradition from the perspective of progress. As alluded to earlier, the slow progress of
consensus-building has had to be complemented in some levels of decision-making by
"top-down" management, because of the high-speed nature of modem global business.
Tadashi Kume, president of Honda, flouts the Japanese convention of vertical
relationships, whereby a junior does not individually question his superior's judgement.
Mr. Kume contends that he rose to his present position by rebelling against Mr.
Honda, and that there will be no progress if his subordinates fail to do likewise.'^^ The
Honda company, although using a management style which discourages the traditional
hierarchy, has extended the concept of communication and understanding to integrate
input from personnel in research, development, and manufacture at each stage of
production. The company feels, for example, that an assembly line worker may offer
fresh or pragmatic insight into the design of a vehicle. The result is more efficient
production through communication at all levels, from design to sales.
Attention to detail pays off in design of such items as automobiles where sunilar
products are differentiated by variety within basic components and optional equipment.
Detail is crucial to quality control, a long-term determinant of customer satisfaction
and positive brand-name recognition.
"^Yamamura Kozo, "Behind the 'Made in Japan' Label," pp. 133-135.
^^^Susan Chira, "Honda: In Tokyo, Its Chief Welcomes Dissent," New York
Times, 15 June 1987, pp. 23, 28.
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To expand from economy cars into sales aimed at the afTluent, Honda is relying
on the reputation for quality it has earned, and on attention to detail in engineering.
Customer satisfaction with product details and with service are hoped to establish
Honda's Acura and Sterling models among BMW- and Mercedes-class buyers.-^^^
Honda's component and automobile plants in Ohio have felt the affect of
Japanese culture. By seeking the assistance of workers at improving product quality
and by eliminating executive perquisites, plant "associates" (assembly workers) have
raised the quality of domestically-built Hondas to equal that of imports from Japan.^^^
More than 350 Japanese auto parts companies have opened plants in the United
States.^^^ The specter of losing the auto parts trade to Japan has U.S. manufacturers
worried. While Ford is the only company now buying parts from Japanese plants in
the U.S., G.M. and Chrysler plan to begin. Chrysler's vice president of procurement
said, "Quality, cost, and deliver}^ speed are the real issues, not nationality. "^^^ His
comment referred to American protectionists who tend to blame "Japan, Inc." for their
problems rather than non-competitiveness of U.S. companies. Many American
suppliers are dealing with the Japanese competition by adopting Japanese practices in
their own manufacturing procedures, or by joining forces in joint American-Japanese
ventures.-^
"^^
A purely Japanese joint venture by Kawasaki and Nissho Iwai fmanced a plant
in Yonkers, New York, to build subway cars for New York and New Jersey. A
comment about the operation, by a professor of production management at the
Columbia University Business School, was typical of the impression created by
Japanese businesses. "The Japanese move in with their engineers, their attention to
detail and a strong emphasis on quality. Before you know it, they've got a market
^^^John Holusha, "Honda: In U.S., New Cars Court the AfQuent," New York
Times, 15 June 1987, pp. 23, 29.
267lbid.
^^^Louise Uchitelle, "Japanese Funds Still Pour In," iV^vt; York Times, 7 April
1987, p. 33.
^^^Louis Uchitelle, "Japan Winning in Auto Parts," New York Times, 1 May
1987, pp. 25, 28.
270lbid.
^^^ Thomas J. Lueck, "Kawasaki Initiative Revives Old Plant," New York Times,
17 April 1987, p. 14.
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Due to the rising value of the Yen, there is increasing financial pressure not to
renew contracts with Japanese firms. Although this development is good news to
American protectionists, the American firms who have established trade with Japanese
companies are not necessarily pleased. Noting that Japan is no longer a prudent
fmancial choice for cost advantage, other factors of Japanese trade have helped them
to maintain current relationships. One such factor is a reputation for dependability as
a supplier. To meet production schedules, firms depend on timely delivery of quality
supplies, and the promise of product service-areas in which the Japanese are noted for
excellence.- '-
Japanese firms have expanded to a variety of globally diverse cultures, bringing
with them the most effective industrial methods derived from Japan's culture.
Although recognizing that some of the methods are unusual, workers in Mexico,
Canada, England, West Germany, and the United States merely perceive these as
innovative (and successful) techniques-not as cultural imperialism.
Fifty Japanese companies have set up factories in Britain, about the same
number as those in West Germany. Among them are Sony, Hitachi, Ricoh,
Sumitomo, and Nissan--all eager to avoid European protectionism by producing in
Europe.
The Nissan auto plant in Sunderland represents the Japanese consensus-building
srv'le of industrialized operations. The Japanese style has helped to break down
Britain's class-based industrial enmities. All employees wear company uniforms, and
cafeterias are shared by factory workers and top executives. There is no time clock, as
the company trusts employees to show up. Every worker is responsible for quality
control. The workers are impressed with the sense of "team effort" which has been
generated."^
''^
Foremen receive pay equivalent to design and manufacturing engineers.
Normally in Britain, they receive roughly 15% less. Small ideas from workers have
been incorporated into production lines, accumulating into big manufacturing benefits.
Signs extolling teamwork, improvement, and quality are prominently visible. Line
workers are referred to as "manufacturing staff', or "assembly technicians"--a
psvxhological promoter of pride.
-^^Bamaby J. Feder, "Where the High Yen Hurts," New York Times, 18 May
1987, pp. 27,31.
^"^^ Steve Lohr, "Nissan's Revolution in Britain," New York Times, 2 June 1987,
pp. 33, 37.
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The seeds offamilyism have been introduced into the British plants, as well. In
Japan, familyism ensures that an employee will not be laid off if a firm modernizes
through technological upgrading. Instead, he is trained for a different job and his
"membership" in the furci is reinforced-psychologically his loyalty is reaffirmed.
Additionally, the more successful a firm is, the larger wages and bonuses its employees
receive. Japanese employees feel tremendous pride in working for a successful and
prosperous firm because they can feel a sense of identity with the firm's
accomplishments.
An example of Japanese workers' identity with the growth of their company,
alien to most American workers, is that the Japanese Ministry of Labor has felt
obliged to exhort employees to take all the paid vacations to which they are entitled--in
1978 only 50% of workers did so.^*^** Since an employee is likely to work with the same
personnel throughout his life, the concept of teamwork is strengthened by a real
community stake in production. Common goals are incentive to work at full capacity.
The Japanese efforts at creating familyism have yielded positive results at the
Sunderland plant. Production has steadily increased to 130 cars per day. The quality
of cars is equal to Nissan's Japanese-made models, and efficiency has yielded a cost
S600 less than its British rivals.^"^^
Fifteen Japanese companies have established maquiladoras (assembly plants) in
Mexico. The assembly plants allow foreign-owned factories to import components to
Mexico duty-free, assemble them in Mexico using cheap local labor, and export the
finished product. The fmished product often is exported to the United States, which
charges only a tax on the value added to the product by its assembly. Obviously, this
system provides a convenient means for penetrating the American market without
causing a trade conflict.
This use of maquiladoras applies to the present discussion regarding the Japanese
concern for men over organization. The manager for a Sanyo television plant said that
the difference between the Japanese and other nationalities was evident by the relative
emphasis on rules versus human relations.
"Americans give an 80 percent weight to the rules and are 20 percent human-
oriented, while Mexicans give an 80 percent value to human relations and 20
^"^"^Yamamura Kozo, "Behind the 'Made in Japan' Label," p. 137.
2'^^Ibid., p. 37.
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percent to following the rules. The Japanese, on the other hand, are 80 percent
human-oriented and 80 percent oriented to the rules."-^"^
His opinion, although not mathematically perfect, is understood. The affect of the
Japanese attitude was reflected in the stability of the workforce in the Japanese
maquiladoras. While some assembly plants experience a turnover rate as high as 15%
per month, the Sanyo plant, as an example, suffered only a 1.8% turnover in April
1987 (the month prior to the source article).
D. JAPANESE-SOVIET "CULTURAL" COMPATABILITY
The CPSU's desire to acquire Japanese production managerial techniques may be
frustrated even if the Japanese are wilhng to share their ideas and methods. Basic
cultural differences preclude the ready input of the Japanese round peg into the Soviet
square hole. Either the input or the receptacle will require substantial modification to
allow implementation of the proven Japanese managerial techniques.
The cultural contract of the group is probably the most important of the factors
described. Although Japan does experience strikes, dismissals, and bankruptcies, most
employees can trust that their employer will lay them off only as a last resort. This
mutual commitment between employer and employee will be difficult to reproduce in
the L'SSR.
The USSR's "social contract" provides heavily subsidized food and shelter, but
workers have not regularly received the fruits of their labors. The trust between
employer and employee in Japan is not generally present in the USSR. Part of the
reason can be surmised from the top-down, centralized decision-making process of the
USSR compared to the consensus-building, bottom-up decision process traditional in
Japan.
The CPSU's latest drive toward achieving the benefits of socialism for workers is
representative of the possible compatibility of that effort with the Japanese concept of
men over organization. In the Draft Law on State Enterprises, the emphasis on use of
profits for upgrading housing, educational facilities, and social programs for workers
(as a "benefit" of their part in a successful enterprise) is parallel to the concept of the
Japanese system. If the Soviets manage to actually put the workers' welfare ahead of
the enterprise's output, the system may work as well as Japan's. The detractor will be,
however, that in the Soviet case worker benefits normally follow the success of the
""^Larry Rohter, "Plants in Mexico Help Japan Sell to U.S.," New York Times,
26 May 1987.' pp. 25, 29.
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enterprise. In contrast, the loyalties of traditional Japanese employers lies first with
their employees, then with the stockiiolders.
In Japan, the principles of this socio-psychological relationship within individual
firms extends to cooperation among firms. The aforementioned attributes, specifically
that of pride in working for a successful firm, encourage cooperation and coordination
of multiple firms into keiretsu groups.^^^ These groups are comprised of a variety of
firms, interrelated to maximize utilization of resources. For example, each keiretsu
usually has a large bank and a general trading company as its foundation, and major
chemical, energy, machinery, and heavy industries as participants. (Mitsui, Mitsubishi,
and Fuji are well-known keiretsu groups.) Cooperation among members enables:
• Sharing of resources;
• "Loaning" of managers, technical, and blue-collar workers among companies;
• Joint purchases of raw materials;
• The sharing of investment in raw materials development;
• Joint training of employees;
• Exchanges of information on new technologies.
All these conglomerate-type activities have clear economic benefits. The most obvious
benefits are increased overall efficiency, economies of scale, and experiential
advantages.
The Soviet Draft Law on State Enterprises also encourages this type of inter-
enterprise cooperation. However, the USSR's centralized planning foundation, the
general resistance to change caused by fear of new ideas, and opposition by the
entrenched bureaucracy will make implementation of these concepts much more
difficult than merely getting them printed on paper.
In summary, although the USSR is trying to adapt these principles to its
economy, fundamental socio-psychological differences between the Soviet Union and
Japan make direct transfer improbable. Nonetheless, within its centralized framework,
and considering its strong impulse for control, the USSR has already made progress in
adapting the Japanese techniques to its own system. However, overcoming the
traditional attitudes of the Soviet workers will be more difficult than merely espousing
rational solutions to inefficiency and low productivity.
^^^Yamamura Kozo, "Behind the 'Made in Japan' Label," pp. 137-140.
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VII. CASE STUDIES
Statistical data on the Soviet economy are, generally speaking, incomplete and
imperfect. Various study centers compile available statistics and make best-guess
judgements as to the status of the Soviet economy. Consequently, the specific impact
of Western technology on the USSR cannot be empirically validated.'^'^^
Nonetheless, one can assume that Western technology acquisitions are both
desirable and beneficial to the USSR. Soviet dedication to acquiring Western
modernized goods, methods, and know-how demonstrates their importance to the
USSR. A few case studies illustrating Soviet effons, accomplishments, and failures in
developing trade and technology transfer with Japan will help to tie together the
economic, political, military, and psycho-social aspects of the question.
A. CASE STUDY OF FAILURE
The proximity of Japan and the USSR suggests the reasonable inclination for the
two to trade. Japan imports 100% of its oil, and the USSR is the world's largest
individual producer of oil.'^'^^ As mentioned previously, the Japanese have hesitated to
become vulnerable to rehance on Soviet oil due to Soviet mihtary power projection and
the conspiratorial political nature of its leadership.
The Soviet Union, to maintain its current petroleum source of hard-currency,
needs to develop the reserves which reportedly exist in Siberia and the Far East.
However, the USSR trails the West in drilling and transport technology, so it has been
desirous of economic deals \\ith Japan, hoping to trade petroleum for advanced
extraction and transport equipment.
Soviet and Japanese proposals for joint development of Tyumen oil were
negotiated under terms whereby Japan would provide credit and certain products to
facilitate Siberian development of the natural resources. In return, Japan would receive
output from the resources which were successfully harnessed. Certain events over the
12-year period of discussions (1962-74) highlighted the disincentives which eventually
defeated the negotiations.
^^^Bronstein, Technology Transfer, p. 17.
^"^Braden, "Anatomy of Failure: Japan-U.S.S.R Negotiations on Siberian Oil
Development," p. 75. Unless noted otherwise, the primary facts for this case study are
taken from the Braden article, pp. 74-105.
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The USSR was initially interested in exporting its natural resources to obtain
industrial material from Japan. As a fundamental mind-set of the Cold War at that
time, the United States was not pleased with Japan's desire to trade with Communist
countries. Japan understood its need for trade with the USSR (and China) as
important for survival.
De-intensification of U.S.-USSR tensions (during the intensified Sino-Soviet
friction) made Japanese prospects for trade with the Soviets appear more promising.
In September 1965, the Japan-Soviet Joint Economic Cooperation Committee
(JSJECC) was formed. In 1966, the Soviet and Japanese Foreign Ministers exchanged
visits.
At the 1966 JSJECC meeting in Tokyo, the Soviets proposed an oil pipeline from
the Tyumen oil fields (in Western Siberia) to Nakhodka. The origii^Vi proposal, which
drew great Japanese interest and expectation, estimated a cost of S2 billion for the
7,700-kilometer pipeline, with annual payments of oil to range from 25-40 million tons.
An incident involving negotiations for a joint natural gas venture affected
expectations for the oil venture. After mid- 1967, a Japanese trading company,
Marubeni-Iida, opted for a 20-year contract for natural gas from Brunei instead of
pursuing a Siberian proposal. The Soviets had felt that their negotiations with
Marubeni-Iida were nearing an initialed agreement, and were angered at the company's
pull-out. This trade confrontation, coupled with reiterated Japanese emphasis on the
Northern Territories issue, caused the USSR to protest about the insincerity of Japan
concerning real desire for Siberian development cooperation. The storm further
highlighted political considerations by causing Japanese reflection on the advisability of
becoming dependent on vital resources from a recognized adversary.
In 1971, the Soviets indefinitely postponed the next JSJECC meeting due to a
deadlock between the Soviets, who demanded long-term, low-interest credit, and the
Japanese government who refused to back the commercial banks issuance of "soft
loans" to the USSR. "Soft loans", by government policy, were available only to Less
Developed Countries (LDCs).
Then, after the U.S. signalled its forthcoming rapprochement with the PRC, the
USSR began to display a softening attitude toward Japan. The JCP chairman even
reported, in September 1971, that Brezhnev had told him that the USSR was earnestly
studying the possibility of returning the Northern Territories to Japan. If so,
Brezhnev's motives were likely a combination of political (preventing a Japan-PRC-
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U.S. entente) and economic (enlisting Japanese aid in Siberian development)
considerations.
Since by 1972 the Soviets had already completed 3400 kilometers of the oil
pipeline, at the rescheduled JSJECC talks in February 1972 the USSR asked for
Japanese assistance in completing the 4,400 kilometers remaining, from Irkutsk to
Nakhodka. The Soviets wanted SI billion credit in return for oil payments of 25 to 40
million tons annually over twenty years.^^^ But the two sides could not agree on the
interest rate of the credit. The USSR wanted 6%, and the Japanese best offer was only
6.5%.
But the Japanese leaders were still interested in the project. In January 1973,
Prime Minister Tanaka broke with standards of the past and conceded that economic
issues could be considered separately from political ones-that the Tyumen oil project
was not inextricably linked to the Northern Territories issue. Tanaka's announcement
met strong opposition in Japan, but he stood his ground. Meanwhile, inexplicably, the
Soviets delayed the next round of JSJECC talks until 1974. Extra time may have been
needed to reach a consensus on new strategy toward Japan in light of Tanaka's altered
policy position. The new position seemingly made Japan more maneuverable toward
Soviet objectives.
When the directors finally met in August 1974, the Soviets announced a revision
of the negotiated payment schedule, originally designed for incremental increases from
25 to 40 million tons annually over twenty years. The revised schedule set a maximum
payment of 25 million tons annually. Many Japanese considered this development to
be a breach of faith, but the deal was not broken off, yet.
One of the key disagreements to date had been Soviet insistence on a
govemment-to-govemment basis for a deal, and the Japanese government's insistence
that it would not become directly involved until a basic agreement had been initialed
between Japanese private businessmen and the Soviets. Tanaka visited the Soviet
Union in late 1973. At the end of the visit, the Soviets acquiesced to the Japanese
government's position. The Japanese government agreed to cover 80% of the loans for
the Twmen oil project, and reiterated that the oil issue was separate from the
Northern Territories issue.
The OPEC oil crisis of 1974 highlighted Japan's resource vulnerability. The
possibility of reduced oil imports implied a negative GNP growth rate. The possibility
^^^Whiting, Siberian Development, pp. 138-139.
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of recession and a balance- of-trade problem complicated the plans for long-range
investment in Siberia.
In March 1974, the JSJECC directors held another meeting, in Moscow. Much
of the discussion focused on U.S. participation in Siberian development and other
projects. Japan wanted the U.S. to be involved to secure Japanese interests, and the
USSR was interested in the credit which would be available if the U.S. Export-Import
Bank was involved. On the last day of the talks, the Soviets dropped the bombshell.
In one fell swoop, Kosygin announced that the planned oil pipeline had been
cancelled. In its place, the USSR planned to build a "multi-purpose transport" system,
the Baikal-Amur Mainline (BAM). In effect, all the negotiations to date were
liquidated. The Soviet Union presented the BAM as its keystone for overall Siberian
development. Kosygin's BAM anr'^uncement had seemed to infer that the USSR
viewed Siberian development as a "package deal", but conflicting Soviet
pronouncements made verification of the point elusive. Although the utility of the
change from a pipeline to a railroad is evident, the military and strategic implications
were immediately evident, as well.
The sudden announcement of the Soviet change of plans disturbed the Japanese.
The Kremlin's decision was not made overnight, yet they had given little indication
that such a drastic alteration of direction was imminent. In April 1974, Tanaka met
with Prime Minister Kosygin and accused the Soviets of indecisiveness. He cited both
the BAM proposal and the unexpected reduction in the agreement for oil deliveries.
He further expressed doubt whether a "package deal" for Siberian development could
be worked out, and maintained that a project-by-project approach would have more
chance of yielding results.
The desire of the Japanese to gain a share of this market was obviously very
strong. A logical reaction to the USSR's fickleness would have been to write off the
time lost in negotiations as a learning experience and to move on to more dependable
ventures. Initially, Japanese government and business interests disagreea on how to
approach the change. Businessmen still wanted to consider the project solely from an
economic perspective.
The Japanese government foresaw that the overriding factors would inevitably be
political and military. Within a month, even business leaders had conceded that the
BAM issue had political overtones. Despite the desire to fulfill the efforts which had
been expended so far, Japan realized that it would have to withdraw from joint
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development of Siberia if plans were contingent upon its support of construction of the
BAM. Japan's reliance on the U.S. for its security would not allow it, in good
conscience, to cooperate in what promised to be a vital strategic asset for the Soviet
Union.
Moreover, other considerations were complicating the issue:
• Building the BAM was a risky and technically difficult project.
• Credit negotiations had deteriorated as both sides refused to give in from their
interest rate positions.
• Questions remained unsettled about the denomination of payments, and about
the price of extracted resources.
By May, the political climate had cooled. The USSR revealed that a visit to Japan by
Brezhnev, Kosygin, and Supreme Soviet President Podgomy, scheduled for late 1974,
would probably not occur.
As 1974 dragged on, the Japanese clearly demonstrated that their participation in
the project hinged on U.S. participation, and its implicit blessing. Going into the
rescheduled JSJECC talks in October 1974, Japanese businessmen were pessimistic
about U.S. participation. Further negative feelings about the possibilities for joint
development of T^oimen oil returned to the question of loans, and to the 25 million ton
ceiling on imports from the investment.
As prospects for increased oil imports from China appeared to be on the rise, the
Japanese decided to give up the joint development concept for Tyumen oil. Instead
they proposed to purchase oil from the Soviet Union on a purely commercial basis.
Upon the Soviet failure to offer any further concessions, the negotiations for Tyumen
oil development ended in October 1974.
From the onset of discussions for Siberian development in 1962 to shelving of the
proposals during the sixth JSJECC talks in 1974, both sides faced sufficient
disincentives to halt progress. For the Japanese, the disincentives which halted
negotiations for T^-umen oil ventures in 1974 can be conveniently separated into
economic/ technical and political/ strategic groupings. Although the Japanese had not
consistently either combined or divided the two groupings throughout the period
discussed. Prime Minister Tanaka's efforts were directed at the possibility of separating
them.
From that perspective, economical/technical disincentives were:
1, Soviet demands for a long-term, low-interesi. deferred payment schedule did not
offer adequate financial security for the Japanese, in view of projected inflation
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and fluctuating interest rates. From the beginning, the Japanese government
had preferred a cash settlement basis for trade in oil.
2. In 1973 the Soviets unilaterally announced a 15 million ton reduction (from the
proposed maximum of 40 million tons) in the rate of oil which would be "paid"
to Japan from 1980 to 2000. The announcement caused the Japanese to doubt
both the profitabihty of the returns to their investment and the reliability of the
USSR to refrain from further unilateral reductions in the agreement.
3. In 1974, the USSR announced that it had decided to transport the oil via a new
trans-Siberian railroad (the BAM) instead of by pipeline, as originally
negotiated. The Japanese were uncertain about the economic feasibility of the
BAM, given the geographic/ climatic conditions which would have to be
overcome.
4. Soviet estimates about the potential of the Tyumen oil fields were suspect.
5. In 1974, prospects were good for stabilization of oil supplies, and possibly even
for a short-term oil surplus. Committing capital to a long-term, expensive oil
venture in Siberia did not seem wise at the time.
6. Interest in Siberian oil was diminished by Japan's imports of oil from China,
beginning in 1973. Increased oil imports from China were expected to follow.
7. Conflicting Soviet pronouncements in 1974 cast doubt on the stability of the
economic planning for development-whether on a project-by-project basis or
by a "package formula".
8. Perhaps the most risky disincentive of all was the prospect of undertaking a
mammoth joint venture with a potentially hostile government with a "closed"
economic system. The conspiratorial nature of the USSR and its enigmatic
fluctuations over decisions cast a cloud of doubt over the prospect.
The political/strategic disincentives for Japan were no less important:
1. The U.S. rapprochement with the PRC under President Nixon had a
destabilizing effect on the region, making long-term commitment to Siberian
ventures with the USSR more risky than mere economic considerations.
2. Construction of the BAM would pose a strategic threat to the region and to
Japan itself. Japanese participation in building the railroad could have
contributed to strategic suicide, or could have signalled a move away from the
United States security umbrella toward neutralism or even toward the Soviet
camp.
3. Related to the point above was the implication that Japanese cooperation on
BAM would have inferred Japan's support of the USSR's "Asian Collective
Security System". That Soviet proposal was intended to contain China.
Obviously, seeming Japanese endorsement would have inhibited Japan's efforts
at rapprochement with China.
4. After the United States returned Okinawa in 1972, the issue of the Northern
Territories was reheated in Japan. Japanese ready cooperation in the Siberian
oil plan would have weakened Japan's bargaining power for the islands.
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The USSR was experiencing disincentives, as well. Although their acceptance of
the failed negotiations is not as clearly defined, one can speculate from knowledge of
the Soviet political and economic systems that the following factors applied:
1. After the Marubeni-Iida about-face in 1967, the USSR doubted Japanese
sincerity toward Siberian development as a joint venture beneficial to both
parties. The trading company's actions confirmed their suspicions that Japan
was only interested in profit, not in a truly cooperative relationship.
2. The Soviet Union perceived its oil resources as a highly sought-after
commodity. The 1973 oil crisis reinforced Soviet perceptions of having the
upper hand in making deals for its valuable, non-renewable oil assets. In light
of the ideological view that time is on its side, the Kremlin felt that it should
maximize its advantage. If Japan did not like the conditions of the proposals,
the USSR was better to wait than to give up a significant asset for
comparatively little return.
3. The Soviet perception of itself is indeed autarchic. Along with the preceding
disincentive, without significant advantage on the Soviet side, the Kremlin
would remain more in line with its doctrine of self-sufficiency to continue slower
development on its own than to risk the intrusion of foreign capital and
influence within its borders.
B. CASE STUDY OF SUCCESS
In light of the preceding disincentives to both Japan and the USSR, one would
think that the fmalization of any meaningful trade agreement would be practically
impossible. As an alternative, the Japanese can turn to the Chinese who have been
easier to work with and can meet many of the same needs as the USSR. But diversity
is important to Japan in terms of both export markets and imports of resources. The
fundamental incentives to Soviet-Japanese trade-geographic proximity,
complementarity of economic needs, and strategic inequalities of size and power-
remain. Mutually beneficial trade has been proven possible.
Successful trade between the USSR and Japan has been concluded in timber
products. With its loss of Sakhalin Island following WW II, the Japanese paper and
pulp industries were devastated. To revitalize these industries, the Japanese needed
timber. The Soviet Union was nearby and available.
In the first joint timber project, undertaken in 1968, the Japanese Export-Import
Bank granted S163 million in deferred credits to the Soviet Union, primarily to cover
the costs of machinery purchased from Japan. Japan was to receive lumber and sawed
timber in return, through 1974. '^^^
^^^Ed. A. Hewitt and Herbert S. Levine, "The Soviet Union's Economic
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The 1968 timber project was especially significant as it marked the first Soviet-
Japanese collaboration since the start of the negotiations. Of the SI 63 million credit,
SI 33 million was on a five-year deferred-payment basis (20% down, at 5.8% interest)
for technical assistance and machinery, plus S30 million for consumer goods.'^^^ The
S30 million for consumer items (e.g. clothing and rubber boots for laborers) was to be
repaid over eighteen months, again at 5.8% interest. ^^^ In return, the USSR provided
7.6 million cubic meters of timber and pulp at a fixed price from 1969-73, and 0.32
million cubic meters of lumber from 1971-73.^^*
An interim wood-chip project was developed in December 1971 for the
construction of plant, port loading facilities, and wood chip carriers (ships). The
Japanese extended S45 million credit for this effort. The Japanese terms of the deal
were for a sLx-year deferred-payment (12% down, at 6% interest, excluding the ships),
plus S5 million cash to meet local consumer needs. In return, the USSR supplied 6.35
million cubic meters of chip and pulp timber between 1972-77. Between 1978-81, an
additional 6.4 million cubic meters would be shipped with payment calculated on
quantity, not on value.-^^^
A second Far East Forestry Development timber project, in 1974, was based on a
S550 million loan from the Japanese Export-Import Bank. Under this project, new
timber resources were opened on the Kirenga, Selemdzha, and Amgun river basins with
expanded paper and pulp mill capacity in Eastern Siberia.^^^ Japan furnished S550
million in loanS"S435 million for facilities for the actual exploitation of timber
resources, S65 million for ships, and S50 million for local costs. In return, the USSR
supplied 18.4 million cubic meters of timber and lumber from 1975-79 at annually
adjusted prices.
These joint wood projects were successful although Japan has alternative sources
for wood products. First-grade softwood is available from North America and first-
grade hardwood from Southeast Asia. Soviet woods are inferior in quality. The
Soviets also require that an entire stand of trees be purchased, not selected or graded
Relations in Asia," Soviet Policy in East Asia, ed. Zagoria, p. 217.
^^^Whiting, Siberian Development, p. 136.
^^^Braden, "Anatomy of Failure," p. 82.
Whiting, Siberian Development, p. 136.
285lbid.
^^^Hewitt and Levine, "The Soviet Union's Economic Relations in Asia," Soviet
Policy in East Asia, ed. Zagoria, 1982, p. 217.
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trees. However, these deficiencies are minimized by concentration on their use for
wood chips and pulp rather than for lumber.
The Soviet Union faces the problems of labor and transportation for extraction
of timber products. Harsh climatic conditions require strong incentives for laborers.
Forest reserves are generally far from roads or raikoads, so transportation is a
restriction. Larch, the most common variety of tree in East Asian Siberia, has a
tendency to sink, so river floating is also risky.'^^^
Despite the apparent Japanese bargaining advantage, in 1978 Japan imported
17-20% of its wood products from the Soviet Union. As an indicator that this was a
focus of Japan's trade with the USSR, those wood imports represented approximately
40% of Japan's total purchases from the USSR.^^^
In light of the discussion of the failure of the Tyumen oil project, a couple of
significant details stand out. In the early successful timber projects, the Japanese
offered credit to the USSR at or below the interest rate desired by the Soviet Union.
In return the Japanese received fixed rates on the material received in payment. The
1974 deal, finalized in the year that the joint T^Timen oil project negotiations broke
down may have succeeded purely on momentum. The Japanese accepted their
pajTnent in annually adjusted prices, despite growing pessimism toward the reliability
of the Soviets as business partners.
C. FISHING
The Japanese-Soviet fishing relationship is a multi-faceted issue. Dimensions
include territorial limits, quotas on catches, management of the fish population, and
fish processing.
Soviet-Japanese relations were in a negative cycle when the Tyumen oil
negotiations broke down in 1974. The anti-hegemony clause in the Sino-Japanese
peace treaty became public knowledge in January 1975.^^^ The Soviets responded with
increased naval and air force activity north of Hokkaido to intimidate Japan. In
Europe, West German Chancellor Willy Brandt had abandoned the disputed territory
east of the Oder-Neisse to Polish control-an area promised to Stalin at Yalta, along
with the Northern Territories, as spoils ofWW II.
^^
'Whiting, Siberian Development, pp. 153-4.
'^^Ibid., p. 153.
^^^Fuji Kamiya, "The Northern Territories," Soviet Policy in East Asia, ed.
Donald S. Zagoria, pp. 121-151. The details in this section are taken from Kamiya's
article unless otherwise noted.
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These political issues had caused serious deterioration of Japanese-Soviet
relations. A more tangible incident then occurred which hardened Soviet attitudes
toward Japan. On 6 September 1976 a Soviet MiG-25 pilot defected, with his plane, to
Hokkaido. Despite Soviet protests, the Japanese allowed the pilot to go to the United
States, and returned the plane in parts two months later-after it had been dismantled
and examined by technicians.
Three weeks after the defection, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko flatly told
Japanese Foreign Minister Kosaka that the USSR had no intention of considering
return of the Northern Territories as a prerequisite to a peace treaty. He totally
rejected Japan's 3-year old invitation for Brezhnev to visit Tokyo. A visit would only
be considered when relations were friendly.
Given this setting of unfriendly relations, the fishing zone territorial limits are
better understood. Shortly after the dismantled MiG-25 was returned, the Soviets
struck back at Japan through fishing access controls. The USSR unilaterally declared
a 200-nautical-mile exclusive fishing zone.
The significance was that the waters around the Northern Territories provide
good fishing. Continued use of the area by Japan would now require political
negotiations. The negotiations for a fishery agreement were concluded relatively
quickly considering the animosity of the USSR toward Japan at that point. Started in
February 1977, the agreement was concluded in May.
Article 1 of the treaty defmed the 200-mile zone as including the Northern
Territories on the Soviet side. Japan attempted to protect its "legal" claim to the islands
by separating the fishing agreement from the territorial issue. Article 8 qualified that
the demarcation in Article 1 would not afiect either nation's positions or views on
other issues (i.e. "ownership" of the islands), but was a workable solution to
establishing economic zones of control. There is some disputed ambiguity in the
phrasing of Article 8, but the intent of the Japanese to separate the economic
consideration from the political issue is clear.
Fishing negotiations occur annually. Each year, the Northern Territories issue is
revived, accompanied by the pressures of public opinion in Japan and political/military
power in the Soviet Union. The media of both sides promote the interests and
perspectives of their respective nations.
The Japanese fishing lobby and historically-minded Japanese nationalists kindle
Japan's opposition to the USSR. The USSR often attempts to intimidate Japan by
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"harassment" of its boats with Soviet naval craft. Moscow answers Tokyo's protests
by citing Japanese violations of catch quotas and poaching in forbidden waters.-^^^
Each year the Soviets drive a hard bargain. They "own" much of the valuable
fishing area, and Japan depends on fish as a dietary staple. The media raises the ante,
and the negotiations begin.
The Soviets base their tough stance on international laws which charge them
with ensuring the proper management of fishing in regions under their control.-^^^ The
Japanese use political pressure from public opinion to provide bargaining power. In
the past, Japan has held out against strict Soviet proposals as long as possible. At last,
Japan has made significant concessions to gain enough rights to survive.
In early December 1986 Japan and the Soviet Union formally signed an
agreement for 1987 detailing the bilateral fishing quotas within each other's 200-mile
zone. 305 Soviet boats will be allowed to utilize the Japanese zone for a total quota of
200,000 tons offish (primarily sardines and mackerel). For Japan, 1,600 boats will be
allowed to enter the Soviet zone for a total quota of 300,000 tons of fish (primarily
Alaska pollack, cuttlefish, and mackerel pike). Japan will compensate the USSR for
the 100,000 ton difference by paying fees of roughly 58. 1 million.-^^^
The contractual-legal basis of bilateral fishing agreements is determined by a
number of agreements, including the one above. The primary negotiating body for
cooperation in fisheries is the Soviet-Japanese Commission on Fisheries, established in
May 1985. At the Commission's annual meeting, the delegations discuss scientific-
technical cooperation in the industry, and plan coordinated exploration of fish
resources. The catch of the salmon species receives particular attention.^^^
In keeping with its responsibility to protect salmon originating in the USSR, the
Soviets declare a desire to totally end salmon fishing on the high seas. Such fishing
prevents salmon migration to their spawning grounds, greatly depleting their numbers.
The USSR has prohibited its own fishermen from high-seas salmon fishing for some
years now.
^^^Whiting, Siberian Development, pp. 127-130.
^^^"TASS Reviews Fisheries Cooperation with Japan," FBIS (USSR, Daily
Report), 9 Januarv' 1987, p. C4. The U.N. Law of the Sea Convention places
responsibility for preservation of salmon on the country of their origin.
^^^"Fisheries Accord Formally Signed With USSR," FBIS (Asia), 11 December
1986, p. CI.
^^^"TASS Reviews Fisheries," FBIS (USSR, Daily Report), 30 Januar}^ 1987, p.
C4.
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Of course, Soviet fishermen do fish for salmon in the spawning areas, inside the
Soviet 200-mile economic zone. The Japanese pay fees for access to this zone of Soviet
control. The Soviet receive other economic cooperation benefits from Japan,
undoubtedly calculated by the Japanese to provide leverage in the negotiations. The
USSR stresses "new forms of cooperation", such as establishing joint ventures and
broadening mutually beneficial ties between Soviet and Japanese fishermen. ^^"^
As evidence of successful cooperation, a Japanese firm, "Seyu" part of the
business group "Seibu", built two fish stores (turnkey projects) in Nakhodka and
Komsomolsk-on-Amur. "Seibu" has also made overtures for agri-industrial
cooperation with the USSR. Members of the group and Soviet officials have discussed
other joint projects in land improvement, plant selection, and the processing, storing,
and transporting of farm produce.^^
The second session of the Soviet-Japanese Commission on fisheries stalled in
January 1986. Because negotiations were proving fruitless, the talks were suspended in
February.^^^ Talks were begun again in March,^^^ and after two more months of
negotiating, a sahnon accord was fmally reached on 24 May 1986.^^^ The Japanese
made significant concessions in order to stave off a Soviet threat to impose a total ban
on salmon fishing in three years, and to allow its fishermen to take advantage of the
rest of the sahnon season.
The immediate impact on Japan included a 35% reduction in its pelagic salmon
catch quota, unequally matched by only a 17.6% reduction in the fishery "cooperation
fees" it paid to the USSR for permission to fish in Soviet waters. The domestic impact
of the accord was the affect on employment of 150,000 to 200,000 Japanese and a 45%
reduction of its 380-boat sahnon fishing fleet. ^^^ (Japan signed an agreement in March
1986 with the United States to stop salmon fishing in the Bering Sea in 1997,^°° further
complicating the issue.)
^^^Ibid.
^^^"Japanese Businessmen Discuss Developing Ties," FBIS ( USSR, Daily Report),
16 October 1986, p. C2.
'^FBIS (USSR, D
'^FBIS (Asia), 18 March 1986, p. CI.
'^FBIS (Asia), 28 May 1986, pp. Cl-C
"^FBIS (Asia), 30 May 1986, p. C2.
'^FBIS (Asia), 28 May 1986, pp.
Canada) in FBIS (Asia), 8 November 1985, pp. C1-C2.
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As a brief example of politically-oriented media manipulation of the annual
fisheries negotiations, a snapshot of this past year follows:
1. On 3 December 1986, Kyodo noncommitally reminded the Japanese of the
ongoing bilateral negotiations. It mentioned the visit of two Soviet trawlers to
Hitachi port, made possible under last year's agreement.^^^
2. On 3 February 1987, Kyodo printed the Soviets' "bitter complaints" about
"reckless" fishing-the USSR's position of strength on the salmon issue. It
responded, in the same article, with the Japanese reminder that prolonged
negotiations could hamper bilateral fishery cooperation-Japan's economic
bargaining chip."^^^
3. On 12 February 1987, Kyodo printed the story of a Japanese trawler which had
been seized by the Soviet Union for allegedly violating Soviet territorial waters.
Whether guilty or not, the report stressed that the trawler was detained for 18
days, had been fmed roughly S320 thousand, and was released after confiscation
of both its catch of 27 tons of codfish and all its fishing gear (valued at another
S150 thousand.^°^
The third session of the Soviet-Japanese Commission on Fisheries convened in
Moscow on 2 February 1987 and ended on 25 Februar\\ Japan initially proposed that
its salmon catch quota in the North Pacific should be increased 10,500 tons from last
year's quota, to a total of 35,000 tons. It proposed an increase of roughly S3. 35
million in fishery cooperation fees above 1986's payment, to a total of roughly S27
nulHon for 1987.^°'*
The Soviets claimed that salmon resources in the north Pacific are in an
"unsatisfactor\^ situation", and that the USSR's duty is to protect the fish from
"reckless" offshore fishing by Japanese boats.^^^ They agreed to allow 24,500 tons of
salmon-the same as in 1986. The Japanese compensation, for the expenses of Soviet
organizations on salmon protection and reproduction, rose by about SI. 35 irdllion.
The Soviets also stressed the need for bilateral cooperation on the rational utilization
^°^"Two Soviet Trawlers Make Hitachi Port Call," FBIS {Asia), 4 December
1986, p. C3.
^°^'USSR Accuses Fishermen of 'Reckless' Salmon Fishing," FBIS {Asia), 4
February 1987, p. C2.
^°^"USSR Releases Detained Trawler After 18 Days," FBIS {Asia), 12 February
1987, p. C2.
^•^^"Japan Proposes Larger Salmon Quota at Meeting," FBIS {USSR, Daily
Report), 9 Februar\- 1987, p. C2.
^°^"USSR Accuses Fishermen," FBIS {Asia), 4 February 1987, p. C2.
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of salmon reserves, and proposed that a Joint test and production enterprise for salmon
reproduction be established--on Soviet territory.^^^
The Commission approved a plan, complete with a draft program for
implementation of joint fisheries studies in 1987. The program will study reserves in
the northwest Pacific, and improvement of methods of processing fish and marine
products.
D. NEW DIRECTIONS
Due to the contemporary nature of trends in the relationship between the USSR
and Japan, little empirical data is available to document specific quantities of change in
their bilateral trade. Neither monetary amount nor volume of transfers is available to
provide sufficient statistical backing for the change which appears to be happening.
Soviet statistics are always sketchy, and up-to-date Japanese data are incomplete. The
change has been instigated primarily by the Soviets' new willingness to open to the
West.
Japanese businessmen have been willing to expand trade as much as possible
within the limits provided by the Japanese government. The limits have primarily been
determined by Soviet inflexibility and the closed nature of its system. The significance
of the new Soviet economic proposals is that they reflect a new opportunity and
willingness to accept trade from the West.
The Kremlin has indicated its plans for economic outreach by officially
developing the vehicles by which its economy can deal with the West. Specific vehicles
for developing foreign economic relations are found in the "Joint Ventures Law", the
"Draft Law on State Enterprises", and the "CMEA Comprehensive Plan for Scientific
and Technological Development to the Year 2000". These documents have been
discussed previously.
A further concrete indicator of Soviet dedication to significantly increasing its
foreign trade is embodied in a Resolution by the CPSU Central Committee and the
USSR Council of Ministers.^^^ To provide centralized leadership for expanded foreign
trade, the "State Foreign Economic Commission" was created as a standing organ of
the USSR Council of Ministers.-^^^ The new Commission directs the work of all
^°^"USSR-Japan Fishery Talks End in 'Understanding'," FBIS {USSR, Daily
Report), 26 February 1987, p. CI.
^°^"Management of Foreign Economic Ties Reorganized," FBIS (USSR, Daily
Report), 4 February 1987, pp. Sl-SlO.
^°^Ibid., p. SI.
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ministries and depanments engaged in foreign economic relations. In describing the
State Foreign Economic Commission (FEC) responsibilities, the concepts "radical",
"d^Tiamic", and "progressive" were used in the Resolution to indicate the nature of its
role.-^09
A Scientific Economic Council was created, subordinate to the FEC, to elaborate
major problems and to prepare recommendations for development to foreign economic
relations. The Chairman of the FEC is also the Chairman of the State Committee for
Science and Technolog\---a pointer for the direction of proposed Soviet foreign
economic activity. For established coordination with its bloc partners, the first deputy
chairman of FEC is also the USSR's permanent representative to CMEA.-^^^
Associations, enterprises, and organizations are specifically given the right to
establish links with similar activities in CMEA countries, independently resolving
questions concerning production agreements and contracts, and scientific,' technical
collaboration. A number of ministries, departments, associations, and enterprises are
granted the right to cany out export-import operations directly, including markets in
capitalist countries, NICs, and LDCs. Activities granted this opportunity are
financially autonomous, including currency self-fmancing and self-capitalizing.^^^
The USSR Ministry of Foreign Trade retains the obligation for operations of
statewide significance. The foreign trade activities under the FEC must ensure that
they develop high-quality goods, acceptable for world markets. The Ministries have
been further instructed to improve planning of foreign economic activity- to allocate
more than "residual" resources to exports, and to stop permitting "unwarranted"
imports.-^^^
The vision is to regain control of the economy by aggressive measures. High-
quality exports will bring in hard-currency. Producing high-quality goods for domestic
use will eliminate wasting funds needlessly on imports which can be internally
manufactured.
The exchange of visits by Soviet and Japanese Foreign Ministers in 1986 heralded
a fast-moving rapprochement between the two countries-or so many analysts believed.






in the direction of a "tilt towards the Soviets".^^^ Japanese writers were predicting that
Nal5.asone was aiming for the Nobel peace prize by attempting to fmalize a peace
treaty between the USSR and Japan.^^"^ They cited the USSR's desire to rapidly fLX its
economy as incentive enough to "give away" two of the four Northern Islands (i.e.
Shikotan and the Habomais) and Nakasone's desire for a page in history as incentive
enough to accept the offer.
Although Gorbachev's subsequent snubbing of Nakasone's repeated offers for
him to visit Tokyo calmed the feverish political speculations,-^^ ^ there is still some hope
for such an agreement. Until that time, the official position of both countries is that
all "four islands" are rightfully theirs.
The Kremlin has reiterated that its friendship is not without limits. It has
denounced Japan for continued "harping" on the Northern Territories issue,^^^ for its
support of U.S. forces''^^ (especially the presence of the F-16's at Misawa), and for its
participation in SDI research. '^^ Secretary Gorbachev has also lashed out at the West
for its unwillingness to share technological advances with the whole world,^^^ meaning
with the Communists. In statements which reflect the Soviet desire to maintain a
proud image, he has lashed out in the other direction and declared that the Soviet
Union does not need Western help-the USSR is fully capable of meeting its objectives
independently. Mikhail Gorbachev stated, following a visit to the Baikonur space
center in Kazakhstan in May 1987,
^^
-^"Rapprochement with USSR Discussed," FBIS {Japan Report), 17 October
1986, p. 1.
^^
"^"Speculation on Return of the Islands," FBIS {Japan Report), 17 October
1986, pp. 2-6.
^^^"USSR Forces Nakasone to Rethink Diplomatic Strategy," FBIS {Asia), 17
November 1986, p. CI.
^^^"Japanese 'Hullabaloo' Over Kuril Islands Rebuked," FBIS {USSR, Daily
Report), 29 January 1987, pp. C2-C3; "Moscow TV on Japan's 'Unlawful' Claims to
Kurils," FBIS {USSR, Daily Report), 23 January 1987, p. C2.
^^"^"U.S.-Japan 'Adventurist Preparations' Criticized," FBIS {USSR, Daily
Report), 30 January 1987, pp. C1-C2.
^^^"Talks on Japanese SDI Participation End 24 Jan", Ibid., p. C2.
^^^"CEMA Comprehensive Program," FBIS {USSR, Daily Report), 19 December
1985, p. BB9.
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there is no need for us to go cap in hand to foreign lands. No embargoes, no
bans on the sale of technology and equipment to us, adopted by some foreign
circles, w\]l slow down our countr\''s development. -^-^
Out of all this, we can read a great Soviet desire to acquire technology and managerial
techniques which will save expenditures of research, development, and production.
However, the Kremlin will not allow the USSR to be manipulated because of
technological shortcomings or industrial backwardness.
The CPSU's General Secretary Gorbachev told Britain's Margaret Thatcher in
April 1987,
The Socialist system has demonstrated repeatedly and in many ways its
advantages over capitalism. This is not boasting but a hard fact. Far from all its
potentialities have been identified and put to use.^^^
Aleksandr N. Yakovlev, a Gorbachev Politburo appointee in charge of culture
and propaganda, told a reporter recently, "Unleashing the Cold War has been your
success, but you won't catch us a second time."^^^ Noting that the Soviet approach to
foreign policy is based on its assessment of domestic and foreign affairs, he stated that
the Soviets feared an American nuclear attack for three generations~but not anymore.
On the development of Soviet economic resources, he feels that the USSR needs
to decentralize power and release initiative, but adds.
We still believe in the socialist principle of a centrally-planned economy along the
main lines of investment and the scientific development of our economy...We
shall again astonish you in the West. And it is not yet the deep of the night. We
will astonish you.^^^
The USSR will not soon draw close to the West as a "good neighbor".
However, Yakovlev also stated, "I believe that the Soviet Union and Japan are
natural trade and economic partners. I believe that the Japanese understand this,
too."^^"^ He said that U.S. trade embargoes and restrictions on the exports of
^'°"Gorbachev Offers Analysis: Soviet Science is Doing Fine," New York Times,




^^^"Propaganda Chief Yakovlev on Soviet Reforms," U.S. News & World Report,
1 June 1987, p. 38.
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technologies have driven the USSR to orient its attempts at Western trade toward
Japan and Europe.
E. JOINT VENTURES AVENUES
Secretary Gorbachev has also expressed the desire to expand trade with Japan.
In the "Vladivostok Speech" he made specific reference to the willingness of the USSR
to develop a new, close relationship with Japan. Speeches by other prominent Party
spokesmen have also referred to Japan as a welcome candidate for increased economic
relations. -^^^ Recent developments in the USSR have suggested that the Kremlin
intends to expand its trade via joint ventures.
Joint ventures are a convenient method of introducing foreign technology and
capital into the USSR. Through joint ventures, the USSR expects to gain scientific
information. Cooperation between enterprises will expectedly link technology with the
practical application of business. -^^^ Joint ventures minimize the hard-currency required
to establish new projects, and provide some "insurance" against trade sanctions.
Interdependence is created by mutual financial stakes in the success of operations.
The USSR first announced that it would enact a "Joint Ventures Law" to an
audience of Japanese businessmen. Soon after, members of the Japan-USSR Business
Cooperation Committee attended a seminar in Moscow. They reported that, by late
December 1986, Soviet enterprises had been approached by 100 interested foreign
firms. Of those, eleven proposals were presented by Japanese businesses.^^^
In December 1986, former Japanese Foreign Minister Saburo Okita discussed the
prospects of Soviet-Japanese economic relations with a Moscow radio reporter. -^^^ He
opined that joint ventures should be expected, beginning small and growing larger with
mutual experience. He felt that fisheries would be a likely initial undertaking. He did
^^^"Pravda Publishes Gorbachev Supreme Soviet Speech," FBIS {USSR, National
Affairs), 3 December 1985, p. R23; "USSR Aims at Japan's High Technology," FBIS
{Japan Report), 5 March 1987, pp. 52-57.
326"jj^^ Scientific Symposium with Japan Ends," FBIS {USSR, Daily Report), 5
January- 1987, p. C2.
327"Joi
1986, p. C8.
^^^"Japan's Okita on Prospects for Joint Ventures," FBIS {USSR, International
Affairs), 23 January 1987, pp. 67-8.
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not expect Japan to seek increased imports of minerals and coal, for example, since
Japan was moving to diversify away from industries which are dependent on those
natural resources.
In the interview, Okita seemed most impressed by the change in the Soviet
Union's attitude.
Under a recent new policy, the Soviet Union will no longer seek to produce
evervthing by itself. It is seeking to produce popular goods and export them, but
it is also seeking to import commodities from foreign countries when their
domestic production is not favorable. The Soviet Union now seems to have the
concept of international division of labor. In particular, as far as Soviet civilian
industry' is concerned, it has thus far been less competitive on foreign markets.
However, government officials and economists are now likely to gear their
thinking toward producing competitive goods in terms of quality and price for
sale to foreign countries. In this context, it seems possible to develop new types
of trade between the two countries. ^"^
Okita is saying that the Soviet leadership has seen the realistic need to utilize assets
from foreign sources which it has not developed itself, or which it cannot afford to
undertake alone. He implies that the Soviet Union is moving toward the "free market"
concept of comparative advantage.
An overly optimistic outlook would be that the Soviet Union and the Western
societies will grow closer through joint ventures and economic cooperation, diffusing
the animosity between them. A more realistic viewpoint is that the intent of the
USSR's drive is selfishly motivated. The Kremlin has admitted its economic deficiency
and will use the West to help fix ilP^ As soon as the economy has been rebuilt, the
era of detente will probably fade into histor\'. The CPSU still wants to retain control,
and the ideological objective is still "the ultimate victory of socialism"--whether through
peaceful or aggressive means.
^^^Ibid., p. 68.




The Soviet economy is not likely to collapse. The standard of living may not
improve very rapidly, but the Soviet peoples are famous for their cultural ability to
suffer and continue on. The centrally-planned nature of the system ensures that the
necessary' inputs for the Kremlin's vital projects will be acquired.
The purpose of the Politburo's current reforms is to invigorate the USSR's
economic system. Reforms will be consistent with integrated policies for strengthening
*h: bonds of the socialist bloc to the Soviet Union (as demonstrated in the CMEA
Comprehensive Plan to the Year 2000). "Proof of successful reforms will be steady
economic growth through capital modernization and increased productivity, as well as
indisputable evidence of the benefits of socialism at the worker level.
Critics will argue that Soviet "maskirovka" (deception) and conspiratorial nature
(secretiveness) will never allow the USSR to open the doors wide to any Western
power. The historical/traditional basis for this argument is strong.
The Soviets will be cautious about the speed of development of economic ties
with the West. Overdependence on the West for equipment (e.g. spare parts) could
make the Soviet Union uncomfortably vulnerable to trade sanctions. By absorbing
complete production packages, the USSR's modernization will be slow, but the pace
will allow the USSR to maintain invulnerability to Western attempts at economic
manipulation.
The USSR can continue its development at a pace consistent with low-risk
ventures, without the pressure of impending crisis. As long as the Politburo believes
that Soviet socialism can survive independently, it can avoid desperate decision-making
and is not likely to risk confrontation with its opponents.
Secretary Gorbachev is well-founded in both ideology and economics. The pro-
trade interpretation of his motives is that he represents a pragmatic perspective which
has recognized and admitted the dangers facing the Soviet Union domestically. The
USSR cannot remain isolated from worldwide interaction.
• The Soviet economy's growth has been declining. Drastic measures are
necessary to wake it up.
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• The source of the economy's decline, relative to prospering capitalist countries,
is its wasteful nature. Massive amounts of inputs are expended to maintain
economic stability.
• "Perestroika" is based on increasing efficiency and productivity in energ>\ labor,
raw materials, natural resources, transportation, communication, and planning.
• Japan has established a phenomenal record of success in promoting worker
efficiencv* and productivity' globally-increased Soviet labor productivity- would
theoretically enable the GNP per capita to grow, even in the face of Russian
demographic decline.
• Modernized equipment and processes would enable the USSR to develop more
efncient production lines. Incorporation of advanced techniques and designs
would produce higher quality manufactured goods for competing on world
markets and for earning hard-currency.
• Advanced communications and data processing are necessary' for more efficient
planning and improved centralized control. "Glasnost" is providing the avenue
for advanced communications to be "safely" introduced into the USSR.
• Increased consumer goods and worker benefits will raise the standard of living,
and will increase incentives to work productively. A higher standard of living
\^ill increase the CPSU's stature as the "correct" political model. The USSR
will become more attractive both globally and domestically.
• Once established economically, the USSR ^^-ill become attractive to workers
worldwide. Socialist ideology will spread, and nations will become "ready" for
Soviet assistance in moving forward from capitahsm toward communism.
This last point is in the distant future, but the current Soviet reforms provide more
hope for that eventuality than the present existence offered to most Soviet citizens.
Although Japan's position in the preceding train of thought is not vital to the
Kremlin's plan, Japanese experience and products could hasten the process as described
above. Consequently, the Soviets would like to have ready access to Japanese products
and processes which would give them an advantage.
Success of the Soviet centrally-planned system is based on the ability of those in
control to adequately foresee the needs of the system's parts, to ensure timely provision
of sufficient inputs to each sector, and to distribute satisfactory- output to the nation.
Although the USSR does not have an inherent dearth of ideas for improvement, the
existent mechanisms for implementation of ideas are generally unproductive.
Translation of concepts into functional designs and products is slow. Once developed,
diffusion and acceptance of new products and methods throughout the nation is
difficult.
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Japanese expertise in computers and data processing offer relief for the
administrators of central planning. The ability of electronics to store, compile, fie,
edit, compute, and transmit information is critical to success in the Soviet system. But
resistance to change is strong at all levels of Soviet society. Giving up the inefficient,
but familiar, vertical "pre-reform" system for expanded horizontal relationships will be
difficult.
In addition to the centrally-planned system's inherent resistance to change.
Western analysts must also be mindful of the information control problem as a
hindrance to the Soviet utilization of high technology. The combination of the
historical technology diffusion problem (across the system), the traditional avoidance
of risk (within the system), and the perpetual fear of loss of control (from the top)
dictates that modernization will be slow in becoming effective. The measure of the
Politburo's success will be how skillfully it is able to balance decreased external
pressure (through detente and arms control/peace initiatives), internal pressures
(demographics, bureaucratic resistance to change in the system), and progressive
reforms (incentives, "glasnost", high-tech information systems, increased efficiency)
without losing Party control and without compromising its ideological legitimacy.
Soviet aggressiveness in obtaining the equipment and processes which are deemed
important is evidenced by its covert acquisitions. Western countries get upset when
their technological advantage is compromised by Soviet theft and illegitimate
purchases. These covert operations underscore the importance of modernization and
scientific advancement to the Kremlin.
The USSR values high esteem in world opinion and would rather avoid
accusations of technology theft. But it values self-preservation moreso. While
condemning the West for selfishness in not sharing its technological advantage, the
Soviets have capitalized on the weaknesses of individuals in capitalist societies to
acquire the fruits of the competitive, capitalist system. This "low-road" avenue of
covert activity continues regardless of the nature of activity occurring on the official
"high-road".
The political "high-road" fluctuates between detente and aggression, following the
path perceived as most advantageous by the Kremlin at the moment. In most of 1986
and 1987 the world has seen the smiling face of General Secretary Gorbachev. The
USSR has put the onus for world peace on the United States. Gorbachev's peace
initiatives, shifting world opinion toward the peaceful nature of the USSR, are forcing
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the United States to consider policy options which are reactive. The Soviet Union will
not propose or agree to any option which decreases its advantage, yet the position of
initiative has given the USSR credibility as a sincere, status quo power.
Secretar\' Gorbachev and other Soviet leaders have clearly stated their political
desire for peace and an expanded relationship (read "trade") with Japan. However,
hopeful prospects for really new developments have subsided in the face of power
politics. Exchanges of Foreign Ministers, and Nakasone's hopes for a Tokyo visit by
Gorbachev, gave way to more fundamental realities. The Kremlin's friendliness toward
Japan subsided when Nakasone did not display sufficient acquiescence to Soviet
desires. Nakasone's participation in "Northern Territories Day" activities in Japan
evidenced a Japanese hard-line approach which the Politburo did not appreciate.
Verified Japanese participation in the United States' SDI research program, continued
suppon of a U.S. presence in Japan, and the inevitable expansion of Japanese defense
expenditures above 1% of GNP, have caused the USSR to become cold in its political
attitude toward Japan. Meanwhile, as evidence of mutual economic compatibility and
desire, separate Soviet-Japanese economic relations have continued.
Politically, the Japanese have declared the Northern Territories to be the critical
factor in a Soviet-Japanese peace treaty. For the Soviets, the islands are critical for its
Far East military strategy. Unless their bastion concept changes, the USSR will not
give up the Northern Territories. They might consider a "trade" of the southern
islands, Shikotan and the Habomais, for significant economic gains.
The other military issue, the SS-20s, is not as visible as the Northern Territories,
but is equally as important. The SS-20s are a nuclear threat to Japan's survival—
a
sensitive issue. This military issue is tied to politics by Japan's Mutual Security Treaty
with the United States. The USSR has threatened Japan with destruction because the
U.S. uses its territory for mihtary forces. The Kremlin further has tried to drive a
wedge between Japan and the U.S. by offering to withdraw the SS-20s east of the Urals
(east of 80 degrees east longitude). Although the missiles still have the capabihty of
reaching Western Europe, the implication of the proposal is that Japan has been
subordinated to Western Europe in relative importance to the United States.
One of the USSR's most serious problems in economic modernization is
domestically applying the fruits of the Kremlin's international manipulations. When
Soviet attempts to acquire improved equipment, technology, and managerial techniques
are successful, they must still be applied within the Soviet system. The psycho-social
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impediments to Russian modernization are characterized as conspiratorial, xenophobic,
autarkic, and risk avoiding. The Russian conspiratorial nature, thriving on secrecy, is a
deep-rooted hindrance to cooperation and predictability. Xenophobia and autarkic
mentality cause resistance to foreign ideas and methods. Most importantly, the
survival syndrome inhibits change from domestically proven methods-the existent
system has provided the peoples' basic needs and has transformed the USSR into the
undisputed position as one of the world's two great superpowers. The feeling is that
the "old way" may be slow, but it has worked...why risk the present security on a
gamble with new approaches to the economy?
B. JAPAN
Although Japan needs natural resources for both energy and raw materials, it will
not allow its economy to become vulnerable to the USSR for those imports. The
Japanese government will continue to keep its Soviet resource dependence at a low
level. If the Soviet Union opens its internal markets to Japanese businessmen, the
likelihood of Japanese participation in joint ventures will be greater than if the USSR
maintains its focus on export-orientation. Japan will continue to massage its
relationship with the U.S. as a protection against further Soviet threats and military
buildup in the region.
Japanese businessmen will buy into as much profitable Soviet trade as they can.
Limitations will be set by the Japanese government's perception of the amount of
economic vulnerability created by trade, as well as by security issues. At this point, it
is unlikely that Japan would consider trading its partnership with the United States for
one with the Soviet Union. The U.S. is emotional, but not threatening. The USSR is
smiling, but the facade may not last.
Economically, Japan can get along without expanded trade to the USSR. Japan
is doing very well at expanding its markets globally without purposely taking on the
problems inherent in trade with the Soviet Union. However, the USSR does offer a
potential market. Japanese speculators hope that the new Soviet reforms are the
harbinger of real change and lucrative markets. Some Japanese businessmen are eager
to take the investment risk in hopes of high returns.
Promotion of business is key to increased Japanese-Soviet trade, so arguments in
favor of technology transfer are strongly supported, especially in non-military
applications. Although Japan will officially continue to support CoCom, the existence
of international capitalist competition drives Japanese businessmen to insist on having
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equal opportunity for a share of Soviet trade. Man's self-serving nature, set in a
capitalist environment, suggests the likelihood that illegal technology transfers will also
continue. The official actions taken in response to apprehension of offenders
illuminates the political perspective of the government toward the restrictions.
Politically, Japan is closely tied to the United States. The major intervening
variable in the prospects of increased Soviet-Japanese trade, the Northern Territories,
remains unresolved largely due to Japan's alliance with the United States. Although
the issue is primarily strategic for the USSR, and psychological for the Japanese, the
U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty makes the problem political, as well. Soviet hopes
to separate the U.S. from Japan are hampered by U.S. military support of Japan.
Nakasone's participation in rallies which continue/promote the Northern Territories
issue indicates official political animosity toward th? USSR, hindering growth in
economic trade.
On the other hand, Japan consistently declares its desire for peace with the
USSR, indicating a willingness to improve political relations. Separation of economic
from political issues provides an avenue for Japanese economic expansion and
incentive for Japanese political relaxation of bilateral tensions.
Japan's decision to increase its own defense expenditures above 1% of its GNP
provided a propaganda issue for the USSR. By adding weight to Soviet denunciations
by its "remilitarization", Japan helps the USSR to tip the balance of world opinion in
the Soviets' favor. The militant perception of Japan has been further promoted by
Nakasone's. characterization of Japan as an "unsinkable aircraft carrier" for the United
States, and by the American-Japanese secret agreement which allows "introduction" of
U.S. nuclear weapons into Japan. Soviet-Japanese economic cooperation helps to
rebalance the scales for peace by increasing mutual stakes in a friendly bilateral
relationship.
Japanese popular opinion is becoming increasingly nationalistic. The U.S. is
becoming more unpopular in Japan because of trade frictions and American political
ambiguity-. But the Soviet Union remains unpopular in Japan primarily due to the
ongoing Northern Territories issue. Soviet attempts to show "good will" by allowing
the reinstitution of graves visitation on the islands was only partially successful-to
some degree the gesture highlighted the Soviets' unrightful occupation. A Soviet-
Japanese peace treaty, contingent on the Northern Territories question, would remove
official obstacles for expansion of economic relations.
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As for the incorporation of Japanese managerial techniques into the Soviet
economy, the most serious hindrance is psycho-social. Japanese successes in
productivity, efficiency, and quality control are culturally founded. The evidence of
Japanese success may appear more promising than the practical adaptability of the
techniques into a culturally divergent context. Both Russian and Japanese societies are
high context, but the respective cultural attitudes toward the worker-employer
relationship vary widely.
C. UNITED STATES
The United States' position in the Soviet-Japanese relationship is not an easy
one. Its pluralistic society, freedom (and sensationalism) of the press, and historically
undemanding international relations combine to make foreign policy a difficult issue.
Japan and the USSR are at the extremes of U.S. bilateral relations. The USSR is its
main opponent. Japan has been a consistent supporter of U.S. decisions and its
strongest economic ally. Balancing its relations with these two poles requires careful
consideration of the inter-relationship of the various aspects of the Japanese-Soviet
trade and technology transfer question.
Economically, the U.S. and Japan are undergoing stressful bilateral relations.
Trade frictions, caused by capitalist competitiveness, have grown to proportions
affecting the interpersonal attitudes of Japanese and Americans. The Japanese quest
for continued economic expansion has caused a discrepancy in Japan's application of
international free trade concepts.
Generally speaking, Japan has severely restricted imports while demanding
deregulation against its exports. The U.S., meanwhile, has blamed a great deal of its
own inefficiency and low productivity on Japanese trading practices. A possible
extended consequence of these deteriorating trading relations between Japan and the
Western free markets would be the inclination of Japan to turn toward an alternative
market-such as the Soviet Union. However, at the "Big Seven" economic conference
in Vieima in June 1987, the expected Japan-bashing did not occur. Non-iteration of
previous threats toward Japan is a signal that a unity of purpose, or at least a common
front, still exists among the leading industrialized nations, despite speculation to the
contrary.
The CoCom countries continue to enforce restrictions of militarily significant
technologies. The United States, absorbing most of the cost of maintaining the
military technology gap, spearheads the efforts to restrict technology transfer to the
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USSR. OfTicially, Japan has been an adamant supporter of the United States in this
realm despite the monetary opportunities offered by the USSR's desires for technology
acquisition. Illegal transfers of restricted technologies (e.g. submarine propeller milling
machines) and authorized transfers of dual-use technologies (e.g. ball-bearing precision
grinding machines) will continue to cause stress within the U.S.-USSR-Japan economic
triangle as long as the opportunity to make a profit over-rides security considerations.
But Japan v/ill not give up its friendship with the United States or its other
Western democratic friends for a few rubles from the USSR. Although individual
Japanese may be overcome by monetary- aspirations, the Japanese government
understands the importance of long-term relationships to continuation of its way of
life. Japan is tied to the United States by its political system, and has experienced,
first-hand, the beneficence of Americans. The contrasting experience of other countries
defeated in WW II, i.e. those who were managed by the USSR, is a vivid reminder of
the advantages of the American alliance over the Soviet bloc.
As part of the United States "protectorate", Japan has been self-restrained in its
militar>- power, but has consistently made concessions to demonstrate its dedication to
the alliance. Japanese agreement to participation in SDI research undoubtedly had
lucrative economic implications, but was also confirmed in the face of Soviet threats
and intimidation attempts.
The availability of Japanese facilities for use by U.S. naval and air forces is a
great contribution to the American ability to project the alliances's power globally. As
an element of strategic nuclear deterrence, Japanese agreement not to ask questions
about nuclear capable U.S. naval craft simplifies implementation of the American
alliance defense strategy-.
Japan agreed to accept protection responsiblity for SLOCs and to increase its
domestic defense expenditures. However, these actions, combined with Japanese
willing cooperation on the nuclear issue, made the tentative American acceptance of
the "zero-zero" option a disturbing surprise for Japan. The option seemingly allows
the SS-20s to more directly threaten Japan than Western Europe. The psychological
impact of potentially "decoupling" Japan from the rest of the Western alliance,
following Japanese concessions to American mutual security requests, was magnified
by the trade friction rhetoric being flung about in both Japan and the United States.
The emotional character of Americans is temporarily driving U.S. Congressmen to
over-react to trade frictions.
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However, even the growing nationalism in Japan is not likely to overcome the
rational importance of its alliance with the United States, but cooperation is being
tested. The United States and Japan will suffer some growing pains in the near future,
but rational understanding of mutual U.S.-Japan reliance in strategic and economic
affairs will resolve the current political and economic strains. United States businesses,
realizing that their non-competitiveness is not wholly Japan's fault, will make necessary
progressive changes. Japan will comply with demands to loosen its trade restrictions
with other Western nations and stimulate its economy to promote foreign imports.
Japan will continue to provide facilities as its part in mutual security with the
United States, and will expand its financial support to relieve some of the fiscal
superpower security strain on the U.S. budget. Although Japan can be expected to
expand trade with the USSR, that trade will not be conducted at the expense of its
long-term relationship with the United States.
D. USSR-JAPAN
Both the USSR and Japan are predominantly controlled by the socio-
psychological considerations within their respective high-context societies. The
Japanese hierarchical structure, combined with its bottom-up consensus-building
nature, has created an aggressive, efficient, productive economy. Soviet community
survival instincts, combined with the elite's obsession for centralized control, has
created a slow-changing, unpredictable, sluggish economy.
Japan has put great emphasis on economic expansion, although less than on
nationalistic and cultural considerations. It decisively resists major concessions to its
position of economic advantage. Japanese international political concerns initially
appear prevalent among its features, but they are in reality subordinate to economic
and security issues. Japan's economic strength is now its source of international pride.
Its military weakness requires political concentration to retain the protection of the
United States and to deter Soviet aggression.
The USSR emphasizes its military strength above all. Security is the number one
consideration, driving Soviet economic and political decisions. Presently, the USSR's
pride and world "prestige" are based on its military capabilities. The second priority is
the economy. A solid economy is necessary for maintaining its military prowess.
Moreover, a flourishing economy would lead to a globally attractive Soviet socialism.
International politics are a necessity for the USSR-a means to achieve its objectives
despite its xenophobic, conspiratorial, and uninviting culture.
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Japan has demonstrated mastery of the business concepts that the USSR needs.
Efficiency and produciivity are fundamental to Soviet economic reforms. No other
nation can offer the expertise and record of sustained success earned by Japanese
businessmen.
In addition to its managerial experience, Japan is in the forefront of research in
automation, biotechnology, artificial intelligence, and micro-chip advancement. Japan
has demonstrated proficiency in quaUty control and its products are generally regarded
as the epitome of reliability and reasonable pricing. These factors have made Japan
the standard for competition in world markets.
As a result, the Soviet Union is most desirous of gaining a woridng economic
relationship with Japan. While denouncing Japan's involvement with the United States
and its allies, the USSR has clearly indicated the desire to expand trade and technology
transfer with Japan.
Japan can be expected to work toward a stable relationship with the USSR, and
in so doing, will trade its high-technology expertise as much as possible-consistent
with Japanese national security and mutual security with its allies. The limiters to
Japanese-Soviet trade will be determined, to a great degree, by the USSR's openness to
mutually beneficial trade. As long as the USSR insists on receiving an inordinate share
of the benefits of joint ventures, Japanese businessmen will be discouraged from
massive investment.
Japan will basically allow its private businesses to conduct as much trade as they
desire with the USSR, within the minimal restrictions required by security
considerations and extra-national agreements such as CoCom. Unofficial (i.e. "non-
political") control will be further exercised by availabiUty of credit and guarantees
through the Export-Import Bank of Japan.
The USSR will insist on terms highly favorable to its own interests. If the deal is
good, business will be conducted. If a clear advantage to the USSR does not exist, the
Soviets will revert to slow, autarkic development. The Kremlin will balance its desire
for rapid economic growth (stimulated by imports for modernization) with its fear of
being perceived as easily manipulated. Russian national pride will not allow the
Soviets to settle for less than a clear advantage in an economic deal, but the need for
rapid evidence of success in the reforms suggests that some flexibility will be evident.
The overall bottom line is that the Kremlin does want to give vitality to its
economy and to increase the nation's standard of living. The USSR sees Japan as the
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economic leader in most of the key areas where it wants to grow, and will seek
Japanese cooperation. Because they are neighbors, Japan is not likely to make a
diplomatic peace without security-related concessions from the USSR. Especially
important to resolution of Soviet-Japanese animosity is a Soviet political concession on
the Northern Territories issue. Beyond governmental security and political issues, the
pressure from Japan's business sector will push the nation toward greater economic ties
with the Soviet Union. Increased trade and technology transfer between Japan and the
USSR are to be expected, but the increase will be slow.
• The USSR can only diffuse and integrate Japan's economic contributions
slowly. Equipment and production modernization requires both time and
money. Changing cultural attitudes of workers and bureaucrats will take time,
regardless of the logic of the new concepts or the rewards they portend. The
Kremlin will control the pace of development to ensure that the USSR retains
its fundamentally autarkic economic invulnerability.
• Japanese businessmen will be restrained by the relatively low returns of Soviet
business terms and by the unpredictability and opaque facade of the Soviet
Union. Japan's government will enforce restrictions on state-of-the-art and
militarily significant technologies and products. Japan will officially allow low-
level beneficial trade with the USSR. It will not consider any large-scale or
bilateral agreements until the Soviet threat to its security is diminished, and
until a Soviet-Japanese peace treaty is signed-contingent on settlement of the
Northern Territories issue.
Current trends suggest that economic exchange will grow, due to complementary
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